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<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><A href=""><FONT face="Times New Roman"
size=3>http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/may2001/timo-m15.shtml</FONT></A><BR><BR><FONT
face="Times New Roman" size=3>Military officer reveals Australian responsibility
for Timor massacre<BR>By Mike Head<BR>15 May 2001<BR><BR><BR>A serving
Australian military intelligence officer has revealed that the <BR>Howard
government suppressed intelligence reports that could have averted <BR>the
massacre of at least 60 people at a police station in the East Timorese <BR>town
of Maliana in early September 1999.<BR><BR>In media interviews broadcast last
week, Captain Andrew Plunkett stated that <BR>throughout 1999 the government
refused to release intelligence reports <BR>showing that Indonesian authorities
were preparing for mass killings at <BR>Maliana and across the island if East
Timor's people voted no in the August <BR>1999 autonomy ballot.<BR><BR>Plunkett
commanded the intelligence section of the Australian army's leading
<BR>contingent in East Timor, the Royal Australian Regiment 3rd Battalion. He
<BR>arrived in Maliana shortly after the carnage, spoke to survivors and read
<BR>the scrawlings left by the victims on the walls of the police compound. Some
<BR>of the graffiti read: "We're about to die, why have people forsaken
us?"<BR><BR>In the weeks leading up to the ballot, Australian and other UN
police and <BR>military election observers urged local people to remain in the
town after <BR>the vote and seek the protection of the Indonesian
police.<BR><BR>Relying on their advice, several thousand people sought sanctuary
in the <BR>Maliana police station when militia violence commenced. According to
<BR>survivors, on September 8 1999, militia members, Indonesian police and
<BR>soldiers surrounded the area. Militiamen hacked independence supporters to
<BR>death with machetes in front of the assembled crowd.<BR><BR>Before arriving
in Timor, Plunkett carried a top-secret security clearance, <BR>giving him
access to data and reports flowing from the Australian military's <BR>extensive
and sophisticated monitoring of Indonesian military and government
<BR>communications.<BR><BR>This material, compiled in Canberra by the Defence
Intelligence Organisation <BR>(DIO), showed that the Indonesian leadership was
funding and training <BR>militia gangs to carry through a bloodbath. In
Plunkett's word, the DIO's <BR>analysis was that "the TNI [Indonesian army]
would basically destroy East <BR>Timor and they'd use militia as
proxies".<BR><BR>That information was not passed on to the East Timorese people
or local UN <BR>personnel. Instead, it was "pushed up the chain of command,
hosed down and <BR>politically wordsmithed by the Asia division of the
Department of Foreign <BR>Affairs and Trade".<BR><BR>Speaking of those who
perished, Plunkett told the Special Broadcasting <BR>Services (SBS) TV program
Dateline: "If they had accurate information, they <BR>would not have trusted TNI
and POLRI [police] full stop. Least of all, they <BR>would not have sought
refuge in a POLRI station."<BR><BR>Asked how he felt when the full extent of
what had happened dawned on him, <BR>Plunkett replied: "I was pretty devastated,
and to be honest, I felt guilty <BR>myself, being associated with the
intelligence area."<BR><BR>Fearing Indonesian retribution, many of Maliana's
people had taken to the <BR>mountains in the leadup to the August 30 ballot, but
Australian and other <BR>UNAMET observers worked closely with local leaders of
the secessionist CNRT <BR>(Timor National Resistance Council) to coax them back
into the town, <BR>claiming that Indonesian police would protect them from any
militia <BR>violence.<BR><BR>Interviewed by Dateline, Maliana survivors
corroborated Plunkett's account. <BR>Filomena da Silva, widow of Lorenco dos
Santos Gomes, who died, said: "On <BR>the 31st [of August 1999] I came back with
UNAMET and things were hotting up <BR>... They told us that if anything happened
at our house we must go to the <BR>police."<BR><BR>Adriano Joao, who was the
CNRT vice-secretary in Maliana, said: "UNAMET also <BR>promised us and the
people that we would not be harmed. If we were, then <BR>within 24 hours a
peacekeeping army would come. That's why the people didn't <BR>run into the
mountains."<BR><BR>Lucio Marques, who had been in the mountains with a
clandestine group, said <BR>his group had planned to go to Maliana to vote but
return immediately to <BR>their hideouts. On August 28, however, a UN-sponsored
joint team of militia <BR>and CNRT leaders implored them to go home and remain
in Maliana to create a <BR>sense of peace and calm in the town.<BR><BR>"On the
28th, they went from village to village, and those still in the <BR>mountains
could come down and listen, calling people back, saying, 'Don't <BR>leave your
houses when the vote is over. Whoever wins, nothing is going to
<BR>happen'."<BR><BR>Plunkett also alleged that he and his troops were ordered
to understate the <BR>death toll. As a result, the official body count
registered for Maliana was <BR>about 12, whereas an intelligence officer saw
evidence of more than 60 <BR>bodies and Australian soldiers were aware that many
more bodies were <BR>probably dumped at sea or in rivers.<BR><BR>Wayne Sievers,
a former federal police officer who served with the UN in <BR>Timor before the
ballot, backed Plunkett's account. He and others gathered <BR>intelligence in
Maliana and elsewhere, including leaked Indonesian <BR>documents. "They were
indicating that indeed it was the Indonesian military <BR>at the highest levels
that were organising, arming, training and funding the <BR>militias at a time
when they were supposed to be disarming them and <BR>protecting
us."<BR><BR>Sievers said he gave an Australian diplomat "chilling" documents
showing <BR>Indonesian plans for the killings in Maliana, which were intended as
a <BR>blueprint for similar massacres across the country. His reports were
<BR>ignored. "I could only conclude the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs
<BR>knew what the Indonesians were planning and didn't want a documentary trail
<BR>to show that they knew," he told Channel Seven.<BR><BR>Aid and church
workers issued similar reports before the ballot, warning of <BR>planned
massacres. Numerous leaks from within the Australian intelligence <BR>apparatus
also indicated that the Howard government knew from early 1999 <BR>that the
Indonesian leadership planned to unleash atrocities if the Timorese <BR>voted
for independence.<BR><BR><BR>Canberra's motives<BR><BR>These damning revelations
have shaken the Australian government. They carry <BR>additional weight because
they have been made by a serving military <BR>intelligence officer who felt so
strongly about Canberra's role in the <BR>Maliana massacre that he was prepared
to breach his confidentiality <BR>agreement and face serious disciplinary and
legal charges.<BR><BR>Unable to refute the detail of Plunkett's account, Foreign
Affairs Minister <BR>Alexander Downer attempted to bluster his way through a
press conference <BR>saying he found the allegations "offensive". Downer baldly
declared that the <BR>government had no motive to withhold intelligence
information from the UN <BR>and "of course we would never do such a
thing".<BR><BR>He added: "I have never heard of such an allegation before and I
don't think <BR>I have ever heard of any Australian government, including the
present <BR>government, refusing to pass on information that might have
otherwise helped <BR>save people's lives."<BR><BR>Both Downer and the Howard
government are counting on the fact that the mass <BR>media, which at the time
threw its full support behind the Australian <BR>military intervention, is
unlikely to challenge the minister's assertion of <BR>moral rectitude. So
sensitive is the issue that following the initial <BR>Dateline program, the
media has all but dropped any mention of Plunkett's <BR>allegations, after
downplaying their significance.<BR><BR>The current Australian government, like
all its predecessors-both Labor and <BR>Liberal-had every reason to suppress
information about the activities of the <BR>Indonesian military, police and
militia in East Timor. Following the <BR>Indonesian invasion in 1975, Canberra's
sole motive has been to pursue what <BR>best served Australia's considerable
strategic and economic interests.<BR><BR>Support for the Suharto dictatorship
and the whitewash of its many crimes <BR>was, until the junta's collapse in
1998, a cornerstone of Australian foreign <BR>policy in South East Asia. Ever
since the Indonesian military coup of <BR>1965-66, Suharto was viewed as a
crucial political ally, providing stability <BR>throughout the region as well as
favourable opportunities for Australian <BR>investors within
Indonesia.<BR><BR>In 1974-75 Labor prime minister Gough Whitlam held two summit
meetings with <BR>Suharto, during which he indicated that Australia would not
oppose Jakarta's <BR>takeover of East Timor. Following the invasion, both Labor
and Liberal <BR>leaders backed the Indonesian annexation and subsequently
covered up the <BR>ongoing suppression of East Timorese opposition that resulted
in an <BR>estimated death toll of 200,000.<BR><BR>The withholding of
intelligence information that might have saved people's <BR>lives began in 1975
itself when the Whitlam government refused to even warn, <BR>let alone protect,
five Australian-based newsmen who were murdered by <BR>Indonesian special forces
as they entered the border town of Balibo. To have <BR>warned the newsmen would
have meant revealing the Labor government's advance <BR>knowledge of the
invasion.<BR><BR>In return for becoming the only administration in the world to
formally <BR>recognise Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, the Hawke Labor
government <BR>secured the 1989 Timor Gap treaty that gave Australia territorial
rights <BR>over most of the rich oil and gas fields beneath the Timor Sea. Only
two <BR>years later, the Hawke government did everything it could to mask the
true <BR>extent of the Dili massacre, in which Indonesian troops shot down more
than <BR>120 protestors.<BR><BR>When the Suharto regime began to disintegrate
under US and IMF pressure <BR>following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, it
provoked a serious crisis for <BR>the Australian political and military
establishment. The Howard government <BR>was concerned by mounting agitation in
East Timor for a ballot on <BR>independence and pressure from Portugal, which
Australia regarded as a <BR>rival, to resolve the international status of its
former colony. In December <BR>1998, Prime Minister Howard wrote to Suharto's
successor, Habibie, <BR>suggesting that his administration propose a form of
autonomy, leading in <BR>the long term to a ballot, as the most effective means
of retaining <BR>sovereignty over the half island.<BR><BR>Jakarta reacted
abruptly to the shift from Australia's previous <BR>unconditional support for
the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia. <BR>Habibie unexpectedly
declared in early 1999 that his government would hold a <BR>ballot on an
autonomy proposal within months, not years, warning that <BR>Indonesia would
"walk away" from the territory if its plan were rejected. <BR>This was a clear
threat of a scorched earth policy.<BR><BR>Nevertheless, the Australian
government insisted that Habibie and his <BR>military chief, General Wiranto,
knew nothing of the mounting pro-Indonesian <BR>militia violence in East Timor,
blaming "rogue elements" in the Indonesian <BR>military instead. Canberra sought
to head off full-scale UN intervention, <BR>opposing the use of UN peacekeepers
and insisting that the TNI remain in <BR>full control of the ballot. Its
preferred option, as set out in Howard's <BR>December 1998 letter, was for
Indonesia to retain power in East Timor.<BR><BR>Simultaneously, however, based
on the intelligence reports it was receiving, <BR>the Howard government launched
military preparations for intervention in <BR>East Timor should the Indonesian
autonomy proposal be defeated. As early as <BR>April 1999, it sent intelligence
and special forces units, including the <BR>SAS, to operate in East Timor
clandestinely. Australian ruling circles were <BR>concerned that rival Portugal,
through the auspices of the UN, could regain <BR>a foothold unless Australian
troops were on the ground first.<BR><BR>Despite a systematic campaign of
harassment and violence by the Indonesian <BR>army, police and loyalist militia
units aimed at intimidating the East <BR>Timorese, the ballot went
overwhelmingly against the Indonesian regime. <BR>Faced with the new situation,
the Howard government rapidly moved to ensure <BR>that Australia would play the
leading role in shaping events in an <BR>"independent" East Timor. It mounted an
intensive diplomatic campaign, <BR>particularly in Washington, for an
Australian-led intervention, in the name <BR>of protecting the Timorese
people.<BR><BR>The Australian government's calculated failure to warn the East
Timorese of <BR>what was in store from them in places like Maliana served two
political <BR>purposes. Firstly, it prevented the East Timorese from taking any
action <BR>either to escape or to defend themselves. Australia, with the
complicity of <BR>the CNRT leaders, insisted that Falantil pro-independence
fighters remain <BR>corralled in holding areas while the militia ran amok. The
last thing that <BR>Canberra wanted was to confront a population in revolt
against the <BR>Indonesian armed forces and their militia
allies.<BR><BR>Secondly, once the long-predicted murders began, Howard and
Downer, </FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3>with the
support of the Australian media and Labor opposition, cynically
</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3>used
the killings to drum up domestic public support for the first
large-scale</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3>use of
Australian troops overseas since the Vietnam War. Just as in
Kosovo</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3>some months
earlier, reports of massacres were used to claim a humanitarian <BR>motive for
military intervention.<BR><BR>The full story of the Howard government's
suppression of information on the <BR>Indonesian leadership's involvement in the
East Timor bloodshed is still to <BR>be told. According to media reports,
further leaked military intelligence <BR>documents are about to be
released.<BR><BR>What is already clear, however, is that everything that the
Howard <BR>government did in 1999 took place with the full knowledge that the
top <BR>levels of the Indonesian regime and military were preparing to unleash
the <BR>militia against independence supporters in East Timor. Throughout all
the <BR>twists and turns in a rapidly changing situation, Downer and Howard
showed <BR>not the least compunction in sacrificing the lives of hundreds of
East <BR>Timorese in order to advance the interests of Australian
capitalism.<BR><BR><BR>See Also:<BR>Timor Gap dispute highlights motives behind
Australian intervention<BR>[25 October 2000]<BR>What the UN knew about militia
violence in East Timor<BR>[6 October 1999]<BR>Kosovo and East Timor: a reply to
a WSWS reader<BR>[1 Ocotber 1999]<BR>The Western powers and East Timor--A
history of manoeuvre and intrigue<BR>[1 October 1999]<BR><BR><BR><BR>The WSWS
invites your comments.<BR>Copyright 1998-2007<BR>World Socialist Web Site<BR>All
rights reserved </FONT><BR></DIV></FONT></BODY></HTML>