[Marinir] Fw: [hankam] A NEW WAY TO WAGE PEACE: US SUPPORT TO OPERATION STABILISE

Wed, 5 Feb 2003 08:25:01 +0700

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----- Original Message -----=20
From: grupv <xjasax@mail.com>=20
To: hankam@yahoogroups.com=20
Sent: Wednesday, February 05, 2003 4:46 AM
Subject: [hankam] A NEW WAY TO WAGE PEACE: US SUPPORT TO OPERATION =
STABILISE

Military Review
Jan/Feb2001, Vol. 81, Issue 1

By Craig A. Collier, Major, US Army

East Timor represents the past, present and future of US Army=20
operations. Worldwide deployments were a hallmark of 20th-century=20
operations, and peacekeeping missions have dominated the past decade.=20
In the coming years, support to coalitions may become the new=20
paradigm as the US military leaves leadership roles to other=20
countries. Collier reports on the Army's deployment in a surprising=20
direction and its participation in successful multinational=20
operations.=20

AS THE UNITED STATES GROWS increasingly weary of taking the lead in=20
peace operations, it may prefer providing discrete support to ally-
led coalitions. For a small, succinct and inconspicuous mission,=20
successful US support to the Australian-led Operation Stabilise could=20
have a greater influence than its obscurity would otherwise indicate.=20

The island of Timor lies near the eastern end of the Malay=20
Archipelago, roughly 350 miles north of Darwin, Australia. East Timor=20
was a Portuguese colony for more than 400 years until the Portuguese=20
dismantled their empire and abruptly left in mid-1975. Indonesia=20
filled the vacuum, invading East Timor on 7 December 1975. Since=20
then, the often-bloody and internationally ignored campaign has=20
continued between independence-seeking guerrillas and the Indonesian=20
military (TNI). In the 1990s international awareness began to grow as=20
details of the conflict's more horrific atrocities reached Western=20
news organizations. Indonesia faced mounting international criticism=20
and threats of economic sanctions for its uneven stewardship of East=20
Timor.(n1)=20

The conflict boiled over on 30 August 1999 after the results of a=20
United Nations (UN)-sponsored referendum became public. The people of=20
East Timor voted overwhelmingly to reject Indonesian rule in favor of=20
independence. Supported by elements of the Indonesian army, local=20
militia groups immediately began a rampage throughout East Timor.=20
Unable to control the situation and with international pressure=20
mounting, the Indonesian government reluctantly agreed to allow a UN-
authorized force to enter East Timor.=20

On 15 September 1999 the UN authorized the creation of International=20
Force-East Timor (INTERFET). Requesting support from other nations,=20
Australia volunteered to take the lead and provide the bulk of the=20
troops. INTERFET's mandate from UN Security Council Resolution 1264=20
was to restore peace and security in East Timor; protect and support=20
the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), the organization tasked with=20
administering the referendum; and within force capabilities, provide=20
humanitarian assistance.(n2)=20

When the first Australian and coalition units arrived on 20=20
September, much of East Timor lay in smoldering ruins. News reports=20
showed block after block of burned-out buildings in the capital,=20
Dili. Most of the terrified populace had either retreated into the=20
hills or been rounded up and sent across the border either into=20
Indonesian-controlled West Timor or neighboring islands. The press=20
frequently reported that as many as 300,000 people had fled East=20
Timor--out of a population of 850,000--and that most of those who=20
remained were in the hills starving, too scared of the militia to=20
return to the cities. Rumors abounded of Balkan-style atrocities. As=20
many as 30,000 were reported killed in the three-week rampage.(n3)=20

FORMING US FORCES INTERFET=20
On the same day that the UN authorized INTERFET, US President William=20
J. Clinton established US Forces INTERFET (USFI). Clinton said=20
that "a few hundred [personnel], in a clearly supportive capacity=20
would deploy."(n4) The United States would provide logistics,=20
intelligence, communications, civil affairs, and operations and=20
planning augmentees for the INTERFET staff.(n5)=20

Commander in Chief, US Forces Pacific, Admiral Dennis Blair directed=20
the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to establish a headquarters=20
for USFI in Darwin.(n6) Blair designated US Marine Brigadier General=20
John G. Castellaw as commander, US Forces INTERFET. Most of=20
Castellaw's key staff members came with him from the III MEF, but all=20
services provided individual augmentation.=20

The 613th Air Expeditionary Group, Pacific Air Forces, provided three=20
C-130s. The US Navy initially supplied heavy-lift support, using=20
helicopters from the amphibious ships USS Belleau Wood and USS=20
Peleliu. The Army provided most of the intelligence and=20
communications assets and all of the civil affairs support. All of=20
the services provided individual planning expertise to INTERFET, most=20
notably on the C2, C5, C6, Air Coordination Command and Naval=20
Coordination Command staffs. More than 6,000 US forces personnel=20
eventually participated in Operation Stabilise, with the majority=20
assigned to the two Marine expeditionary units/amphibious readiness=20
groups that supported the mission. More than 230 US soldiers deployed=20
to support Operation Stabilise, so at any time, about 70 percent of=20
the ground forces in East Timor were Army.(n7)=20

FROM AUSTRALIA TO EAST TIMOR=20
On 1 October, after establishing the headquarters and while gathering=20
the support forces in Darwin, USFI began to send INTERFET planning=20
staff augmentees and other mission-essential personnel into East=20
Timor. The primary concern throughout the operation was force=20
protection. Dili remained tense despite the arrival of INTERFET=20
forces because of continued TNI presence, hidden militia members and=20
skirmishes with Australians near the border. No one was really sure=20
how the militia or the Indonesian army would respond to INTERFET. One=20
militia leader boasted, "We East Timorese are thirsty for the blood=20
of white people."(n8)=20

Castellaw designated Army Component Commander Colonel Randolph P.=20
Strong as Commander of US Forces-East Timor (USFET), subordinate to=20
USFI.(n9) Strong and his staff deployed to Dili in mid-October. Most=20
of the USFET staff came from Headquarters, US Army Pacific (USARPAC),=20
with some augmentation from the other services. The USFI staff=20
remained in Darwin.(n10) Remaining US forces deployed to East Timor=20
when force-protection conditions allowed.=20

Intelligence support.=20
USFI provided 46 personnel to INTERFET for intelligence support. Six=20
personnel operated Trojan Spirit II, which downlinked classified=20
information via satellite; eight others provided counterintelligence=20
support and expertise; the rest were integrated into the INTERFET C2=20
staff.=20

US intelligence support personnel began to redeploy in mid-November,=20
much earlier than originally planned. With the situation calming,=20
INTERFET could assume US intelligence responsibilities. After=20
demonstrating its reliability, the Australian Joint Intelligence=20
Support System (JISS) replaced Trojan Spirit II in late November. The=20
remainder of the intelligence support team redeployed after training=20
their INTERFET counterparts.=20

Task Force Thunderbird.=20
The 11th Signal Brigade, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, provided long-haul=20
voice- and data-communication support to INTERFET. The brigade=20
studied the requirements and tailored a communications support=20
package based on INTERFET needs.=20

Task Force (TF) Thunderbird was the largest US asset in East Timor=20
and by far the most expensive to bring into theater. It arrived at=20
Darwin Royal Australian Air Force Base in 12 C-5s and one C-17 in=20
early October.(n11) At the height of the operation, communicators had=20
57 pieces of rolling stock and 83 soldiers deployed at six locations=20
throughout East Timor, with another 40 remaining in Darwin to provide=20
communications support to USFI headquarters. Most of TF Thunderbird's=20
equipment deployed to East Timor from Australia by sea. Like other=20
assets, TF Thunderbird's elements often waited to move to their final=20
locations while supported units made the necessary force-protection=20
preparations.=20

The East Timor communication infrastructure, largely destroyed during=20
the militia rampage, had to be rebuilt before TF Thunderbird could=20
redeploy. The Australian government contracted the rebuilding of the=20
communication system, with a planned completion date of 15 December=20
1999.=20

The civil-military operations center.=20
Twelve soldiers from B Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort=20
Bragg, North Carolina, were the first US Army personnel to arrive in=20
Darwin. Their mission was to establish a civil-military operations=20
center (CMOC) in East Timor and then train INTERFET forces. The CMOC=20
coordinated nongovernment, private voluntary and UN relief efforts=20
with military operations.(n12) Humanitarian-assistance organizations=20
benefited greatly by having access to military helicopters. The=20
CMOC's efforts helped INTERFET facilitate humanitarian assistance.=20

Most of the civil affairs soldiers waited in Darwin until force-
protection conditions became acceptable. Before deploying to Fort=20
Bragg, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion established the CMOC and=20
handed off control in early November to 10 US Army Reserve soldiers=20
from the 322d Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Shafter, Hawaii.=20

All civil affairs soldiers had the additional mission of working=20
themselves out of a job--that is, teaching and training foreign=20
soldiers assigned to the CMOC. From the beginning the goal was to=20
hand over civil-military operations to other INTERFET forces as soon=20
as they could operate the CMOC.=20

Heavy lift.=20
The only way to bring food and supplies into the difficult-to-reach=20
interior was by track or helicopter. INTERFET forces lacked vertical=20
lift, so some of the most important US lift assets were medium- and=20
heavy-lift helicopters. From early October through November the=20
Belleau Wood and Peleliu took turns providing CH-46 Sea Knight and CH-
53E Super Stallion helicopters.=20

Operation Kitchen Sink was a typical heavy-lift helicopter mission=20
that showed Army assets supporting INTERFET. At one CMOC daily=20
meeting, a representative from a relief organization requested=20
assistance to transport kitchen utensils and other supplies to Suai,=20
a small border town on the south coast. He had only one truck with=20
which to move 12,000 pounds of supplies across Timor's spine. He=20
estimated that getting the supplies to Suai would take at least two=20
months, provided the monsoons did not wash out the dirt roads across=20
the mountains. The 96th Civil Affairs Team at the CMOC referred him=20
to the US Marine liaison officer from Dili, who coordinated with the=20
Peleliu using communication equipment installed by TF Thunderbird. A=20
few days later, two CH-53s moved the 12,000 pounds of supplies to=20
Suai in one afternoon.=20

Replacing the Peleliu with another amphibious ship was simply too=20
costly, so the US Pacific Command decided to contract the services,=20
then tasked the US Navy to provide funding for heavy-lift=20
helicopters.=20

Ironically, the Navy turned to the Army to administer the $10-million=20
contract. A contract representative from Army Materiel Command's=20
newly formed Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Support Unit=20
arrived in East Timor in mid-November to begin coordinating with=20
INTERFET. The prime contractor, DynCorp, agreed to provide two=20
Russian MI-26 Halo helicopters and two MI-8 Hip medium-lift=20
helicopters. A new section of runway apron was built at Dili's Komoro=20
Airport to accommodate the huge MI-26s. The MI-8s arrived first, with=20
the MI-26s on station by mid-December. All four aircraft supported=20
INTERFET missions from December 1999 through the end of February 2000.
(n13)=20

Force protection.=20
In any deployment, balancing force-protection requirements with=20
mission needs is unavoidable and sometimes contradictory. Operating=20
in a supporting role as part of a coalition further complicates the=20
issues. Other armies may not share US force-protection concerns. The=20
contingents supporting Operation Stabilise were no exception.(n14)=20

Protecting US forces meant ensuring that USFI had rock-solid measures=20
in place, but establishing the appropriate level of force protection=20
at ransacked and vandalized compounds took time.(n15) Until USFI had=20
proper security, INTERFET staff augmentees worked in Dili but slept=20
aboard US Navy ships anchored in Dili Harbor. By mid-October the main=20
US compounds had adequate force protection in place, allowing US=20
assets to stay permanently.(n16)=20

Every nation involved in Operation Stabilise had different standards=20
for force protection. Even within a nation's armed forces the=20
standards varied from service to service and unit to unit. US=20
measures for force protection were usually significantly more=20
stringent than others.(n17)=20

Before Americans could work at these locations, a USFI team inspected=20
and certified them for force protection. The USFI team met with the=20
supported officer in charge, reviewed the entire defense plan and=20
explained what measures needed to be established. The team verified=20
that the necessary corrections were in place before US personnel=20
moved in. Castellaw decided which compounds met US force-protection=20
standards before US assets deployed to East Timor.=20

Most often the supported unit had some force-protection measures=20
already in place, but they were not considered adequate to protect US=20
forces. In most cases the supported unit welcomed the US perspective=20
and immediately improved security. However, several times supported=20
units believed their security was adequate and that US personnel were=20
being too rigorous. This disconnect required diplomacy, but foreign=20
contingents understood that failure to provide adequate force=20
protection would delay US support. In every case the host unit=20
complied with requirements, and US forces moved in.=20

Sometimes various forces simply agreed to disagree. For example,=20
after the monsoon's first rain season, backed-up sewers and drains=20
flooded the INTERFET-run outdoor dining facility. The USFET=20
preventive medicine noncommissioned officer recommended that US=20
personnel return to meals, ready to eat, until several measures=20
ensured that food preparation complied with US sanitary standards.=20
The decision saved US personnel from the gastrointestinal illnesses=20
that plagued other contingents.=20

The USFI established familiar force-protection procedures. For=20
example, any US citizen deploying to East Timor wore Ranger body=20
armor or a flak vest; USFI monitored the movement of all personnel;=20
and all vehicles carded communication equipment. Also, all US=20
military personnel brought extra malaria pills, carried mosquito=20
netting and wore permethrin-impregnated uniforms. Through these=20
efforts--and good fortune--only one US soldier contracted a vector-
borne disease. However, from 20 September 1999 to 1 April 2000,=20
INTERFET and UN forces suffered 191 cases of malaria and 324 cases of=20
dengue fever.(n18)=20

Unique, limited support.=20
USFI was at the end of a long line of communication, brought only=20
essential personnel, and supported missions planned largely by=20
Australia and other INTERFET contingents. US forces were clearly=20
members of the supporting cast--without a sector or area of=20
responsibility of their own. In this environment, establishing a good=20
working relationship with INTERFET was critical. Castellaw=20
established rapport by assigning US liaisons to key INTERFET staff=20
sections, which benefited both INTERFET and USFI. INTERFET received=20
expertise and a visible sign of US commitment, and liaisons kept USFI=20
informed of upcoming missions.=20

Because of limited assets, USFI often coordinated with INTERFET for=20
logistic requirements, particularly transportation. Visiting=20
dignitaries usually required additional transportation and security.=20
Since INTERFET also had limited assets, missions to support and=20
dignitaries to entertain, meeting those requirements was not easy.
(n19) Keeping a small footprint required innovation and flexibility=20
to do more with less. For example, the J2 and J6 performed the=20
additional duties of watch officer and public affairs officer.(n20)=20

"Mil-to-mil" engagement.=20
USARPAC conducts 35 joint and combined command post and field=20
training exercises annually as part of its Expanded Relations Program=20
(ERP). Most of them involve one or more members of the Association of=20
Southeast Asian Nations. In fact, at the same time Operation=20
Stabilise began, so did CROCODILE '99, a combined Australian-US=20
exercise. These exercises train US soldiers and strengthen the=20
relationship between the United States and its allies.(n21)=20

A useful byproduct of these exercises is the interaction among the=20
services. Within a three-year tour, soldiers often find themselves=20
working with the same sailors, airmen and Marines with whom they=20
worked in earlier exercises. In fact, many personnel involved in=20
Operation Stabilise had worked with familiar members from sister=20
services in one or more exercises. This experience reduced the time=20
needed to integrate staffs.=20

In addition, as part of the ERP, Australia and Singapore regularly=20
exchange officers with US units. Five Australian signal officers=20
involved in Operation Stabilise were alumni of this program.(n22) One=20
extraordinary example of the value of these exchanges involved TF=20
Thunderbird. Australian Army Major John Wilson, a former exchange=20
officer with the 11th Signal Brigade, served as a signal officer with=20
Australia's Land Component Headquarters during Operation Stabilise.=20
He was able to match Australian requirements precisely with US=20
capabilities. "I could tell you what we needed right down to the=20
bumper number on the vehicles," he claimed.(n23)=20

Redeployment strategy.=20
Before all US assets deployed to East Timor, Castellaw began devising=20
a redeployment strategy. Fortunately, even as early as October, the=20
situation in East Timor appeared to be improving. The Indonesian army=20
began to evacuate its forces, and when unrepentant militia stood and=20
fought, they lost to INTERFET ground forces in lopsided border=20
skirmishes. The timetable for completing the mission was actually=20
pushed forward. Based on INTERFET's goal to complete the peace=20
enforcement by 15 January 2000, Castellaw's goal for the redeployment=20
of US assets was 15 December 1999.(n24)=20

The ambitious time line forced USFI to define the end state quickly=20
and begin executing actions necessary to meet the target date. The=20
key step was determining when US support would no longer be required.=20
The supporting US role made it easier for USFI to plan and execute=20
its exit strategy.(n25) Castellaw based redeployment time lines on=20
successfully setting up commercial alternatives, training replacement=20
forces and knowing US support was no longer required.=20

Castellaw briefed INTERFET Commander Major General Peter Cosgrove on=20
the redeployment plan.(n26) Cosgrove supported the plan and ensured=20
Australian communication contractors stuck to their time line, which=20
was crucial to TF Thunderbird's redeploying on schedule. US forces=20
redeployed as the mission and available sea- and airlift allowed.=20

The last major US Army element to leave East Timor was TF=20
Thunderbird, which remained until most of the commercial=20
communication system was up and running. Except for three officers=20
left behind on the INTERFET staff, the last 50 soldiers, sailors,=20
airmen and Marines redeployed to Darwin on 17 December. The mission=20
was successful, with no embarrassing incidents or US casualties.=20

The US effort in East Timor validated the concept of focused US=20
support as a subordinate command in successful multinational peace=20
operations. Establishing a joint headquarters helped US forces=20
translate national commitment into the right troop-to-task support.=20
Although it is difficult to quantify the benefit of combined=20
exercises and officer exchanges, these opportunities smooth=20
operations with allies when crises arise. The ubiquitous US concern=20
with force protection can be reconciled within a coalition without=20
putting US forces at unnecessary risk. Finally, a supporting US role=20
helps establish exit criteria and the early redeployment of US=20
forces.=20

During Operation Stabilise, US participation was meager in comparison=20
to the 8,000 personnel sent by the other INTERFET forces, yet US=20
assets were significant force multipliers. US support--
communications, intelligence, civil affairs, heavy lift and planning=20
expertise--is typical of the unique and important assets that many US=20
allies lack and the kind that will most likely be requested in future=20
operations.=20

NOTES
(n1.) US Department of Defense, "East Timor," INTERFET Handbook=20
(October 1999), 36-37.=20

(n2.) UN Security Council Resolution 1264, para 3, available online=20
at <www.un.org/ peace/etimor/docs/9936481E.htm>.=20

(n3.) The reports of those killed by the militia were exaggerated.=20
Although the militia committed some gruesome atrocities, at the end=20
of November 1999, just under 700 bodies had been discovered. Reports=20
of thousands of starving Timorese also appear overblown.=20

(n4.) "Remarks made by US President William J. Clinton upon departure=20
from Auckland, New Zealand," available online at <www.fas.orglmad/dod-
101/ops/docs991990914-timor-wh1.htm>.=20

(n5.) US Forces INTERFET After Action Report (USFI AAR), Part=20
I, "Executive Overview" (11 February 2000), 1. Part II contains the=20
detailed individual lessons learned.=20

(n6.) ADM Dennis Blair decided not to stand up a joint task force=20
(JTF) because of the US supporting role. Instead of JTF East Timor,=20
the US effort became known as US Forces INTERFET (USFI). For a=20
discussion of how that decision affected the mission, see the USFI=20
AAR, Part I.=20

(n7.) Ibid.=20

(n8.) Ron Moreau and Jeffrey Bartholet, "Marching Into a Trap,"=20
Newsweek (22 September 1999), available online at=20
<www.newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/int/asia/ ovin0313_1.htm>.=20

(n9.) COL Randolph P. Strong, a signal officer with previous=20
contingency operations experience in Bosnia, is also Commander, 516th=20
Signal Brigade and Deputy Chief of Staff, Information Management=20
(DCSIM), USARPAC, Fort Shafter, Hawaii.=20

(n10.) Both BG John Castellaw and COL Strong arrived with a core of=20
Marines and soldiers who had worked together at their home stations.=20
On the ground, and as the mission's size and scope clarified, each=20
commander augmented his staff with subject matter experts. Strong's=20
J2, J3, J4 and J6 staff included US Army officers from USARPAC. The=20
J1, camp commandant, operations noncommissioned officer (NCO) and=20
Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) liaison officers were Marines; the=20
preventive medicine NCO was Navy; and the Catholic chaplain was Air=20
Force.=20

(n11.) Bill McPherson, "The East Timor Tapes: An Interview with=20
Colonel Randolph P. Strong, commander, US Forces East Timor (October-
December 1999)" Pacific Voice (Special Edition, Spring 2000), 15.=20

(n12.) US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-23, Peace Operations=20
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 1994), 40.=20

(n13.) James Folk and LTC Andy Smith, "A LOGCAP Success in East=20
Timor," Army Logistician, July-August 2000, available online at=20
<www.almc.army.mil/alog/julaug00/ms566.htm>. This issue contains a=20
special section devoted to East Timor, particularly contracted=20
support.=20

(n14.) To some, US insistence on adequate force protection before=20
moving in was, to paraphrase one INTERFET officer, "beneath the=20
wodd's only superpower." The US interest in force protection=20
substantially improved everyone's security but may have cost some=20
credibility by insisting on better force-protection conditions than=20
our coalition partners thought necessary.=20

(n15.) "DoD News Briefing" (12 September 1999), available online at=20
<www.fas.org/ man/dod-101/ops/docs99/t09141999_trfg-914.htm>.=20

(n16.) Most US forces lived and worked in the "cultural section"=20
downtown Dili. USFET headquarters was the former home of the labor=20
ministry, while TF Thunderbird shared the partially destroyed Dill=20
University compound with an Australian topographic unit.=20

(n17.) During the height of US support to Operation Stabilise, the=20
United States provided personnel in five towns in East Timor. Within=20
Dill, USFI supported INTERFET at six locations. Within the "Dill=20
Precinct"(a guarded and patrolled area of about five square blocks=20
located in the city center), US personnel worked and lived at six=20
compounds. US forces coordinated force-protection requirements with=20
Australian, New Zealand, Thai, Brazilian, Filipino and British=20
forces.=20

(n18.) "Malaria, Dengue Take Toll on Troops," The Age (Melbourne,=20
Australia) available online at=20
<www.theage.com.au/breaking/0004/03/A46759-2000 apr3.html>.=20

(n19.) During one memorable discussion while coordinating for two US=20
senators' visits, an exasperated Australian army major in the=20
INTERFET visitor's coordination cell asked me a series of questions=20
on the US legislative branch: "How many congressmen do you=20
have?" "How many senators?" I was mildly impressed that he took such=20
an interest until his last question: "And how many of them intend to=20
visit us?"=20

(n20.) USFET entertained many dignitaries, including six generals,=20
three ambassadors and several other officials, so public affairs=20
became a significant additional duty.=20

(n21.) "Expanded Relations Program," available online at=20
<www.usarpac.army.mil/ docs/expan.htm>.=20

(n22.) Robert K. Ackerman, "U.S. Forces Provide Deployable=20
Communications to East Timor," Signal, April 2000, 45.=20

(n23.) Dennis Steele, "End State," Army Magazine, available online at=20
<www.ausa.org/ armyzine/steele3feb00.html>.=20

(n24.) In October, MG Cosgrove told his staff that the target date=20
for changing the flag from INTERFET to the UN Transitional=20
Administration-East Timor (UNTAET); that is, when the mission could=20
change from peace enforcement to nation-building, was 15 January=20
2000.=20

(n25.) USFI AAR, Part I, 25.=20

(n26.) Mission Analysis/Redeployment Briefing given to Cosgrove in=20
Dili on 11 November 1999

Ksatrian: http://www.ksatrian.or.id

-=3D Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori =3D-=20

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service.=20

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<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial">----- Original Message -----=20
<DIV style=3D"BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; font-color: black">From: <A=20
title=3Dxjasax@mail.com href=3D"mailto:xjasax@mail.com>">grupv=20
&lt;xjasax@mail.com&gt;</A> </DIV>
<DIV>To: <A title=3Dhankam@yahoogroups.com=20
href=3D"mailto:hankam@yahoogroups.com">hankam@yahoogroups.com</A> </DIV>
<DIV>Sent: Wednesday, February 05, 2003 4:46 AM</DIV>
<DIV>Subject: [hankam] A NEW WAY TO WAGE PEACE: US SUPPORT TO =
OPERATION=20
STABILISE</DIV></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV><TT>Military Review Jan/Feb2001, Vol. 81, Issue =
1 By=20
Craig A. Collier, Major, US Army East Timor represents the past, =
present=20
and future of US Army operations. Worldwide deployments were a =
hallmark of=20
20th-century operations, and peacekeeping missions have dominated =
the past=20
decade. In the coming years, support to coalitions may become the =
new=20
 paradigm as the US military leaves leadership roles to other =
 countries.=20
Collier reports on the Army's deployment in a surprising direction =
and its=20
participation in successful multinational operations. AS THE =
UNITED=20
STATES GROWS increasingly weary of taking the lead in peace =
operations, it=20
may prefer providing discrete support to ally- led coalitions. For a =
small,=20
succinct and inconspicuous mission, successful US support to the=20
Australian-led Operation Stabilise could have a greater influence =
than its=20
obscurity would otherwise indicate. The island of Timor lies =
near the=20
eastern end of the Malay Archipelago, roughly 350 miles north of =
Darwin,=20
Australia. East Timor was a Portuguese colony for more than 400 =
years until=20
the Portuguese dismantled their empire and abruptly left in =
mid-1975.=20
Indonesia filled the vacuum, invading East Timor on 7 December 1975. =
Since=20
 then, the often-bloody and internationally ignored campaign has=20
 continued between independence-seeking guerrillas and the Indonesian =

military (TNI). In the 1990s international awareness began to grow =
as=20
 details of the conflict's more horrific atrocities reached Western =
 news=20
organizations. Indonesia faced mounting international criticism and =
threats=20
of economic sanctions for its uneven stewardship of East Timor.(n1)=20
 The conflict boiled over on 30 August 1999 after the results of =
a=20
 United Nations (UN)-sponsored referendum became public. The people =
of=20
 East Timor voted overwhelmingly to reject Indonesian rule in favor =
of=20
 independence. Supported by elements of the Indonesian army, local=20
 militia groups immediately began a rampage throughout East Timor. =
 Unable=20
to control the situation and with international pressure mounting, =
the=20
Indonesian government reluctantly agreed to allow a UN- authorized =
force to=20
enter East Timor. On 15 September 1999 the UN authorized the =
creation of=20
International Force-East Timor (INTERFET). Requesting support from =
other=20
nations, Australia volunteered to take the lead and provide the bulk =
of the=20
 troops. INTERFET's mandate from UN Security Council Resolution 1264 =
 was=20
to restore peace and security in East Timor; protect and support the =
UN=20
Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), the organization tasked with =
 administering=20
the referendum; and within force capabilities, provide humanitarian=20
assistance.(n2) When the first Australian and coalition units =
arrived on=20
20 September, much of East Timor lay in smoldering ruins. News =
reports=20
 showed block after block of burned-out buildings in the capital, =
 Dili.=20
Most of the terrified populace had either retreated into the hills =
or been=20
rounded up and sent across the border either into =
 Indonesian-controlled West=20
Timor or neighboring islands. The press frequently reported that as =
many as=20
300,000 people had fled East Timor--out of a population of =
850,000--and that=20
most of those who remained were in the hills starving, too scared of =
the=20
militia to return to the cities. Rumors abounded of Balkan-style =
atrocities.=20
As many as 30,000 were reported killed in the three-week =
rampage.(n3)=20
 FORMING US FORCES INTERFET On the same day that the UN =
authorized=20
INTERFET, US President William J. Clinton established US Forces =
INTERFET=20
(USFI). Clinton said that "a few hundred [personnel], in a clearly=20
supportive capacity would deploy."(n4) The United States would =
provide=20
logistics, intelligence, communications, civil affairs, and =
operations and=20
 planning augmentees for the INTERFET staff.(n5) Commander in =
Chief,=20
US Forces Pacific, Admiral Dennis Blair directed the III Marine=20
Expeditionary Force (MEF) to establish a headquarters for USFI in=20
Darwin.(n6) Blair designated US Marine Brigadier General John G. =
Castellaw=20
as commander, US Forces INTERFET. Most of Castellaw's key staff =
members came=20
with him from the III MEF, but all services provided individual=20
augmentation. The 613th Air Expeditionary Group, Pacific Air =
Forces,=20
provided three C-130s. The US Navy initially supplied heavy-lift =
support,=20
using helicopters from the amphibious ships USS Belleau Wood and USS =

Peleliu. The Army provided most of the intelligence and =
 communications=20
assets and all of the civil affairs support. All of the services =
provided=20
individual planning expertise to INTERFET, most notably on the C2, =
C5, C6,=20
Air Coordination Command and Naval Coordination Command staffs. More =
than=20
6,000 US forces personnel eventually participated in Operation =
Stabilise,=20
with the majority assigned to the two Marine expeditionary =
units/amphibious=20
readiness groups that supported the mission. More than 230 US =
soldiers=20
deployed to support Operation Stabilise, so at any time, about 70 =
percent of=20
 the ground forces in East Timor were Army.(n7) FROM =
AUSTRALIA TO=20
EAST TIMOR On 1 October, after establishing the headquarters and =
while=20
gathering the support forces in Darwin, USFI began to send INTERFET =
planning=20
 staff augmentees and other mission-essential personnel into East =
 Timor.=20
The primary concern throughout the operation was force protection. =
Dili=20
remained tense despite the arrival of INTERFET forces because of =
continued=20
TNI presence, hidden militia members and skirmishes with Australians =
near=20
the border. No one was really sure how the militia or the Indonesian =
army=20
would respond to INTERFET. One militia leader boasted, "We East =
Timorese are=20
thirsty for the blood of white people."(n8) Castellaw =
designated=20
Army Component Commander Colonel Randolph P. Strong as Commander of =
US=20
Forces-East Timor (USFET), subordinate to USFI.(n9) Strong and his =
staff=20
deployed to Dili in mid-October. Most of the USFET staff came from=20
Headquarters, US Army Pacific (USARPAC), with some augmentation from =
the=20
other services. The USFI staff remained in Darwin.(n10) Remaining US =
forces=20
deployed to East Timor when force-protection conditions allowed.=20
 Intelligence support. USFI provided 46 personnel to INTERFET =
for=20
intelligence support. Six personnel operated Trojan Spirit II, which =

downlinked classified information via satellite; eight others =
provided=20
counterintelligence support and expertise; the rest were integrated =
into the=20
INTERFET C2 staff. US intelligence support personnel began =
to=20
redeploy in mid-November, much earlier than originally planned. With =
the=20
situation calming, INTERFET could assume US intelligence =
responsibilities.=20
After demonstrating its reliability, the Australian Joint =
Intelligence=20
 Support System (JISS) replaced Trojan Spirit II in late November. =
The=20
 remainder of the intelligence support team redeployed after training =

their INTERFET counterparts. Task Force Thunderbird. The =
11th=20
Signal Brigade, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, provided long-haul voice- =
and=20
data-communication support to INTERFET. The brigade studied the =
requirements=20
and tailored a communications support package based on INTERFET =
needs.=20
 Task Force (TF) Thunderbird was the largest US asset in East =
Timor=20
 and by far the most expensive to bring into theater. It arrived at=20
 Darwin Royal Australian Air Force Base in 12 C-5s and one C-17 in =
 early=20
October.(n11) At the height of the operation, communicators had 57 =
pieces of=20
rolling stock and 83 soldiers deployed at six locations throughout =
East=20
Timor, with another 40 remaining in Darwin to provide communications =
support=20
to USFI headquarters. Most of TF Thunderbird's equipment deployed to =
East=20
Timor from Australia by sea. Like other assets, TF Thunderbird's =
elements=20
often waited to move to their final locations while supported units =
made the=20
necessary force-protection preparations. The East Timor=20
communication infrastructure, largely destroyed during the militia =
rampage,=20
had to be rebuilt before TF Thunderbird could redeploy. The =
Australian=20
government contracted the rebuilding of the communication system, =
with a=20
planned completion date of 15 December 1999. The =
civil-military=20
operations center. Twelve soldiers from B Company, 96th Civil =
Affairs=20
Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, were the first US Army =
personnel to=20
arrive in Darwin. Their mission was to establish a civil-military =
operations=20
 center (CMOC) in East Timor and then train INTERFET forces. The CMOC =

coordinated nongovernment, private voluntary and UN relief efforts =
 with=20
military operations.(n12) Humanitarian-assistance organizations =
 benefited=20
greatly by having access to military helicopters. The CMOC's efforts =
helped=20
INTERFET facilitate humanitarian assistance. Most of the civil =
affairs=20
soldiers waited in Darwin until force- protection conditions became=20
acceptable. Before deploying to Fort Bragg, the 96th Civil Affairs =
Battalion=20
established the CMOC and handed off control in early November to 10 =
US Army=20
Reserve soldiers from the 322d Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort =
Shafter,=20
Hawaii. All civil affairs soldiers had the additional mission of =
working=20
 themselves out of a job--that is, teaching and training foreign =
 soldiers=20
assigned to the CMOC. From the beginning the goal was to hand over=20
civil-military operations to other INTERFET forces as soon as they =
could=20
operate the CMOC. Heavy lift. The only way to bring food and =

supplies into the difficult-to-reach interior was by track or =
helicopter.=20
INTERFET forces lacked vertical lift, so some of the most important =
US lift=20
assets were medium- and heavy-lift helicopters. From early October =
through=20
November the Belleau Wood and Peleliu took turns providing CH-46 Sea =
Knight=20
and CH- 53E Super Stallion helicopters. Operation Kitchen =
Sink was a=20
typical heavy-lift helicopter mission that showed Army assets =
supporting=20
INTERFET. At one CMOC daily meeting, a representative from a relief=20
organization requested assistance to transport kitchen utensils and =
other=20
supplies to Suai, a small border town on the south coast. He had =
only one=20
truck with which to move 12,000 pounds of supplies across Timor's =
spine. He=20
 estimated that getting the supplies to Suai would take at least two=20
 months, provided the monsoons did not wash out the dirt roads across =
 the=20
mountains. The 96th Civil Affairs Team at the CMOC referred him to =
the US=20
Marine liaison officer from Dili, who coordinated with the Peleliu =
using=20
communication equipment installed by TF Thunderbird. A few days =
later, two=20
CH-53s moved the 12,000 pounds of supplies to Suai in one afternoon. =

Replacing the Peleliu with another amphibious ship was simply =
too=20
 costly, so the US Pacific Command decided to contract the services, =
 then=20
tasked the US Navy to provide funding for heavy-lift helicopters.=20
 Ironically, the Navy turned to the Army to administer the =
$10-million=20
 contract. A contract representative from Army Materiel Command's =
 newly=20
formed Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Support Unit arrived in =
East=20
Timor in mid-November to begin coordinating with INTERFET. The prime =

contractor, DynCorp, agreed to provide two Russian MI-26 Halo =
helicopters=20
and two MI-8 Hip medium-lift helicopters. A new section of runway =
apron was=20
built at Dili's Komoro Airport to accommodate the huge MI-26s. The =
MI-8s=20
arrived first, with the MI-26s on station by mid-December. All four =
aircraft=20
supported INTERFET missions from December 1999 through the end of =
February=20
2000. (n13) Force protection. In any deployment, =
balancing=20
force-protection requirements with mission needs is unavoidable and=20
sometimes contradictory. Operating in a supporting role as part of a =

coalition further complicates the issues. Other armies may not share =
US=20
force-protection concerns. The contingents supporting Operation =
Stabilise=20
were no exception.(n14) Protecting US forces meant ensuring that =
USFI=20
had rock-solid measures in place, but establishing the appropriate =
level of=20
force protection at ransacked and vandalized compounds took =
time.(n15) Until=20
USFI had proper security, INTERFET staff augmentees worked in Dili =
but slept=20
 aboard US Navy ships anchored in Dili Harbor. By mid-October the =
main US=20
compounds had adequate force protection in place, allowing US assets =
to stay=20
permanently.(n16) Every nation involved in Operation Stabilise =
had=20
different standards for force protection. Even within a nation's =
armed=20
forces the standards varied from service to service and unit to =
unit. US=20
 measures for force protection were usually significantly more =
 stringent=20
than others.(n17) Before Americans could work at these =
locations, a USFI=20
team inspected and certified them for force protection. The USFI =
team met=20
with the supported officer in charge, reviewed the entire defense =
plan and=20
 explained what measures needed to be established. The team verified =
 that=20
the necessary corrections were in place before US personnel moved =
in.=20
Castellaw decided which compounds met US force-protection standards =
before=20
US assets deployed to East Timor. Most often the supported unit =
had some=20
force-protection measures already in place, but they were not =
considered=20
adequate to protect US forces. In most cases the supported unit =
welcomed the=20
US perspective and immediately improved security. However, several =
times=20
supported units believed their security was adequate and that US =
personnel=20
were being too rigorous. This disconnect required diplomacy, but =
foreign=20
 contingents understood that failure to provide adequate force =
 protection=20
would delay US support. In every case the host unit complied with=20
requirements, and US forces moved in. Sometimes various forces =
simply=20
agreed to disagree. For example, after the monsoon's first rain =
season,=20
backed-up sewers and drains flooded the INTERFET-run outdoor dining=20
facility. The USFET preventive medicine noncommissioned officer =
recommended=20
that US personnel return to meals, ready to eat, until several =
measures=20
 ensured that food preparation complied with US sanitary standards. =
 The=20
decision saved US personnel from the gastrointestinal illnesses that =
plagued=20
other contingents. The USFI established familiar =
force-protection=20
procedures. For example, any US citizen deploying to East Timor wore =
Ranger=20
body armor or a flak vest; USFI monitored the movement of all =
personnel;=20
 and all vehicles carded communication equipment. Also, all US =
 military=20
personnel brought extra malaria pills, carried mosquito netting and =
wore=20
permethrin-impregnated uniforms. Through these efforts--and good=20
fortune--only one US soldier contracted a vector- borne disease. =
However,=20
from 20 September 1999 to 1 April 2000, INTERFET and UN forces =
suffered 191=20
cases of malaria and 324 cases of dengue fever.(n18) Unique, =
limited=20
support. USFI was at the end of a long line of communication, =
brought only=20
 essential personnel, and supported missions planned largely by =
 Australia=20
and other INTERFET contingents. US forces were clearly members of =
the=20
supporting cast--without a sector or area of responsibility of their =
own. In=20
this environment, establishing a good working relationship with =
INTERFET was=20
critical. Castellaw established rapport by assigning US liaisons to =
key=20
INTERFET staff sections, which benefited both INTERFET and USFI. =
INTERFET=20
received expertise and a visible sign of US commitment, and liaisons =
kept=20
USFI informed of upcoming missions. Because of limited =
assets, USFI=20
often coordinated with INTERFET for logistic requirements, =
particularly=20
transportation. Visiting dignitaries usually required additional=20
transportation and security. Since INTERFET also had limited assets, =

missions to support and <BR>dignitaries to entertain, meeting those =
requirements=20
was not easy.<BR>(n19) Keeping a small footprint required innovation and =

flexibility to do more with less. For example, the J2 and J6 =
performed the=20
 additional duties of watch officer and public affairs officer.(n20)=20
 "Mil-to-mil" engagement. USARPAC conducts 35 joint and =
combined=20
command post and field training exercises annually as part of its =
Expanded=20
Relations Program (ERP). Most of them involve one or more members of =
the=20
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In fact, at the same time =
Operation=20
 Stabilise began, so did CROCODILE '99, a combined Australian-US=20
 exercise. These exercises train US soldiers and strengthen the=20
 relationship between the United States and its allies.(n21) =
 A useful=20
byproduct of these exercises is the interaction among the services. =
Within a=20
three-year tour, soldiers often find themselves working with the =
same=20
sailors, airmen and Marines with whom they worked in earlier =
exercises. In=20
fact, many personnel involved in Operation Stabilise had worked with =

familiar members from sister services in one or more exercises. This =

experience reduced the time needed to integrate staffs. In =
addition,=20
as part of the ERP, Australia and Singapore regularly exchange =
officers with=20
US units. Five Australian signal officers involved in Operation =
Stabilise=20
were alumni of this program.(n22) One extraordinary example of the =
value of=20
these exchanges involved TF Thunderbird. Australian Army Major John =
Wilson,=20
a former exchange officer with the 11th Signal Brigade, served as a =
signal=20
officer with Australia's Land Component Headquarters during =
Operation=20
Stabilise. He was able to match Australian requirements precisely =
with US=20
 capabilities. "I could tell you what we needed right down to the =
 bumper=20
number on the vehicles," he claimed.(n23) Redeployment strategy. =

Before all US assets deployed to East Timor, Castellaw began =
devising a=20
redeployment strategy. Fortunately, even as early as October, the =
 situation=20
in East Timor appeared to be improving. The Indonesian army began to =

evacuate its forces, and when unrepentant militia stood and fought, =
they=20
lost to INTERFET ground forces in lopsided border skirmishes. The =
timetable=20
for completing the mission was actually pushed forward. Based on =
INTERFET's=20
goal to complete the peace enforcement by 15 January 2000, =
Castellaw's goal=20
for the redeployment of US assets was 15 December 1999.(n24) =
 The=20
ambitious time line forced USFI to define the end state quickly and =
begin=20
executing actions necessary to meet the target date. The key step =
was=20
determining when US support would no longer be required. The =
supporting US=20
role made it easier for USFI to plan and execute its exit =
strategy.(n25)=20
Castellaw based redeployment time lines on successfully setting up=20
commercial alternatives, training replacement forces and knowing US =
support=20
was no longer required. Castellaw briefed INTERFET Commander =
Major=20
General Peter Cosgrove on the redeployment plan.(n26) Cosgrove =
supported the=20
plan and ensured Australian communication contractors stuck to their =
time=20
line, which was crucial to TF Thunderbird's redeploying on schedule. =
US=20
forces redeployed as the mission and available sea- and airlift =
allowed.=20
 The last major US Army element to leave East Timor was TF=20
 Thunderbird, which remained until most of the commercial =
 communication=20
system was up and running. Except for three officers left behind on =
the=20
INTERFET staff, the last 50 soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines =
redeployed=20
to Darwin on 17 December. The mission was successful, with no =
embarrassing=20
incidents or US casualties. The US effort in East Timor =
validated the=20
concept of focused US support as a subordinate command in successful =

multinational peace operations. Establishing a joint headquarters =
helped US=20
forces translate national commitment into the right troop-to-task =
support.=20
 Although it is difficult to quantify the benefit of combined =
 exercises=20
and officer exchanges, these opportunities smooth operations with =
allies=20
when crises arise. The ubiquitous US concern with force protection =
can be=20
reconciled within a coalition without putting US forces at =
unnecessary risk.=20
Finally, a supporting US role helps establish exit criteria and the =
early=20
redeployment of US forces. During Operation Stabilise, US=20
participation was meager in comparison to the 8,000 personnel sent =
by the=20
other INTERFET forces, yet US assets were significant force =
multipliers. US=20
support-- communications, intelligence, civil affairs, heavy lift and =

planning expertise--is typical of the unique and important assets =
that many=20
US allies lack and the kind that will most likely be requested in =
future=20
 operations. NOTES (n1.) US Department of Defense, =
"East=20
Timor," INTERFET Handbook (October 1999), 36-37. (n2.) UN =
Security=20
Council Resolution 1264, para 3, available online at &lt;www.un.org/ =

peace/etimor/docs/9936481E.htm&gt;. (n3.) The reports of those =
killed by=20
the militia were exaggerated. Although the militia committed some =
gruesome=20
atrocities, at the end of November 1999, just under 700 bodies had =
been=20
discovered. Reports of thousands of starving Timorese also appear =
overblown.=20
 (n4.) "Remarks made by US President William J. Clinton upon =
departure=20
 from Auckland, New Zealand," available online at=20
&lt;www.fas.orglmad/dod- 101/ops/docs991990914-timor-wh1.htm&gt;.=20
 (n5.) US Forces INTERFET After Action Report (USFI AAR), Part =
 I,=20
"Executive Overview" (11 February 2000), 1. Part II contains the =
 detailed=20
individual lessons learned. (n6.) ADM Dennis Blair decided not =
to stand=20
up a joint task force (JTF) because of the US supporting role. =
Instead of=20
JTF East Timor, the US effort became known as US Forces INTERFET =
(USFI). For=20
a discussion of how that decision affected the mission, see the USFI =

AAR, Part I. (n7.) Ibid. (n8.) Ron Moreau and =
Jeffrey=20
Bartholet, "Marching Into a Trap," Newsweek (22 September 1999), =
available=20
online at &lt;www.newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/int/asia/ =
ovin0313_1.htm&gt;.=20
 (n9.) COL Randolph P. Strong, a signal officer with previous=20
 contingency operations experience in Bosnia, is also Commander, =
516th=20
 Signal Brigade and Deputy Chief of Staff, Information Management=20
 (DCSIM), USARPAC, Fort Shafter, Hawaii. (n10.) Both BG John=20
Castellaw and COL Strong arrived with a core of Marines and soldiers =
who had=20
worked together at their home stations. On the ground, and as the =
mission's=20
size and scope clarified, each commander augmented his staff with =
subject=20
matter experts. Strong's J2, J3, J4 and J6 staff included US Army =
officers=20
from USARPAC. The J1, camp commandant, operations noncommissioned =
officer=20
(NCO) and Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) liaison officers were =
Marines; the=20
 preventive medicine NCO was Navy; and the Catholic chaplain was Air=20
 Force. (n11.) Bill McPherson, "The East Timor Tapes: An =
Interview=20
with Colonel Randolph P. Strong, commander, US Forces East Timor=20
(October- December 1999)" Pacific Voice (Special Edition, Spring =
2000), 15.=20
 (n12.) US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-23, Peace Operations=20
 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 1994), 40.=20
 (n13.) James Folk and LTC Andy Smith, "A LOGCAP Success in East=20
 Timor," Army Logistician, July-August 2000, available online at=20
 &lt;www.almc.army.mil/alog/julaug00/ms566.htm&gt;. This issue =
contains a=20
 special section devoted to East Timor, particularly contracted =
 support.=20
 (n14.) To some, US insistence on adequate force protection =
before=20
 moving in was, to paraphrase one INTERFET officer, "beneath the =
 wodd's=20
only superpower." The US interest in force protection substantially =
improved=20
everyone's security but may have cost some credibility by insisting =
on=20
better force-protection conditions than our coalition partners =
thought=20
necessary. (n15.) "DoD News Briefing" (12 September 1999), =
available=20
online at &lt;www.fas.org/=20
man/dod-101/ops/docs99/t09141999_trfg-914.htm&gt;. (n16.) Most =
US forces=20
lived and worked in the "cultural section" downtown Dili. USFET =
headquarters=20
was the former home of the labor ministry, while TF Thunderbird =
shared the=20
partially destroyed Dill University compound with an Australian =
topographic=20
unit. (n17.) During the height of US support to Operation =
Stabilise, the=20
 United States provided personnel in five towns in East Timor. Within =

Dill, USFI supported INTERFET at six locations. Within the "Dill=20
 Precinct"(a guarded and patrolled area of about five square blocks=20
 located in the city center), US personnel worked and lived at six=20
 compounds. US forces coordinated force-protection requirements with=20
 Australian, New Zealand, Thai, Brazilian, Filipino and British =
 forces.=20
 (n18.) "Malaria, Dengue Take Toll on Troops," The Age =
(Melbourne,=20
 Australia) available online at=20
 &lt;www.theage.com.au/breaking/0004/03/A46759-2000 apr3.html&gt;.=20
 (n19.) During one memorable discussion while coordinating for =
two US=20
 senators' visits, an exasperated Australian army major in the =
 INTERFET=20
visitor's coordination cell asked me a series of questions on the US =

legislative branch: "How many congressmen do you have?" "How many =
senators?"=20
I was mildly impressed that he took such an interest until his last=20
question: "And how many of them intend to visit us?" (n20.) =
USFET=20
entertained many dignitaries, including six generals, three =
ambassadors and=20
several other officials, so public affairs became a significant =
additional=20
duty. (n21.) "Expanded Relations Program," available online at=20
 &lt;www.usarpac.army.mil/ docs/expan.htm&gt;. (n22.) Robert =
K.=20
Ackerman, "U.S. Forces Provide Deployable Communications to East =
Timor,"=20
Signal, April 2000, 45. (n23.) Dennis Steele, "End State," Army=20
Magazine, available online at &lt;www.ausa.org/=20
armyzine/steele3feb00.html&gt;. (n24.) In October, MG Cosgrove =
told his=20
staff that the target date for changing the flag from INTERFET to =
the UN=20
Transitional Administration-East Timor (UNTAET); that is, when the =
mission=20
could change from peace enforcement to nation-building, was 15 =
January=20
 2000. (n25.) USFI AAR, Part I, 25. (n26.) Mission=20
Analysis/Redeployment Briefing given to Cosgrove in Dili on 11 =
November=20
1999 </TT> <TT>Ksatrian: <A=20
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