[Marinir] Loyalty and Integrity in the Indonesian Armed Forces

[Hong Gie]

----- Original Message -----
From: novarin gunawan
To: yap hong gie
Cc: frankie wisendha
Sent: Monday, August 16, 2004 10:05 AM
Subject: ruu tni

Dear abang hong gie
thanks berat atas kiriman berita selama ini,pokoknya kalo ada yang menarik
langsung aja aku dikirimin. saat ini istri saya udah berada di
quantico,mulai tanggal 13 kemarin.
pelajaran disini banyak membahas issue perang modern,terutama irak dan
afganisthan.saya banyak belajar bagaimana mereka memahami ttg  strategi
perang .
saya baru melihat salah satu tanggapan seorang alumnus siswa seskoad robert
craveling,USAR  ttg TNI (loyalty and integrity in the indonesian armed
forces, bisa di baca  http://www.faoa.org/journal/indonsia.html
itu aja dulu , au......wah

NOVARIN GUNAWAN
MAJOR MARINE
4430 B QUARTERS MCB
QUANTICO,VIRGINIA,USA 22134
Telp.1.703.221.0461
-----------------------------------------------------

http://www.faoa.org/journal/indonsia.html

Loyalty and Integrity in the Indonesian Armed Forces
Major Robert Creveling, USAR

Foreword.

Many changes have occurred in Indonesia since I initially wrote this article
in June of 1999. In August East Timor selected independence from Indonesia
in a UN-sponsored referendum. While this article helps explain why the
Indonesian military (TNI) would support pro-Jakarta militias in disrupting
the referendum, I have yet to meet anyone--including two former Indonesian
ambassadors--who foresaw intensity of the reaction to the results.

Second, Indonesia successfully conducted its first democratic election in
forty years, resulting in the selection of Aburrahman Wahid ("Gus Dur") as
President and Megawati Sukarnoputri as Vice President. President Wahid seems
to have reduced the political influence of the Army by moving General
Wiranto to the position of Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs and
Security and by placing a civilian and a Navy Admiral in Wiranto's two
previous positions of Defense Minister and Chief of TNI, respectively.
Arguably, the most significant announcement the new President has made is
that he will permit the province of Aceh to conduct a referendum, although
it is currently unclear as to what exactly they will be voting
for--independence, greater autonomy, or merely Islamic Law.

Unlike East Timor, Aceh has been a part of Indonesia since the archipelago
nation earned its independence in 1949. As you read the following article,
ask yourself how the Indonesian military might react to the prospect of a
referendum for independence in that province. You will find that current
political developments have little impact on my original findings, which
aimed to provide insight into the culture of the Indonesian military. In
fact, if anything, current developments have served to validate the utility
of the analysis contained herein. I stand by my conclusion that "because
cultural change is both difficult and slow, [this] analysis of loyalty and
integrity in the Indonesian Armed Forces will remain useful in explaining
and predicting TNI actions for several years to come."

-Robert Creveling,
Alexandria, VA
29 November, 1999
Introduction.


Many western observers encounter difficulties in understanding the seemingly
irrational and unprofessional actions of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI).
They have admitted to abducting student activists, committing human rights
violations in Aceh and Timor, and more recently, rumors abound that members
of the TNI are connected to various "provocations" throughout Indonesia,
ranging from the Banyuwangi Ninja murders to the race riots in Ambon. My
purpose is to provide insight into the culture of the Indonesia military in
order to help the western reader interpret and to predict TNI actions.
Because it is my belief that the key to understanding the mindset of the
Indonesian officer lies in understanding his views of integrity and loyalty,
I will start by providing two examples--one hypothetical and one real--that
illustrate Indonesian officers' attitudes toward these two concepts. Next, I
will describe the historical and doctrinal factors that have shaped their
mindset; and finally, I will interpret allegations against TNI, without
trying to prove or disprove their veracity.
Integrity.

Figure 1 - Protestors in Jakarta demonstrate against recent elections in
East Timor

Imagine that you are a small-group instructor at the United States Infantry
Officer Advanced Course. One of the students in your class is from Indonesia
(this is not far-fetched; MG Agus Wirahadikusumah is an IOAC graduate).
During a block of instruction on ethics, you ask your students to write as
succinctly as possible their definition of "integrity."

As you thumb through their responses, you are not surprised to see some of
the same definitions you learned during basic officer training: "doing the
harder right over the easier wrong," "obeying the laws and legal orders of
the officers assigned over you," "always telling the truth," etc. Suddenly,
you pause as you read the definition submitted by your Indonesian student:
"Unity, security, and stability".

When you question your Indonesian student about his puzzling response, he
explains to you that the greatest challenge a TNI officer faces is
maintaining the unity and integrity of the vast archipelago consisting of
over 7,000 inhabited islands and numerous ethnic groups speaking hundreds of
regional dialects (the Indonesian language is a "second" language to many
Indonesians). Moreover, the term "Unity of the Republic of Indonesia" is one
of the five principles enshrined in the Pancasila state philosophy, while
"security and stability" are doctrinal preconditions for national
development. National development, in turn, provides "national resilience"
against dissolution. Thus, just as the emphasis on one meaning of the word
integrity causes US officers to produce responses related to honesty, the
TNI's emphasis on the other meaning of integrity would cause its officers to
respond in a manner quite puzzling to a westerner.
Loyalty.

Three days before I graduated from the Indonesian Command and Staff College
(SESKOAD) in May of 1999, my class of 175 enjoyed a formal social gathering
with our families and the SESKOAD staff. I was surprised to see Kopassus
(Special Forces) Major Bambang Kristiono at this party, as he had earlier
been dropped from the course to undergo court-martial proceedings related to
the abduction, torture, and disappearance of student activists in 1997-98.
He had already pled guilty to masterminding the operation, but was able to
attend the party because his sentence was under appeal.

I was puzzled at the warm reception Bambang received from my classmates.
Clearly, had an American officer been convicted of such a crime, his fellow
officers would have treated him as a pariah. After questioning some of the
Indonesian officers, I came to the conclusion that they all believed Major
Bambang was a scapegoat. He had simply obeyed the orders of his superiors,
then protected them by claiming he alone had planned the operation out of
feelings of hati nurani (inner conscience), believing his actions
justifiable because the activists threatened national integrity. Thus, in
the eyes of Indonesian officers, Bambang's actions were acceptable because
he had obeyed his orders then had remained loyal to his superiors. The
question of the legality of these orders was not as important as their aim:
neutralizing political activists who were provoking instability.
Instability, of course, threatens the integrity of the Indonesian republic.
1
Historical Foundation.

To understand the evolution of the Indonesian officer's interpretation of
integrity and loyalty, we must selectively examine historical events since
Indonesia's independence in 1945. TNI believes that they were formed
spontaneously by the people when the Japanese emperor announced the
capitulation of Japan on 14 August 1945. These freedom fighters urged
President Soekarno and V.P. Hatta to declare independence on 17 August 1945.
Soon thereafter, Indonesia's pre-WWII colonizers, the Dutch, attempted to
regain control of Indonesia. The struggle ended four years later, when The
UN Security Council called for a cease-fire, the release of captured
Indonesian leaders, and the return of Jogjakarta, the capitol, by the Dutch.
2

The exceptional leadership of General Soedirman during the struggle for
independence is arguably the single greatest influence on the TNI's
self-perception. When the Dutch invaded Jogjakarta on 19 December, 1948,
President Soekarno, V.P. Hatta, and several cabinet members were captured
because they refused to leave the city to wage a guerrilla war, as President
Soekarno and General Soedirman had agreed upon prior to the Dutch attack.
Soedirman, although critically ill, disregarded Soekarno's orders to
surrender, and instead retreated to the woods to lead a large-scale guerilla
war against the Dutch forces. He also headed a military government that was
later to become the basis for the current territorial apparatus. 3
Figure 2 - Indonesian army Chief of Staff Wiranto

Thus, in the TNI's view, it was Soedirman's act of disobedience that was
chiefly responsible for achieving Indonesia's independence from Dutch
colonization. As a result of this action, the TNI views itself as an
"instrument of the nation" (alat negara) rather than "an instrument of the
government" (alat pemerintah), meaning the Indonesian military is obliged to
disregard civilian leadership if obeying their orders will endanger national
integrity or sovereignty of the nation. 4  In his book on the dual function
of TNI, Bilveer Singh correctly notes that the Indonesian military elite
remains convinced that they are the only true guardians of the country, the
constitution, and the state philosophy, Pancasila. This was summed up by
General Nasution when he argued that "on three occasions the ABRI became the
savior of the Republic when the civilian government was either unable or
incapable", namely, during the Dutch attacks in 1948-49, the numerous
regional revolts in 1957-58, and the 1965 communist coup. 5  Thus, as an
organization, TNI is foremost loyal to the nation and its integrity, not to
its civilian leaders.
Indoctrination.

Soedirman's influence on the TNI mindset was reiterated on 10 May 1999 in a
speech by Army Chief of Staff Subagyo presented to the officers attending
the Army Command and Staff College (SESKOAD) in Bandung:

Faced with the developing of a situation that is uncertain at this time, I
hope that all of you officers in actualizing leadership will hold firmly to
the mandate of General Soedirman who stated: "That the sole national
possession of the Republic of Indonesia that remains wholly intact and
unchanging in the face of all problems and changes is the Indonesian Defense
Force." 6

Subagyo then elaborated on these words, explaining that the meaning
contained in the statement "unchanging" is first, that the Indonesian
Defense Force is a military of the people, military of freedom fighters, and
a national military that was formed from the people, and "struggles" with
the people, for the good of the people. The second connotation of
"unchanging" is that the Indonesian Defense Forces possesses a "spirit and
resolve to "struggle", that is, to defend the existence of the Unitary State
of the Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia) that is
based on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution that was proclaimed on 17
August, 1945." 7  Classroom instruction at SESKOAD reiterates the TNI's role
as an instrument of the nation rather than an instrument of the civilian
government. The school even has a "Department of Struggle" (Departemen
Perjuangan) tasked with inculcating students with a sense of duty and
nationalism. 8

Besides Soedirman's statement on ABRI's unchanging role, there are two other
Codes of Conduct implemented in the post-independence era that Western
observers must be familiar with in order to understand the TNI mindset. The
first is the Sumpah Prajurit, or Soldier's Oath, which orders all soldiers
to adhere to the following set of rules:

- To be faithful to the Government and obedient to the laws and the state
Ideology, Pancasila .

1. To obey military law.

2. To execute my duties with full responsibility to the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Indonesia.

To firmly uphold military discipline, meaning to be obedient, faithful and
subordinate as well as devoted to superiors, without questioning their
orders or decisions (emphasis added by author). 9

It is noteworthy that whereas Indonesian officers are devoted to their
superiors, without questioning their orders, American officers are taught
that they will remain faithful to the constitution and obey the legal orders
of the officers appointed over them. I often highlighted this point to my
Indonesian classmates, explaining that the US emphasis on legality is a
post-Vietnam phenomena intended to avoid the recurrence of My Lai-type human
rights violations.

The second major guiding force is the Sapta Marga, or Seven Pledges,
enumerated as follows:

I. We are citizens of the unitary Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila.

II. We are Indonesian patriots, bearers and defenders of the state ideology,
who are responsible and know of no surrender.

III. We are Indonesian knights, who are devoted to the One God, and who
defend honesty, truth and justice.

IV. We are soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces, guardians of the
Indonesian state and nation.

V. We soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces uphold discipline, are
obedient and observant to our leadership, and uphold the soldiers attitude
and oath.

VI. We soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces set ourselves to perform our
task with courage, and are always ready to devote ourselves to the state and
nation.

VII. We, soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces are loyal and keep our word
and the Soldier's Oath. (emphasis added by author) 10

The continued relevance of these two creeds is demonstrated during the
Independence Day Parades that I participated in as a student at SESKOAD on
the 17th not just of August, but of every month. Students recite The
Preamble of the Constitution, the Pancasila, Sumpah Prajurit and Sapta Marga
during these ceremonies. Moreover, in a speech to my class in December 1998,
General Wiranto encouraged all students to internalize and practice the
values contained in Sudirman's statement on the unchanging role of TNI, the
Soldier's Oath, and the Seven Pledges, as these creeds and oaths would guide
them through Indonesia's crisis.
Ramifications.

One of the most significant ramifications of TNI indoctrination is that it
requires officers to mindlessly obey illegal orders, rationalizing that
their actions preserve national integrity and promote the greater good of
stability and national development. Paradoxically, the importance of obeying
all orders in accordance with the Soldier's Oath has caused TNI to stray
from its role as a "tool of the nation" (alat negara) by forcing each
officer to become the tool of his commanding officer (alat atasan). Why?
Because the Draft Law on Voluntary Military service of May 1982 stipulates
that soldiers who disobey the Sumpah Prajurit or Sapta Marga--and therefore
the orders of one's superior, whether legal or illegal--will be
court-martialed. 11  This helps explain the common statement of senior TNI
reformists that the military has diverged from its basic role by becoming
the "instrument" (alat) by which Soeharto maintained security and preserved
power.

Within this context we also understand why an officer or soldier would
convey or obey orders to abduct, torture, and murder student activists:
activists create unrest and instability, which threatens the integrity and
growth of the nation. Moreover, it explains allegations that TNI is arming,
training, and supporting pro-integration forces in East Timor, in
contradiction to the civilian government's orders: a vote for autonomy in
Timor will fuel separatist movements in Aceh, Irian and other regions in the
archipelago and threaten national integrity. General Soedirman certainly
would not follow such dangerous instructions from civilian leaders

While Indonesia's history of separatist movements and the TNI indoctrination
helps us to comprehend TNI actions taken in the name of national
preservation, it is harder to understand why TNI would be involved in the
"provocations" that seemingly promote instability and national dissolution.
There are two explanations for this.

The first is that TNI might incite unrest in isolated areas so it can "come
to the rescue" and demonstrate its invaluable role in preserving national
integrity. For example, there are many high ranking Generals, both retired
and active, who wholly believe that TNI's role in the parliament is critical
toward preserving national stability. In the past few years, they have
witnessed the TNI's allocation of seats in the DPR whittled away from 100 to
75 in the previous election, then to 38 in this 1999 election. The TNI is
also reducing its role in kekaryaan positions, whereby active duty officers
serve as Mayors, Governors, District heads, and other important postings in
the government and government-controlled industries. Thus, I believe that
TNI officers, past and present, are capable of creating unrest with the
hopes of demonstrating the importance of TNI and dwifungsi out of a genuine
concern for national integrity, or perhaps more succinctly, out of hati
nurani (their inner conscience). Naturally, TNI "provocateurs" would want
their involvement to remain secret; if exposed the populace would demand a
diminution of TNI power rather than its preservation.

The second explanation for TNI members' involvement in provocations is more
related to loyalty to one's patron and self-preservation than it is related
to loyalty to the nation and national preservation. For example, one Kodam
Jaya (Jakarta District) intelligence officer in my class who was based in
Jakarta during the May 1998 riots concurred with western news reports that
TNI members were involved. These reports claimed that LTG Probowo, the
former Kopassus commander and son-in-law to former President Soeharto,
plotted to discredit GEN Wiranto so he could replace him as Commander of
ABRI/Defense Minister. There are also rumors that Kopassus deserters have
admitted to participation in other provocations, such as the Banyuwangi
Ninja murders. If true, their motive might be to send a veiled warning to
the government that it should not pursue legal action against Prabowo or
former President Soeharto, who is still revered as a father by many in TNI.

This seemingly outlandish analysis finds support from the works of Neils
Mulder, an anthropologist who has spent thirty years studying Indonesian and
SE Asian culture. He writes:

The world outside the home is a competitive area where people vie with each
other for prestige and power, where prowess is admired, and where the most
successful become the patrons of other Beneficiaries incur a debt of
gratitude that creates obligation for life. In the hierarchy of power,
protection, patronage and prestige, and favors given also oblige, and those
debts of gratitude tie people to each other, often in predictable ways; it
functions as the cement that keeps the known, the personal world together.
12

I had the opportunity to witness the TNI's system of patronage in 1999 when
the LTG Djamari, the Kostrad (Strategic Reserve) Commander visited the
Indonesian Command and Staff College. As he lectured the 175 students on
personal integrity, one of his aides sorted envelopes of money for SESKOAD
officers who were former Kostrad members. This is a common and open method
used by TNI commanders to supplement the meager salaries of their soldiers
(a Major makes less than $100.00/month). A Kopassus supply officer in my
class informed a fellow international student that he had accompanied LTG
Prabowo to the bank to draw the equivalent of $100,000 to distribute to his
subordinates upon his change of command. Such actions display power and
cultivate loyalty.

Current events can also be interpreted by understanding culture of patronage
and the loyalty it incurs. Andy Ghalib resigned yesterday as the Indonesian
Attorney General. He also happens to be a Lieutenant General in the
Indonesian Army. Ghalib made little progress investigating the wealth of his
former boss, General Soeharto. Not only did he remain loyal to his former
mentor, the patronage system served an additional critical function of
ensuring that had Ghalib exposed Soeharto, he too would have been exposed.
After all, as a Lieutenant General, Ghalib has certainly received monetary
gifts from his superiors (perhaps even Soeharto) and had also provided them
to his subordinates--this is a necessary means of surviving on ludicrously
low salaries. Thus, had Ghalib accepted monetary gifts from bank officials,
while clearly illegal, it is a norm acceptable under the "feudalistic
culture" of the TNI. 13  This also explains why the assistant commandant of
SESKOAD, in an informal discussion a politics and reform once declared "we
are all corrupt, including Megawati and Rais " 14

If the reader still cannot relate to the culture of patronage and loyalty
within the TNI and its ability to motivate officers to extreme actions, then
look closer to home (assuming the reader is American). What actions might a
Mafia soldier take to protect his Godfather? The answer will provide you
insight into the TNI's culture.
Conclusion.

In this end of tour report, I have intentionally ignored that TNI's
leadership has launched a reform campaign, or Paradigma Baru, as symbolized
by the Indonesian Armed Forces' change of name from ABRI to TNI. Because
cultural change is both difficult and slow, I nevertheless believe that my
analysis of loyalty and integrity in the Indonesian Armed Forces will remain
useful in explaining and predicting TNI actions for several years to come.
Finally, the analysis contained herein is completely my own based on my
experience as a foreign student attending the Indonesian Command and Staff
College from 1998-1999. It does not in any way represent the official
viewpoint of the United States Government.
Bandung, Indonesia June 1999

Robert Creveling is an Army Reserve Major and a FAO, Southeast Asian (48I).
He holds a BS from the United States Military Academy, an MS from the
Illinois Institute of Technology, and is currently attending the Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC in order
to earn a Masters in International Public Policy.

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Endnotes
1. In my mid-term report I describe the "Sospol Estimate," that territorial
officers conduct to determine appropriate courses of action to maintain
security/stability. I argue that the abduction of the activists was probably
someone's "optimal course of action" (Prabowo?) resulting from his sospol
estimate.BACK

2. Singh, Bilveer. P 32. Dwifungsi ABRI: The Dual Function of the Indonesian
Armed Forces.BACK

3. Ngandani, p 31.BACK

4. For the sake of brevity, I have ignored the influence of General Nasution
in forming TNI's self perception. He was largely responsible for encouraging
Soekarno to return to the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila philosophy,
for implementing the territorial structure to counter the communist
influence, for declaring TNI "a special interest group" so that it had a
constitutional right to seats in the DPR, and for placing officers in
non-military kekaryaan positions after the nationalization of Dutch
industries. In short, he set the groundwork for Dwifungsi . See chapter 2 of
Singh, mainly pages 45-47. BACK

5. Singh, pg 157.BACK

6. Subagyo, p 64. Ceramah Kepada Pasis Susreg ke-36 SESKOAD tentang
Kepemimpinan Lapangan di Lingkungan TNI-AD Dalam Menghadapi Tantangan Masa
Depan, 10 May 99.BACK

7. Ibid, 64.BACK

8. The concept of "struggle" is as positively emotive to Indonesians as the
"Spirit of 76" is to Americans. Hence the selection of the name
"PDI-Perjuangan" (the PDI Struggle Party) by Megawati Sukarnoputri.BACK

9. Singh, pg 44.BACK

10. Ibid, 42-43.BACK

11. Maynard, Harold, pg. 199, The Role of the Indonesian Armed Forces" in
Southeast Asia in the Modern World, edited by Edward A. Olsen and Stephen
Jurika, Jr. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc, 1986.BACK

12. Mulder, 239. Inside Southeast Asia. Religion, Everyday life, Cultural
Change. Amsterdam, The Pepin Press, 1996.BACK

13. Eeep Saefulloh, 26 May 99, Kompas. As a panelist discussing
civil-military relations Eep said that as early as 1995 MG Agus
Wirahadikusumah had expressed the need to end "leadership that cultivates a
feudalistic culture."BACK

14. Syndicate discussion (13-man group) with BG Taat Tridjanuar attended by
the author. BACK

1999, Foreign Area Officer Association
Springfield, Virginia
Maintained by LTC Steve Gotowicki.
http://www.faoa.org