[Nasional-d] [Nasional] Islamic Extremist in Indonesia - AL-QAEDA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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   EMBARGOED FOR 17:00 JAKARTA TIME
8/8/02                                                                           
ASIA Briefing
Jakarta/Brussels. TK 8 August 2002
AL-QAEDA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE CASE OF THE "NGRUKI NETWORK" IN INDONESIA
 

OVERVIEW
One network of militant Muslims has produced all the Indonesian nationals so far
suspected of links to al-Qaeda. This briefing paper explains how that network
emerged, its historical antecedents, and the political dynamics over the last
two decades that led some of its members from Indonesia to Malaysia to
Afghanistan. It is part of an occasional series that ICG intends to issue on the
nature of radical Islam in Southeast Asia. 

The network has as its hub a religious boarding school (pesantren or pondok)
near Solo, Central Java, known as Pondok Ngruki, after the village where the
school is located. The "Ngruki network" began to coalesce in the late 1970s as
Indonesian intelligence operatives embarked on an operation to expose potential
political enemies of then President Soeharto from the Muslim right. It drew in
additional members in the early 1980s, many of whom had served time in prison
for anti-government activities. An inner core of the network, led by the two
founders of Pondok Ngruki - Abdullah Sungkar (now dead) and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir -
and radicalised by repression at home, fled to Malaysia in 1985.  Some
associated with the Ngruki network returned to Indonesia after Soeharto's
resignation in 1998; others stayed in Malaysia but continued to be in close
contact with those who went back.

Most members of the network share common characteristics: loyalty to Pondok
Ngruki or its founders; commitment to carrying on the struggle of Darul Islam
rebellions of the 1950s; desire to create an Islamic state by first establishing
an Islamic community or jemaah islamiyah, and shared experiences of political
detention in the 1980s. Many are on the executive committee of an organisation
formed in Yogyakarta in 2000 called the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI,
Indonesian Mujahidin Council).

The problem is that the Ngruki network is far wider than the handful of people
who have been accused of ties to al-Qaeda, and includes individuals with
well-established political legitimacy for having defied the Soeharto government
and gone to prison as a result. Many Indonesians have expressed concern that
pressure from the U.S. and Southeast Asian governments on Indonesian authorities
to carry out preventive arrests of suspects without hard evidence could be
seriously counterproductive. It could easily turn the targets of that pressure
into heroes within the Muslim community - as has happened with Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir - to the point that they become the beneficiaries of substantial
political and financial support. And with a combination of a highly politicised
national intelligence agency and law enforcement institutions and courts that
are both weak and corrupt, such pressure could lead to a recurrence of the
arbitrary arrests and detentions that characterised the Soeharto years. 

Indonesia is not a terrorist hotbed. Proponents of radical Islam remain a small
minority, and most of those are devout practitioners who would never dream of
using violence.  But even a tiny group of people can cause an immense amount of
damage. The challenge, both for the Indonesian government and the international
community, is to be alert to the possibility of individuals making common cause
with international criminals, without taking steps that will undermine
Indonesia's fragile democratic institutions.
 

I.	AL-QAEDA LINKS: THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE 
Following the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September
2001, authorities in Singapore, Malaysia, and the United States became convinced
that a terror network linked to al-Qaeda was operating in the region. In
December 2001, Singapore authorities arrested fifteen Muslim militants suspected
of working with al-Qaeda. Later, a videotape found in Afghanistan confirmed the
Singapore connection. Thirteen of the Singapore detainees were said to be
members of a cell of an organisation that authorities identified as Jemaah
Islamiyah. Eight of the thirteen reportedly had training in al-Qaeda camps in
Afghanistan. They were believed to be planning to bomb a shuttle bus service
carrying U.S. military personnel, as well as U.S. naval vessels in Singapore. 
Singapore authorities said at the time that the arrested men reported to an
Indonesian based in Malaysia known as Hambali.   

With the naming of Hambali, and with related arrests of alleged Jemaah Islamiyah
members in Malaysia, including several Indonesian nationals, attention shifted
to an Indonesian preacher named Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. In a speech in Singapore in
May 2002, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew stated:

Interrogation [of the suspects detained in Singapore] disclosed that Abu Bakar
Baasyir, the leader of the Indonesian Mujahideen Council in Indonesia, was the
overall leader of the JI organisation, which covered both Malaysia and
Singapore. He was a member of Darul Islam, which aimed at the violent
establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia since the late 1940s. He was in
Malaysia for 14 years to avoid detention by the Soeharto government and returned
in 1999 after Soeharto fell from power.  

Ba'asyir, the founder of a religious school in Ngruki, outside Solo, Central
Java, tried unsuccessfully to sue the Singapore government for defamation after
similar statements from Minister Lee in February 2002. He is teaching openly at
his school and has gained many admirers both for defying attempts to connect him
to al-Qaeda and questioning U.S. motives in the war against terrorism. For the
last two decades, he has been associated with small groups called jemaah
islamiyah whose teachings had both religious and political content. 

Through a complex network described in this report, Ba'asyir also is linked to
the small handful of Indonesians who have been accused of having direct or
indirect ties to al-Qaeda. Four men in particular stand out among those arrested
or currently being sought:

q	Fathur Rahman al-Gozi, detained in Manila since January 2002 on the charges of
illegal possession of explosives and falsification of documents. He reportedly
confessed to having taken part in a series of bombings in Manila in December
2000, and Philippines authorities have said he took part in the plans to attack
American assets in Singapore. Al-Gozi, 30, is from Madiun, East Java, and is a
former Ngruki student. 

q	Hambali, alias Riduan Isamuddin, alias Nurjaman who is thought to be
al-Qaeda's main Indonesian contact. From Cianjur, West Java, he remains at large
but may be in Indonesia. He has been linked by Southeast Asia intelligence
sources and the Indonesian police to a wave of bombings in Indonesia in December
2000; the Manila bombings in which al-Gozi reportedly participated; and plans to
attack American navy personnel at a Singapore train station.  Minister Lee
referred to Hambali as "Ba'asyir's right-hand man."


q	Abu Jibril, alias Fikiruddin (Fihiruddin) Muqti, alias Mohamed Iqbal bin
Abdurrahman, in detention in Malaysia under the Internal Security Act since
January 2002. Jibril appears on a videotape recruiting fighters for the Moluccan
conflict, but Southeast Asian intelligence sources also claim he was a financial
conduit for al-Qaeda in the region.  He is from Lombok, east of Bali.

q	Agus Dwikarna, detained in Manila since March 2002 on charges of illegal
possession of explosives. The evidence appears to have been planted in
Dwikarna's suitcase. Philippine authorities have said that based on information
from al-Gozi and some of the men detained as terrorist suspects in Singapore,
Dwikarna is thought to have been involved in bombings in Manila and Jakarta and
to have had communication with Fathur Rohman al-Gozi.  The precise nature of any
suspected links to al-Qaeda have never been made public.

It is important to underscore that with the exception of Fathur Rahman al-Gozi,
who has been sentenced by a Philippines court to two terms of twelve and six
years respectively, and Hambali, who has not been apprehended, no convincing
evidence of involvement in terrorist activities has been made public against
these suspects.  Fikiruddin, alias Abu Jibril, is detained under the Internal
Security Act in Malaysia on charges of having undergone military training in
Afghanistan a number of years ago, working to establish a "Nusantara Islamic
State" (Daulah Islamiah Nusantara), endangering the safety of Malaysia by
preaching jihad and the desirability of dying as a martyr (mati syahid), and
giving lectures to members of a Malaysia militant group, three members of which
subsequently underwent military training in Maluku.  The official indictment
contains no reference to al-Qaeda.

All the men named above are linked in one way or another to the group of
Indonesian exiles in Malaysia throughout the late 1980s and most of the 1990s
under the spiritual guidance of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar.
Ba'asyir was not involved in the Darul Islam rebellions of the 1950s, but those
rebellions   constitute a crucial element of the Ngruki network's heritage.

II.	THE ORIGINS: DARUL ISLAM
The Ngruki network's interest in establishing an Islamic state draws heavily on
the experience of the Darul Islam rebellions. These rebellions, in Aceh, South
Sulawesi, and West Java, were only three of numerous regional political
movements that broke out in the aftermath of Indonesia's successful guerrilla
war against the Dutch. In each case, they were led by charismatic militia
commanders from "modernist"  Muslim backgrounds who controlled significant
territory during the revolution and were reluctant to surrender their authority
to the new central government. In each case, whatever the original cause of the
rebellion, they ended up demanding an Islamic state.

The leader in West Java, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo, remains the primary
political inspiration for Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, his associates, and the thousands
of others - but still a minority - in Indonesia who desire implementation of
Islamic law. Kartosuwirjo had been active in Muslim nationalist politics in the
Dutch East Indies before the Second World War. He had helped organise Hizbullah,
a volunteer militia set up under the auspices of Masjumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin
Indonesia, All-Indonesia Muslim Council), during the Japanese occupation of
Indonesia, and helped turn Masjumi into a political party after the war's end. 
But he became deeply disillusioned with the pre-independence political
manoeuvring of Masjumi's components, and in 1947 began gathering his militia
members together in West Java.  

In January 1948, after the Indonesian nationalists were forced to reach a
much-hated agreement with the Dutch to withdraw forces from parts of Java,
Kartosuwirjo announced the establishment of the Islamic Army of Indonesia
(Tentara Islam Indonesia, TII). At that point, he regarded the Dutch government,
not the newly declared Indonesian republic, as the enemy and had not yet
declared a separate state.  But, as he consolidated his authority in West Java
and began to set up political and administrative structures, clashes with the
new republican army were inevitable. On 7 August 1949, Kartosuwirjo officially
proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia or NII), and
proceeded to fight the Indonesian republic for the next thirteen years.  The
areas of West Java under NII control were called Darul Islam, "Abode of Islam",
hence the name of the movement. Kartosuwirjo was finally arrested in 1962.

In South Sulawesi, the rebellion broke out as a result of the new Indonesian
army's refusal to incorporate local militia units en bloc as a separate brigade.
The commander of those militias was Kahar Muzakkar (also spelled Qahhar
Mudzakkar), from Luwu, in the northern part of South Sulawesi. Like
Kartosuwirjo, he came from the modernist stream of Indonesian Islam and was
educated in Muhammadiyah schools, first in Sulawesi, then in Solo, Central Java;
he was also active in the wartime Hizbullah. But the rebellion he led only took
on a distinctly Islamic cast in 1952, after Kartosuwirjo made contact, and the
two movements joined forces, at least on paper. 

Kahar Muzakkar had impeccable nationalist credentials. He had been one of
Sukarno's bodyguards in 1945. From Java, he helped recruit guerrillas from among
Sulawesi youths studying there and infiltrated them back into Sulawesi. Despite
a noteworthy clash in 1947 with a young Javanese lieutenant colonel named
Soeharto that led to a temporary demotion, he remained an important figure in
the revolution. He was sent back to South Sulawesi in 1950 and worked to
establish the authority of the young republic. For this, he expected his forces
to be rewarded with positions in the newly established Tentara Nasional
Indonesia (TNI). Instead, the army leadership, determined to demobilise as many
of the militia fighters as possible, not only rejected a separate brigade led by
Muzakkar but also seemed to treat the Sulawesi fighters as poor cousins to their
counterparts in Java and Sumatra. As a result, Kahar Muzakkar broke with the new
republic and led a rebellion that lasted until he was tracked down and shot by
the military in February 1965.

Kahar Muzakkar never really articulated a vision of an Islamic state; he was
always more focused on Sulawesi, and on South and Southeast Sulawesi in
particular. At different times, however, he did reach out to other parts of
Indonesia. In 1953, he proclaimed Sulawesi part of the "Negara Republik Islam
Indonesia" (NRII, Indonesian Islamic Republic).  

Meanwhile regional dissatisfaction with Jakarta resulted in rebellions in
several parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi and the formation of a rebel government -
PRRI - in 1958. The PRRI and a related rebellion in Sulawesi were soon brought
under control by the central government but not fully defeated. In February
1960, the Republic of the Union of Indonesia was announced, comprising Kahar
Muzakkar's NRII and the remnant forces of the PRII.  But these efforts were
always largely more against the central government than in support of an Islamic
state.

The third of the rebellions known as Darul Islam, in Aceh, has less direct
relevance to the Ngruki network, although it is noteworthy that the Free Aceh
rebel movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) emerged in 1976, at exactly the
same time that Komando Jihad operations were underway, and initially drew many
of its recruits from the families of former Darul Islam fighters.

Following the defeat of the regional rebellions by the mid-sixties, the key
figures disappeared from public view. Many surrendered to the government and
were given amnesty; some were even incorporated into the army. Some fled to
Malaysia. And some remained quietly out of sight in Indonesia, including Kahar
Muzakkar's defence minister, Sanusi Daris, who in the mid-1980s reappeared as a
link between the South Sulawesi radicals and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's group.

III.	EMERGING IN THE 1970s
A little over a decade later after they were crushed, the Darul Islam movements
came back into focus. President Soeharto - Kahar Muzakkar's old enemy - had been
in power since 1966.  As elections were approaching in 1977, the one permitted
Muslim party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP) was gathering strength as the
loyal opposition. A vote for the PPP (or the nationalist PDI) was the only way
ordinary Indonesians in the tightly controlled state could express
dissatisfaction with the government. To pre-empt the possibility of a large PPP
vote, Gen. Ali Moertopo, in charge of covert operations for Soeharto,
reactivated Darul Islam, although some people close to old Darul Islam leaders
say that he merely moved in to manipulate a movement that had already shown
signs of revival. 

Through the intelligence agency, BAKIN, former Darul Islam fighters, primarily
but not exclusively from Java, who had been incorporated into the Indonesian
army and government, were persuaded to contact their old comrades.  The argument
provided by BAKIN was that, with the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, Indonesia
was in danger of Communist infiltration across the Indonesian-Malaysian border
in Borneo, and that only the reactivation of Darul Islam could protect
Indonesia. Whether through coercion or money or a combination of both, a number
of DI leaders rose to the bait, and by mid-1977, the government had arrested 185
people whom it accused of belonging to a hitherto unknown organisation called
Komando Jihad, committed to following the ideals of Kartosuwirjo and
establishing the Islamic state of Indonesia (NII).  In realty, the Komando Jihad
was Ali Moertopo's creation.

Two men accused of being leading Komando Jihad figures were Haji Ismail Pranoto,
more commonly known by the acronym Hispran, and Haji Danu Mohamad Hasan. Both
had been close associates of Kartosuwirjo. In 1983, Haji Danu told a court
trying him on subversion charges that he had been recruited by BAKIN as early as
1971, and that under instructions from the West Java (Siliwangi) division of the
army, he had called his former comrades-in-arms together to discuss how to
counter the communist threat. One such meeting, he said, had taken place at the
Siliwangi headquarters in Bandung. The prosecutor said that between 1970 and
1977, Haji Danu and six others, including Kartosuwirjo's son, had set up an
elaborate administrative structure which paralleled that of the old Darul Islam
movement. Even though their activities apparently ceased in 1977, the seven were
not arrested until 1981 when a new government-sponsored campaign against
political Islam was beginning as the 1982 general election approached. 

Hispran, who became linked to Abu Bakar Bas'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar, was a
native of Brebes in Central Java, near the border of West and Central Java. He
had been a commander under Kartosuwirjo. Arrested on 8 January 1977 and put on
trial in September 1978, he was charged with having tried since 1970 to regroup
the old Darul Islam forces to overthrow the government. His lawyers tried
unsuccessfully to have Ali Moertopo called as a witness.  

>From the beginning, Komando Jihad and what government prosecutors called Jemaah
Islamiyah (Islamic community) intersected, although it was never clear whether
the government was attributing more structure to the latter than was in fact the
case. Komando Jihad was the label applied by the government and the Indonesian
media to the former Darul Islam fighters, who never used it themselves. The term
"Jemaah Islamiyah" appears in court documents from the 1980s to refer to the new
organisation that the Darul Islam men thought they were setting up. But while
the Darul Islam members certainly talked in terms of establishing Islamic
communities in a generic sense, government prosecutors offered little hard
evidence that Jemaah Islamiyah was in fact an organisation with an identifiable
leadership. 

It was a premise of the Darul Islam movement, later adopted by Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir and his followers, that setting up a Jemaah Islamiyah was a necessary
precursor to the establishment of an Islamic state. The various incarnations of
Darul Islam through the 1970s and 80s, as will be seen below, saw the
establishment of small jemaah committed to living under Islamic law as an
essential part of their overall strategy. When suspects "confessed" to being
members of Jemaah Islamiyah, they may have been referring to this phenomenon.

The government's case that Komando Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah were linked
surfaced early on in the case of Gaos Taufik in Medan, North Sumatra. Gaos was
allegedly a Komando Jihad leader for Medan. Once a fighter in the West Java
Darul Islam, he had moved with other ex-DI members to a village in North Sumatra
after DI's defeat in the early 1960s. In 1975, according to one indictment, Gaos
Taufik invited a young Muslim teacher from eastern Flores named Abdullah Umar to
attend a meeting at the home of a well-known community leader in Medan. 

At the meeting, according to the prosecution, Taufiq discussed how the Soeharto
government had violated Islamic law, suggested that those in attendance join an
organisation called Jemaah Islamiyah committed to the strict implementation of
Islamic law, and invited them to swear an oath. The meeting was reported to
Indonesian authorities, and in July 1977, Taufik and the man at whose house the
meeting was held were arrested. Abdullah Umar, the teacher, was arrested in
1979.  
A.	ABU BAKAR BAS'ASYIR AND ABDULLAH SUNGKAR
The Komando Jihad - Jemaah Islamiyah link appears most prominently in the trial
of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar. 

Ba'asyir and Sungkar came from strikingly similar backgrounds. Both of Yemeni
descent, they were born a year apart, Sungkar in 1937 in Solo, Central Java,
Bas'asyir a year later in Jombang, East Java.  In the mid-fifties, both became
leaders of Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (GPII, Indonesian Muslim Youth
Movement), an independent and activist student group that had close ties to the
Masjumi, the main 'modernist' Islamic political party that was banned in 1960.
In 1963, after two years at Pondok Gontor, a pesantren that pioneered the
blending of a modern curriculum with standard religious teachings, the younger
man moved to Solo where he met Sungkar. 

Both men were deeply involved in dakwah (proselytisation) activities, Sungkar
with Masjumi, Ba'asyir with the al-Irsyad organisation.  In 1967, they joined
forces, together with a man named Hasan Basri, to found a radio station called
Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Surakarta, the Islamic Proselytisation Radio of Surakarta
(Solo). Four years later, in 1971, they founded Pesantren al-Mu'min, which moved
to its current home in the village of Ngruki, outside Solo, in 1973 and became
known as Pondok Ngruki. 

>From his Masjumi involvement onward, Sungkar was always the more overtly
political of the two men. In 1975, the radio station was shut down by the
internal security apparatus for its political content and anti-government tone.
Two years later, Sungkar was arrested and detained for about six weeks for
urging his followers not to vote in the 1977 elections. He publicly lamented at
the time that Muslim political aspirations in Indonesia had never been met
because of pressure from civil authorities. 

While Sungkar and Ba'asyir were never part of the original Darul Islam, they
were deeply sympathetic to its aims. They were arrested on 10 November 1978 in
connection with meetings they had with Haji Ismail Pranoto, and at their trial,
four years later, the government made an explicit link between Komando Jihad and
Jemaah Islamiyah.

The government charged that in 1976, Hispran inducted them into Darul Islam by
having them swear an oath used in 1948 by Kartosuwirjo. The alleged induction
took place at Sungkar's house in Sukohardjo district, Central Java.  After a
second visit in February 1977, the prosecutors said, Sungkar was installed as
military governor of NII for Central Java and made head of a group called Jemaah
Mujahidin Anshorullah. The indictment stated that from that point on, Sungkar
and Ba'asyir began recruiting and inducting others into Jemaah Islamiyah. It is
not clear how Jemaah Mujahidin Anshorullah metamorphosed into Jemaah Islamiyah,
but the indictment suggests that in the government's estimation, the two names
were interchangeable. 

At the trial, Sungkar admitted having Hispran as a guest in 1976 and that they
agreed to form a jemaah as a way of confronting the new communist threat arising
from the fall of Vietnam. He and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir denied ever taking the oath
used by Kartosuwirjo, however, and the only evidence to the contrary is the
written testimony of Hispran, who never appeared in court and thus could not be
cross-examined.  (During his trial, Sungkar said one intelligence agent told
him, "My task is to make you admit you swore an oath to Hispran - if you don't,
you'll be in prison for the rest of your life".) 

The government's case against the two men rests far more on the content of
statements urging disobedience to secular authority than on any evidence of an
underground organisation. Sungkar, for example, is accused of urging people not
to acknowledge the validity of the Indonesian constitution because it was made
by man, not by God. 

Both men were accused of circulating a book called Jihad and Hijrah, by Pondok
Ngruki lecturer Abdul Qadir Baraja, to fellow members of Jemaah Islamiyah in
Solo. The book reportedly urged Muslims to go to war against enemies of Islam
who resisted the application of Islamic law.  They refused to fly the Indonesian
flag at their pesantren. They rejected Pancasila as the state ideology. The
charges were standard fare for the time, broadly worded accusations against two
men who dared to criticise the Soeharto government, with nothing to suggest that
they advocated violence or were engaged in criminal activity. Their arrests
served only to heighten their reputation within the growing Muslim political
opposition.
B.	"TEROR WARMAN"
After they were detained, however, a series of violent crimes took place, all
tied in one way or another to people from Pondok Ngruki - and to what the
government was calling Jemaah Islamiyah. The first of these was the murder in
January 1979 of the assistant rector of Sebelas Maret University in Solo.
According to court documents, the victim was accused of revealing the existence
of Jemaah Islamiyah to the authorities and therefore being directly responsible
for the arrest of Sungkar and Ba'asyir. 

The murder was carried out by a shadowy underworld figure, known for extortion
of Chinese shopkeepers, named Musa Warman, who reportedly had ties to the army;
a Muslim Papuan named Hasan Bauw;  Abdullah Umar, the Ngruki teacher drawn into
the Komando Jihad network (see above); and a man named Farid Ghozali. Warman was
also reportedly planning to kill the judge and prosecutor responsible for the
conviction of Hispran, who was sentenced to life in prison for his Komando Jihad
activities in 1978.  If, in 1977-1978, the Indonesian government used the terms
Komando Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah interchangeably, by 1979 the same people were
also being referred to as "Teror Warman" or Warman's terrorists.

On 15 January 1979, Farid Ghozali was killed by Indonesian authorities allegedly
while trying to flee. Two days later, Hasan Bauw was shot and killed by a group
led by Warman, who accused Bauw of having informed the military of Ghozali's
impending departure. Information from Bauw, according to Warman, also was
responsible for the arrest of Abdul Qadir Baraja, the author of the book on
jihad who resurfaces repeatedly as a member of the Ngruki inner circle. 

Two robbery attempts followed, both led by Warman and both involving Abdullah
Umar, the Ngruki teacher. The first was successful. On 1 March 1979, a team led
by Warman robbed a car transporting salaries of teachers at the State Islamic
Institute in Yogyakarta. Warman reportedly promised his accomplices 20 per cent
of the Rp.3.9 million haul (U.S.$5,570 at the then exchange rate), with the rest
to be turned over to the heads of Jemaah Islamiyah. The second attempt, on 21
March 1979, at a teacher training institute (IKIP) in Malang, East Java, failed.
The noteworthy aspect of these two attempts, however, was that the perpetrators
justified them in terms of the Islamic concept fa'i, raising funds by attacking
enemies of Islam.  

At the end of 1979, it remained unclear whether Jemaah Islamiyah was a construct
of the government, a revival of Darul Islam, an amorphous gathering of
like-minded Muslims, or a structured organisation led by Sungkar and Ba'asyir.
To some extent, it was all of the above, and the name seems to have meant
different things to different people.  

There is some evidence that the Central Java jemaah was being more
systematically organised than groups elsewhere.  One witness in the trial of
suspects in the assistant rector's murder told the court that in 1979, Jemaah
Islamiyah had about 100 members in the Yogyakarta area, many from the State
Islamic Institute. The organisation was divided into district (kabupaten),
regional (daerah) and provincial (wilayah) commands and focused on collection of
funds and arms. The five districts, he said, in which Jemaah Islamiyah had
representatives were the city of Yogyakarta itself, Kolon Progo, Sleman, Bantul,
and Gunung Kidul. 

The operation set in motion by Ali Moertopo and Indonesian intelligence in the
1970s had several unintended consequences. It renewed or forged bonds among
Muslim radicals in South Sulawesi, Sumatra, and Java. It promoted the idea of an
Islamic state in a way that the original Darul Islam leaders had perhaps not
intended, and in doing so, tapped into an intellectual ferment that was
particularly pronounced in university-based mosques. That ferment was only
beginning when Komando Jihad was created, but through the late 1970s and early
1980s, it was fuelled by the Iranian revolution, the availability of Indonesian
translations of writings on political Islam from the Middle East and Pakistan;
and anger over Soeharto government policies.

To university students at the time, the Darul Islam rebellions of the 1950s
seemed like an authentically Indonesian effort to fight repression while
upholding Islamic values. These ideas, combined with anger generated by arrests
made in the name of Komando Jihad and relationships made among prisoners, helped
radicalise a new generation. It is worth noting that the father of Fathur Rahman
al-Gozi, currently detained in Manila, was imprisoned in the late 1970s for
alleged membership in Komando Jihad.

IV.	EXILE IN THE 1980s
A.	JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH AND USROH, 1983-1985 
Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir were tried in 1982 and sentenced to nine
years in prison for subversion. They had been in detention since November 1978.
When in late 1982, their sentences were reduced on appeal to three years and ten
months, equivalent to their pre-trial detention, both men were released, and
they returned to Pondok Ngruki, while the prosecution appealed the reduced
sentence.

The Ngruki founders had two years of freedom in Central Java before fleeing in
1985 to Malaysia, and those two years saw an extraordinary degree of organising
and network building.  The foundations for what in 2002 would be called the
Jemaah Islamiyah in Malaysia were laid during this period. It was a time of
heightened opposition across Indonesia to the Soeharto government, especially
after the policy of azas tunggal or "sole basis" was announced, requiring all
organizations to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideological basis - as opposed
to, say, Islam or Christianity.  

Muslim organisations in particular were outraged. In September 1984, a major
riot broke out in the Tanjung Priok port area of Jakarta, and army troops opened
fire on Muslim protestors, killing dozens. The riot led to an intensified
government crackdown on the Muslim opposition, and to intensified
anti-government activity on the part of militant Muslim groups, including some
bombings and other acts of violence, in which men linked to Ngruki were
involved. 
B.	STUDENT ACTIVISM
By the time Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir were freed, the university
town of Yogyakarta in Central Java had become the centre of an Islamic
resurgence.  The Iranian revolution was a source of inspiration to many of the
thousands of college students in the area; Islamic discussion groups grew up on
many campuses. Mesjid Sudirman, or Mesjid Colombo, in the Sleman area of the
city, became known for its militant preachers (muballigh), as devoted to
opposition to the Soeharto government as they were to the strict implementation
of Islamic law. Among the well-known muballigh associated with Mesjid Sudirman
were two men who later joined Ba'asyir and Sungkar in Malaysia: Fikiruddin,
originally from Lombok, and Muchliansyah. 

Another member of the Ngruki inner circle, Irfan Suryahardy, now known as Irfan
S. Awwas, came to national attention at this time. The brother of the
above-mentioned Fikiriddin, he is at present the chair of the executive
committee of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia. In 1981 he began publishing a militant
Muslim newsletter, ar-Risalah (The Bulletin), that was distributed at the
Sudirman mosque and contained everything from quotations from Ayatollah Khomeini
to interviews with former leaders of Darul Islam and criticism of particular
policies of the Jakarta government. 

In 1982, Irfan became head of the Yogyakarta office of a Muslim activist
organisation called Badan Koordinasi Pemuda Mesjid (BKPM, Coordinating Body of
Mosque Youth). As head of BKPM, he published and circulated in 1982 the full
court documents of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's and Abdullah Sungkar's trial, with
commentary from leading human rights activists. Because these publishing
activities were such a daring challenge to government attempts to suppress
freedom of expression, Irfan became a hero among student activists - even more
so after the BKPM office was raided in 1983 and he was arrested. He was
sentenced in February 1986 to thirteen years in prison on subversion charges, a
heavy sentence even by Soeharto-era standards. 

At his trial, the prosecution claimed among other things that Irfan wanted to
establish an Islamic state and was using ar-Risalah to "invite Muslims
throughout the world to bring the Islamic revolution to fruition" using the
Iranian revolution as a model. Authorities had confiscated copies of the Iranian
embassy's newsletter, Yaum al-Quds, and they accused Irfan of receiving funding
from the Middle East.  Prosecutors also accused Irfan of having been Komando
Jihad's deputy commander for the Yogyakarta area in 1979, when he was sixteen
years old. No serious evidence was produced to substantiate that claim. 

Before he was arrested, Irfan developed close associations with many other
like-minded students through the BKPM, which had an equivalent on many
Indonesian college campuses. Among the student leaders he met and became close
friends with was Agus Dwikarna, the man from Makassar who has been in detention
in Manila since March 2002. 
C.	USROH
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir used his new-found freedom to set up a new network of small
cells devoted to the implementation of Islamic teaching. He began in 1983 by
bringing former detainees to Ngruki in monthly meetings, saying that his aim was
"to collect the members of Jamaah Islamiyah who had been scattered by the
arrests of the previous years." 

Again, information about what came to be known as the usroh movement comes
primarily from the court documents prepared for the trials of usroh members who
eventually were arrested on charges of trying to establish an Islamic state. 
The defendants said they were required to swear an oath of obedience to Abu
Bakar Ba'asyir as long as his orders did not conflict with the will of God and
his Prophet.   They received instructions form Ba'asyir during meetings at
Ngruki about how to form small groups of between eight and fifteen members in
their villages or neighbourhoods, with the aim to enforce Islamic law and uphold
an Islamic way of life. 

The groups do not appear to have been particularly secretive. Members were
required to follow Islamic law as outlined in a manual written by Ba'asyir
called Usroh, derived from the teachings of Hasan al-Banna, founder of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. A key teaching was that usroh members should avoid
any non-Islamic institutions, such as schools or courts, and that all laws other
than sharia were heathen and should thus be disobeyed.  The groups were also
supposed to collect money (infaq) to help fellow members who were sick or
otherwise in need, but 30 per cent of the collection was to be turned over to
Ba'asyir for the movement. The funds collected were insignificant. When Ba'asyir
fled to Malaysia in early 1985, the usroh movement collapsed, and most members
were arrested.
D.	THE CONNECTION TO SOUTH SULAWESI
One other development during this period is worth noting, because it provides
one of several links between the Ngruki circle and men linked to the Darul Islam
rebellion in South Sulawesi. In 1982, after decades living a clandestine life,
Sanusi Daris, one of Kahar Muzakkar's deputies in that rebellion, came out of
hiding.  He was arrested almost immediately and put on trial in Makassar in
1984.  He served only a few months before he was released, reportedly after an
intervention of Gen. Mohamad Yusuf, a former defence minister.   

Sanusi then travelled almost immediately to Java in the company of a Ngruki
student named Andi Mohamed Taqwa. Taqwa reportedly brought Sanusi to meet
Abdullah Sungkar, and the two agreed to work to reinstate the Republic Persatuan
Indonesia, the old fusion of the West Java, South Sulawesi, and South Sumatra
rebellions. Some time later Sanusi stayed briefly with Sungkar in Negeri
Sembilan, Malaysia, and eventually moved to Sabah where he reportedly maintained
ties to the Ngruki network. He died there in 1988.  

Taqwa himself was a link to other strands of the Ngruki network. After
introducing Sanusi Daris to Sungkar, Taqwa apparently joined his uncle, a former
explosives expert for the original South Sulawesi Darul Islam rebellion, in
travelling through Java and Sumatra making quiet contact with Darul Islam
leaders who had not been rearrested. In 1985, they met with Daud Beureueh, the
leader of the Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh, a meeting that reportedly had a
profound effect on Taqwa.  (The uncle, Mohamad Jabir, was arrested in late 1985
in Makassar on charges of plotting to kill Soeharto; he was brought to Jakarta
where he died in custody, possibly as a result of torture, in January 1986.)   

Taqwa then joined Sungkar and Ba'asyir in Malaysia, and in 1986 was put in
charge of recruiting Indonesians to fight in Afghanistan as a way of
strengthening the military capacity of Jemaah Islamiyah.  He reportedly was able
to find only six volunteers. (The goal was 30.) He spent some time in
Afghanistan himself, according to ICG sources in Makassar. In 1988, he left
Malaysia for Sweden, where he was granted political asylum. He apparently went
back and forth to Malaysia; an ICG contact reported meeting him there in 1993.
Apparently inspired by the Acehnese struggle for independence, he was later
reported to have proclaimed the state of independent Sulawesi (Negara Sulawesi
Raya) although there is no indication that he ever gained any followers.
E.	THE HIJRAH TO MALAYSIA
In February 1985, the Indonesian Supreme Court heard the prosecution's appeal
against the reduced sentence of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar. The
court ruled in the prosecution's favour and issued a summons to the two men. As
their re-arrest appeared imminent, they decided to leave for Malaysia, in their
view not in flight from justice, but on a religiously-inspired hijrah
(emigration) to escape from the enemies of Islam, similar to the Prophet's
hijrah from Mecca to Medina.

Most information on the first years of the Ngruki network in Malaysia comes from
the trial documents of a young man named Muzahar Muhtar, who accompanied the two
Ngruki founders there in April 1985 and subsequently served as their courier
between Indonesia and their new home. Muzahar himself embodied some of the
elements of the Ngruki network outlined above. In 1982, he was a high school
student who belonged to a youth group (remaja mesjid) at the Sudirman mosque in
Yogyakarta; the head of the youth group was the Ngruki-linked preacher,
Fikiruddin. Muzahar enrolled in the State Islamic Institute in Yogyakarta in
1983 but later that year dropped out and in September enrolled as a student at
Pondok Ngruki. He told prosecutors that shortly thereafter, he took an oath at
Pondok Ngruki to support the Islamic state of Indonesia (NII). He also became a
member of an usroh group.

In April 1985, he said, he was ordered by Muchliansyah - the other Ngruki-linked
preacher associated with the Sudirman mosque - to accompany a group of the
Ngruki circle to Malaysia. All were going illegally; that is, without full
documentation or with false passports. The group included Abdullah Sungkar, Abu
Bakar Ba'asyir, Fikiruddin, Agus Sunarto, Ahmad Fallah, Rusli Aryus, Mubin
Bustami, Fajar Sidiq  and Agung Riyadi. The latter, a brother of Fajar Sidiq, is
one of those arrested in Malaysia in January 2002 under the Internal Security
Act and charged with being a member of Jemaah Islamiyah.

In August 1985, Muzahar reported, the Ngruki exiles held a series of meetings at
which they decided that they would get funds for the movement by asking "jemaah
members" in Solo to recruit fellow members to work in designated companies in
Malaysia and turn over 20 per cent of their salaries to the jemaah.  Abdullah
Sungkar had already identified a number of sympathetic Malaysian businessmen
willing to take on Indonesian workers and help the effort to establish an
Islamic state at the same time. 

The exiles also decided to send Sungkar and Ba'asyir to Saudi Arabia to seek
additional funds. At the same time, they decided to strengthen the jemaah
militarily by sending volunteers from Jakarta to train in Afghanistan. Andi
Mohamad Taqwa and a man named Abdullah Anshori, also known as Ibnu Thoyib, were
to recruit the volunteers. Anshori, whose brother, Abdur Rohim, was a Ngruki
teacher, returned to Indonesia before 1988 and appeared as a witness in
Muzahar's trial.  He then returned to Malaysia.

Sometime in August 1985, Fikiruddin and Muchliansyah ordered Muzahar to go back
to Indonesia and accompany their wives to Malaysia. He returned in September
with the women. In October 1985, Muzahar went back to Indonesia on orders of
Agus Sunarto to pick up four workers recruited from Solo; the second wife of
Muchliansyah; and the wife of Mubin Bustami. At the beginning of November,
Muzahar brought the new group safely to Malaysia. At the end of November, he was
ordered to return to Indonesia to bring back four more workers from Solo, which
he did the following month.  Muzahar went back to Indonesia again to pick up Abu
Bakar Ba'asyir's wife. She apparently was not ready to leave, so Muzahar began
trading in batik to earn enough money to return to Malaysia. He was arrested in
Jakarta on 2 August 1986.

Even though very little hard information about the Ngruki network is available
from the 1990s, several points are worth noting from the Muzahar trial
documents. The link between the Ngruki network in Indonesia and the exile
community in Malaysia remained strong, not only because of teacher-student ties
but because many exiles had relatives back in Indonesia who were part of the
network's inner circle. These included the exile Abdullah Anshori, whose brother
taught at Ngruki; Fikiruddin, whose brother, Irfan Suryahardi, was released from
prison in 1993 and returned to Yogyakarta; Muchliansyah, whose wife was the
sister of Fikiruddin and Irfan; and Ba'asyir, whose wife is related to Abdul
Qadir Baraja. 

Secondly, Ba'asyir and Sungkar continued to give instructions to their followers
in Jakarta through couriers. For example, it emerged during the trial that
Sungkar, through a message carried by Muzahar and delivered in August 1985, had
ordered a leading usroh figure to reactivate usroh groups in Central Java. 

Thirdly, by 1987, the network was already becoming international. At least six
Ngruki followers had left for Pakistan and Afghanistan, and more were to follow.
Several witnesses in the Muzahar trial testified that the group had decided to
send members to "Moro [Philippines], Afghanistan and Pattani [Thailand]",
although there is no reference in the documents to anyone actually having gone
to Thailand or the Philippines.  

One member of the ar-Risalah editorial board, Zakaria Qudah, also known as
Zakariya Kuddah, then 27, was in Saudi Arabia.  More than a dozen men and women
had left for Malaysia. As already noted, Andi Mohamad Taqwa, from Bone, Sulawesi
was in Malaysia and later left for Sweden. The son-in-law of Kahar Muzakkar, a
man named Kadungga, based first in Germany, then in Holland, became a key
international contact with links to a radical Egyptian group. He returned
periodically to Malaysia.

Given those international connections, it is not surprising that someone like
Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, who had been a student at Pondok Ngruki after Ba'asyir
fled to Malaysia and is now detained in Manila, could have gone from Ngruki
through Malaysia to Lahore, even though he was a generation or two younger than
the original exiles. 
F.	THE JAKARTA CONNECTION
By the time the two Ngruki founders fled to Malaysia, their network extended
into several different but connected groups. One was the old Darul Islam circle
and the people drawn into it by the activities of the late 1970s. Another was
the BKPM network of student activists and preachers centred around the Sudirman
mosque in Yogyakarta in the early 1980s that in turn was linked to the usroh
network. Another was the Ngruki circle of students and alumni. Finally, there
were individuals drawn in by the proselytisation efforts of the group's main
preachers, including Sungkar, Ba'asyir, Fikiruddin, and Muchliansyah. 

Despite the central Java locus of Pondok Ngruki and the Sudirman mosque, the
network had a wide geographic reach: the Darul Islam connections extended
through West Java, North Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and to a lesser extent Aceh.
Students from South Sulawesi, Lombok, Ambon, West Sumatra, and Lampung were key
members of BKPM in Yogyakarta; and the pattern of arrests under the Soeharto
government forced many in the network to seek refuge in Jakarta.

It was Jakarta, not central Java, that became the main backup point in Indonesia
for the Ngruki exile community in Malaysia in the mid-1980s. Muchliansyah, the
Yogyakarta preacher, was instrumental in building up the community in Jakarta
from late 1983 until he left for Malaysia in mid-1985. Couriers like Muzahar
went back and forth between Malaysia and Jakarta, Jakarta donors were an
important source of funds, and a loosely-knit congregation was established there
consisting of some of the different elements of the Ngruki network outlined
above.  

The congregation was less a tightly organised underground structure committed to
establishment of an Islamic state, as the Indonesian government maintained, than
a collection of people who were being hunted for different reasons by the
government and therefore had to operate more or less clandestinely. Most were
committed to the application of Islamic law in Indonesia, many looked to Darul
Islam for inspiration, and all were opposed to the Soeharto government. But the
group does not seem to have engaged in any serious discussion, let alone
planning, for achieving specific political ends. A main focus of its concerns in
1985, for example, was the possibility that some members were attracted to the
Shiite strand of Islam.  It did, however, attract some criminal elements, who
committed robbery and murder in the name of fa'i, not unlike the Warman group in
1978-79.

Following the raid on the ar-Risalah office in late 1983 and arrest of Irfan
Suryahardy, many of the young men involved in Irfan's immediate circle, or
connected more generally with the BKPM network, fled to Jakarta and shared a
house in the Pisangan Lama (East Jakarta) neighbourhood. The house was known as
a haven for Darul Islam and usroh fugitives - virtually anyone on the run from
Soeharto-era charges of trying to establish an Islamic state could find a
welcome.  It became the place where people en route to or returning from
visiting the Ngruki exiles in Malaysia would stay.

If Pisangan Lama was the unofficial residence of the Jakarta-based Ngruki group,
its unofficial headquarters was the house of a wealthy Jakarta contractor,
Hasnul Ahmad, in the elite south Jakarta suburb of Kebayoran Baru. Hasnul Achmad
had become a committed anti-Soeharto militant after hearing Muchliansyah preach,
and subsequently opened his house, and his chequebook, to anyone associated with
Muchliansyah. From at least 1984 onwards, training for jemaah members was
conducted in Hasnul's house along the lines of the cadre philosophy that has
been a key element of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's teachings since the late 1970s.  The
training consisted of religious instruction but with some discussion of
politics.

Government prosecutors in the trial of Muzahar Muhtar tried to get witnesses to
describe the structure of the Islamic State of Indonesia or Jemaah Islamiyah
organisation, but no two versions were identical. What they had in common was
Muchliansyah as the overall coordinator, and a vague division of tasks that
included proselytisation (dakwah) and finance. In some versions of the
structure, the Tanjung Priok-based preacher from South Sulawesi, Mohamed Jabir,
also played a key role. 

The group seems to have held regular religious meetings (pengajian) in which the
main themes were the need to work for the enforcement of Islamic law, rejection
of Soeharto government policies such as the Pancasila-only doctrine, and
establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. The participants represented a
variety of approaches that ranged from Darul Islam's commitment to the
establishment of an Islamic state through armed struggle to the usroh approach
of using a cell structure to develop new cadres with a deeper commitment to an
Islamic way of life. 

A senior member of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia who was familiar with the Jakarta
group looked at the various versions of the alleged structure of the Jakarta
group at ICG's request and said there was nothing sinister about it. It was
natural for any religious organisation to have a structure and division of
labour; there was nothing, he said, to suggest that the individuals involved at
the time were engaged in Islamic rebellion. 

But there were several incidents of violence linked directly or indirectly to
the Jakarta group. One was the murder of a taxi driver and the theft of his car
in June 1985. The murder was apparently committed on the initiative of a member
of the Jakarta group named Syahroni, alias Ahmad Hikmat. Another jemaah member,
Safki Syahroni, was a gang leader with ties to leading figures in the Jakarta
underworld, who began attending the religious meetings at Hasnul Ahmad's house
and claimed he repented of his criminal deeds. He  expressed admiration for the
Red Brigades and the Japanese Red Army and reportedly advocated blowing up the
Indonesian parliament. Syahroni and Safki became committed to the idea of
raising funds for jemaah activities through fa'i, or confiscating the property
of unbelievers. The idea reportedly was endorsed, if not initiated, by
Muchliansyah, but was explicitly condemned by Abdullah Sungkar who took
Muchliansyah to task in Malaysia when he realised what had happened. 

Syahroni and Safki fled to Malaysia immediately after the murder and joined the
Ngruki circle but left in October 1985.  They were involved in the murder a year
later of Hasnul Ahmad's driver and another man. The driver had been the
go-between in a dispute over a loan made by Hasnul Ahmad to a business
associate, and Syahroni killed him because he was afraid he would go the police
and endanger the jemaah. Syahroni and Safki were arrested for the murder; Safki
later committed suicide.

In addition to Hasnul Ahmad, the other major donor of the Jakarta group (and on
whose property the murder of the taxi driver took place) was Dody Ahmad Busubul.
Dody was an Indonesian of Arab descent, who had a longstanding business
relationship with Mohammed Jabir, the South Sulawesi preacher with Darul Islam
connections mentioned above. He also appears to have had a business relationship
with a senior army officer then serving as a close personal assistant of
President Soeharto.  

By 1987, most members of the Jakarta group either had been arrested, fled to
Malaysia, or gone underground.
G.	BOROBODUR AND LAMPUNG
Two other violent incidents in the 1980s had indirect links to the Ngruki
network. In the aftermath of the Tanjung Priok riot of September 1984, Java was
wracked by a series of bomb explosions that Jakarta blamed on Muslim extremists.
On 21 January 1985, one of these explosions damaged nine stupas at the newly
restored Borobodur temple in central Java, the largest Buddhist monument in the
world after Angkor Wat.  Among the seven men arrested and charged with
involvement was a cloth trader and itinerant preacher, Abdul Qadir Baraja. As
noted above, Baraja, then a lecturer at Pondok Ngruki, had been arrested in 1979
in connection with the murder and robberies linked to the Warman group, although
it is not clear on what evidence. He was sentenced to five years in prison. When
Sungkar and Bas'asyir were tried in 1982, one minor charge was that they had
circulated Baraja's book, Jihad and Hijrah, which then was considered
subversive. 

After serving his sentence in Java, Baraja, originally from Sumbawa in eastern
Indonesia, went to Telukbetung, Lampung, where he was arrested in May 1985. The
prosecution charged that in April or May 1984, Baraja met with one of the others
accused in the bombing case, a blind preacher named Husein Ali al-Habsyi, and
agreed that Islam was in danger from Christianisation and the growth of vice. 

He allegedly expressed his willingness to obtain explosives to use to
demonstrate Muslim anger against the government. In a letter produced by the
prosecutors, Baraja informed the preacher of the price of explosives in
Telukbetung. In his defence, Baraja did not deny the letter but said explosives
were bought and sold in Lampung for use in fishing, and he was supplying
information at the preacher's request, without questioning how the bombs were to
be used.  Baraja was sentenced to thirteen years in prison, increased to fifteen
years on the prosecutor's appeal.

After his release, Baraja again became part of the Ngruki inner circle and holds
a prominent position as a respected Muslim cleric in the Majelis Mujahidin
Indonesia. At his speech at the first Mujahidin Congress in August 2000, Baraja
spoke of how Kartosuwirjo, in proclaiming the Islamic state of Indonesia in
1949, intended to restore the Muslim caliphate that had been destroyed in 1924
in a Western conspiracy against Islam. 

In 1989, a bloody shootout at a Muslim school in Way Jepara, Lampung, became,
like Tanjung Priok, another entry on the long list of Muslim grievances against
the Soeharto government. The linkage to Ngruki was indirect. In 1985, as it
became increasingly clear that Sungkar and Bas'asyir might face reimprisonment,
the former  left Java for Lampung. He stayed briefly in a hamlet called
Siderejo, in the subdistrict of Way Jepara. As the result of his teachings, his
followers, led by a man named Warsidi, set up a jemaah islamiyah, on land
donated as wakf (endowed for religious use) by Sungkar. 

The jemaah attracted Muslims from elsewhere in the country, primarily central
and east Java.  In a meeting that took place in Cibinong, Jakarta on 12 December
1988, a group of students decided to emigrate (hijrah) to Way Jepara to join the
jemaah. The group had developed close contacts with former Darul Islam members
from Aceh and West Java - and through a man called Ridwan, with Abdul Qadir
Baraja. 

The jemaah attracted the attention of local authorities because of its hardline
teachings, including refusal to salute the Indonesian flag and rejection of
secular authority. In February 1989, Warsidi was summoned by the military and
refused to respond. The subdistrict military command then detained nine of his
followers. Believing the compound around Warsidi's school would be attacked, his
followers prepared homemade weapons and swore to resist. 

The subdistrict military commander went to meet Warsidi and was hacked to death.
The next day, the military, led by Col. Hendropriyono as head of the Korem 043
regional military command, attacked the compound.  An unknown number, believed
to be close to 100, died. Many of those who survived were detained, as were
students in Jakarta who had taken part in the 1988 meeting. The Way Jepara
jemaah was effectively destroyed, and it is unclear whether any members joined
the Ngruki exiles in Malaysia.

V.	RETURNING IN THE 1990s. 
	The Ngruki network became radicalised in the mid-1990s, largely through one of
its main international links: Abdul Wahid Kadungga, the son-in-law of Kahar
Muzakkar. 
	
	Kadungga was the man who met Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar upon their
arrival in Malaysia and arranged a place for them to stay. Part of the Darul
Islam network, he had fled to Europe and by 1971 was a student in Cologne,
Germany. There he helped found the Muslim Youth Association of Europe (PPME,
Persatuan Pemuda Muslim se-Eropa).  Through that association, he became friendly
with Muslim activists from the Middle East and gradually became more radical; he
also developed close ties to PAS in Malaysia. 
	
	Sometime in the 1980s, Kadungga moved to the Hague, and in 1989, he developed a
close friendship with Usama Rushdi, or Rashid, of Gama Islami, a breakway
faction of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan ul-Muslimin) - led by Sheikh
Umar Abdul Rahman, later convicted in the U.S. in the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing case.  Kadungga focused on providing religious training to Indonesian
students studying in Germany. He also traveled around Europe, the Middle East,
Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia during this period and stayed in regular contact
with Ba'asyir and Sungkar. 
	
	In an October 2000 article published in an Indonesian magazine, Kadungga was
described as difficult to find because he had no fixed residence. "Occasionally
he's in the Netherlands, then he's talking with top officials of PAS in Kelantan
or Trengganu, and not long after, he's conversing with Osama bin Laden in the
depths of Afghanistan."  
	
	A split occurred among the Ngruki exiles when Sungkar and Bas'asyir became
close to Gama Islami in 1995. They were reportedly introduced to the movement
through Kadungga.  As a result of their new affiliation, they moved beyond their
commitment to an Islamic state within Indonesian boundaries and took a more
radical stance which promoted the return of an international Islamic caliphate.
Fikiruddin and Muchliansyah retained their commitment to the Darul Islam vision
of an Islamic Indonesia. Only after Soeharto's resignation, when Ba'asyir and
Sungkar returned to Indonesia, did a reconciliation between the two groups take
place, through the efforts of Irfan Suryahardy.   
	
The reconciliation between the two factions of the Ngruki network apparently
involved the radicalization of Fikiruddin and those around him. Both Fikiruddin,
who adopted the name Abu Jibril, and Abdullah Anshori, who changed his name to
Abu Fatih, went to Afghanistan and Pakistan some time in the 1990s. Faiq Hafidz,
another member of the network who had been part of the Sudirman mosque group in
the early 1980s, was arrested by Malaysian authorities in January 2002; he also
spent several years in Afghanistan after leaving Indonesia. 
	
After President Soeharto resigned, not only Ba'asyir and Sungkar, but also
Muchliansyah, Agus Sunarto, Nursalim, and several other exiles returned to
Indonesia. Sungkar died a month after his return. Ba'asyir went back to Pondok
Ngruki. Muchliansyah settled in Banjarmasin, Kalimantan, Nursalim in Bandung.
	
On 5-7 August 2000, members of the Ngruki network held an extraordinary
gathering in Yogyakarta called the Mujahidin Congress, bringing together
representatives of virtually every major group committed to the implementation
of Islamic law in Indonesia. The Congress gave rise to the Majelis Mujahidin
Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin Council or MMI), whose top leadership reads like
a who's who of the Ngruki network.
	
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was chosen as "commander" or Amir ul-Mujahidin of the
governing council, Ahlul Halli wal 'Aqdi. (AHWA) committed, among other things,
to laying the foundation for a new international caliphate.  Abdul Qadir Baraja
was appointed to the fatwa division of the AHWA. Muchliansyah and Fikiruddin,
under his Malaysian name of Abu Jibril, were appointed to the department of the
executive committee in charge of strengthening mujahidin resources (Departemen
Peningkatan Sumber Daya Mujahid), as was Mahasin Zaini, a former political
prisoner arrested for his connections to the usroh movement. Aris Rahardjo,
arrested in connection with the 1979 "Teror Warman" crimes, was appointed to the
department in charge of inter-mujahidin communications. Another former usroh
prisoner, Shobbarin Syakur, a veteran of the Sudirman mosque days, was made
secretary-general of the executive committee, with Irfan Awwas Suryahardy as
chair.    
A.	THE SOUTH SULAWESI CONNECTION - AGAIN
Another name that appears on the executive committee of Majelis Mujahidin
Indonesia is Agus Dwikarna, the man arrested in Manila in March 2002 and charged
with having explosive materials in his suitcase. The evidence was almost
certainly planted, and he was arrested on suspicion of having links to al-Qaeda,
although it is not clear what the concrete evidence against him is.

Agus Dwikarna's connection to the Ngruki network was initally through Irfan
Awwas Suryahardy, a close friend from the days when both were student activists
working against the Pancasila-only policy. The organisational links, however,
are more interesting, because they go back to old Darul Islam associations. Agus
Dwikarna is the head of Laskar Jundullah, the security unit associated with a
Makassar-based organization called Komite Pengerak Syariat Islam (KPSI,
Committee for Upholding Islamic Law).  The head of the organisation, Abdul Aziz
Qahhar Muzakkar, is the son of Kahar Muzakkar, the former rebel commander. The
secretary general of KPSI told ICG that for many members, KPSI was a way of
continuing the Darul Islam struggle through constitutional means.  

Much of the leadership of KPSI is from the district of Luwu, where Kahar
Muzakkar was born. (Agus Dwikarna is not among them.) The younger Muzakkar, who
heads KPSI, runs a religious boarding school (pesantren) in Makassar that also
serves as the Makassar branch of the Hidayatullah network. This network, which
publishes the militant Muslim magazine Hidayatullah, is based in Balikpapan,
Kalimantan. The founder of the Hidayatullah network, Muhsin Qahhar, also known
as Abdullah Said, was not directly associated with Kahar Muzakkar but considered
himself the rebel leader's spiritual heir.  

The most interesting figure associated with KPSI, however, is Abdul Wahid
Kadungga, Kahar Muzakkar's son-in-law, who assisted Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and
Abdullah Sungkar when they first reached Malaysia and who is believed to have
had direct communication with al-Qaeda through his ties to the Egyptian-led Gama
Islami. (Communication alone, however, is not evidence of criminal activity.) At
KPSI's first congress in Makassar in May 2000, Kadungga appeared as an honored
guest, bringing with him the deputy head of PAS-Malaysia.

B.	ISLAMIC LAW, ISLAMIC STATE OR CALIPHATE
In some ways, the themes of preachers linked to the Ngruki network have been
remarkably consistent over two decades. The call for the application of Islamic
law, the harkening back to the days of Darul Islam and the pioneering efforts of
Kartosuwirjo, the obligation to disobey secular authorities whose policies
undermine or conflict with Islamic law - these have all been constants.  As long
as Soeharto was in power, the focus of speeches by Ba'asyir and Sungkar was
overwhelmingly on the iniquities of his government and its efforts to divide and
destroy the Indonesian ummat.   It was the Soeharto government, according to the
Ngruki founders, that was the main obstacle to establishment of an Islamic state
in Indonesia and the achievement of Kartosuwirjo's aims.

Ba'asyir in particular has also been consistent in his call for establishing
Islamic communities (jemaah islamiyah) as the necessary precondition of an
Islamic state (dawlah islamiyah) and jihad as one of the means toward that end.
The speech he gave at the first Mujahidin Congress in August 2000 was no
different from themes he had propounded in the late 1970s.   

But other members of the Ngruki network began moving away from the notion of an
Indonesian Islamic state per se and toward the idea of an international
caliphate - a favourite theme of Hizb-ut Tahrir, the Jordan-based militant
organisation that has a growing presence in Indonesia. (It was well represented
at the Mujahidin Congress.).  The theme of a caliphate was picked up by Irfan
Suryahardy and others in their statements to the media at the Congress. 

Much has been made by Malaysian and Singaporean authorities of the call for the
establishment of a caliphate, either internationally or in Southeast Asia, as
evidence of possible links to al-Qaeda. The Malaysian government's accusations
against Fikiruddin, alias Abu Jibril, for example, are based on his alleged call
for a Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara involving Indonesia, the southern Philippines
and Malaysia.  But the call for a caliphate has become such a common theme among
militant groups in Indonesia that it is hard to see, how by itself, it indicates
much of anything
VI.	CONCLUSION
The Ngruki network, committed to continuing what its members saw as the struggle
of the Darul Islam rebellion to establish a state based on Islamic law, was
radicalised by Soeharto government policies of the 1980s. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir,
inspired by Hasan al-Banna, may have been the main architect of the notion of
setting up jemaah islamiyah as a precursor to an Islamic state, but Abdullah
Sungkar was the political driving force of the network, first in Indonesia, and
then in exile in Malaysia. He seems to have been succeeded in that role by
Fikiruddin, alias Abu Jibril.

It was determination to get the funds and training to fight the Indonesian
government that first led members of the network to Afghanistan in the
mid-1980s. But it was almost certainly the residence of the exiles in Malaysia -
in the 1990s, a meeting place for representatives of Muslim guerrilla groups of
all kinds - that moved some beyond anti-Soeharto activities to more sinister
activities that may have included planning attacks on targets in Singapore and
Indonesia. 

The dilemma is what to do now. Association with the Ngruki network is not
equivalent to terrorism, and yet the possibility remains that some members of
the exile group who have since returned to Indonesia may be sources of support
for criminal activities. But repression helped give birth to the network, and it
would be a major mistake to encourage the Indonesian government, or other
governments in the region, to re-institute the kind of arbitrary practices that
Soeharto's resignation was supposed to bring to an end. 

The claim by Agus Dwikarna and the other two arrested with him in March 2002
that the evidence in their suitcase in Manila was planted appears to be
well-founded, but the U.S. government still wants to reward Indonesian
intelligence for working with Philippine authorities to bring off the arrest.
Such tactics are likely to backfire - Agus Dwikarna has already become a hero to
many in South Sulawesi, to the point that local and national politicians vie to
get him released.

Pressure on Indonesia to arrest Ba'asyir led the government to drag out his old
case file from 1982 and see if he could still be charged, since he fled the
country before the Supreme Court's decision to re-institute his original
nine-year sentence could be implemented. In the intervening years, the
anti-subversion law under which he had been charged was repealed, and all
Soeharto-era political prisoners released. The Supreme Court decided rightly
that it could not pursue the case.

Indonesian officials interviewed by ICG have lamented the lack of an Internal
Security Act, similar to those used in Malaysia and Singapore to carry out
preventive arrests, claiming they would be better able to fight the war on
terror if they had such a tool. The danger is that in Indonesia it could well
create more terrorists than it stops, just as the indiscriminate application of
the Anti-Subversion Law (revoked after Soeharto's resignation) hardened the
determination of some activists, including some members of the Ngruki network,
to bring down the Soeharto government. 

The anti-terrorism law now being drafted has raised concerns that an
all-powerful internal security agency will be recreated. Many involved in
writing the law are determined to avoid this, and the draft produced in June
2002 is less sweeping than the Malaysian or Singaporean laws.  To charges by
several non-governmental organisations that U.S. pressure was driving the
process, one member of the drafting committee told ICG that Indonesia was going
ahead with the legislation in response to its obligations as a member of the
United Nations and in response to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373.  

Defining terrorism, or distinguishing between terrorism and other forms of
military, guerrilla, or criminal activity, is highly subjective.  The bombings
that took place in Manila and throughout Indonesia that have been attributed to
Indonesian nationals, and the plans to attack targets in Singapore and Jakarta,
are clearly criminal and punishable under the Indonesian Criminal Code, just as
Fathur Rahman al-Gozi was sentenced under the Philippine criminal code, not
special terrorism legislation.

In the current climate, with many Indonesian Muslims organisations fearing they
will become the target of anti-terrorism legislation, it would lessen the chance
of turning criminal suspects into heroes if the label "terrorist" was dropped
altogether.
       
                    Jakarta/Brussels, TK August 2002











J 





Glossary of Names 

Abdul Aziz Qahhar Mudzakkar: son of former Darul Islam commander Kahar Muzakkar;
head of KPSI, Komite Pengerakan Syariat Islam, in Makassar; head of Hidayatullah
pesantren in Makassar; member of the Suara Hidyatullah editorial board  

Abdul Qadir Baraja. Former Ngruki lecturer, member of the executive committee of
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia. Born in Sumbawa, later lived in Telukbetung,
Lampung. Author of Hijrah dan Jihad. Arrested in January 1979 in connection with
"Terror Warman", served three years, arrested again in connection with bombings
in East Java and Borobodur, in 1985.

Abdul Rachman, alias Gunung Windu Sanjaya,  recruited by Ngruki group to work in
Malaysia, 1986.

Abdullah Anshori, alias Ibnu Thoyib, alias Abu Fatih. Left for Malaysia in June
1986. Reportedly helped Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's Jemaah Islamiyah group in exile
recruit volunteers for Afghanistan 1985-86. Reported to be important figure in
Southeast Asian structure that was planning attacks in Singapore. From Pacitan,
East Java, he is the brother of Abdul Rochim, a teacher at Ngruki.

Abdullah Sungkar, co-founder of Pondok Ngruki, born in 1937 to a well-known
family of batik traders of Yemeni (Hadramaut) descent in Solo. Detained in 1977,
arrested with Ba'asyir in 1978, fled to Malaysia in 1985, died in Indonesia
1999. 

Abdullah Umar, born in Lamahala, Flores in 1949, fled Medan after Komando Jihad
arrests there in 1977, became Ngruki teacher, arrested for involvement in Terror
Warman crimes carried out in the name of Jemaah Islamiyah, according to
Indonesian government. Was detained in Nusakambangan Prison throughout the
1980s, executed by firing squad in 1989.

Abdur Rohim (Rochim), teacher at Ngruki, said to have been inducted into Jemaah
Islamiyah by Abdullah Umar in Pacitan, East Java. Brother of Abdullah Anshori.
Accused of being part of Jemaah Islamiyah's fa'i division (raising funds by
confiscating property of enemies of Islam) in 1984-85.


 Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, co-founder of Pondok Ngruki, active in al-Irsyad
organization, born in 1938 in Jombang, East Java. Arrested in 1978, released in
1982, fled to Malaysia in 1985, returned to Indonesia 1998. Currently commander
of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia.

Abu Fatih, see Abdullah Anshori

Abu Jibril, see Fikiruddin

Agung Riyadi, member of the Ngruki network, fled to Malaysia in April 1985 with
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, arrested in January 2002 in Malaysia under the ISA. Brother
of Fajar Sidiq.

Agus Dwikarna, arrested in Manila in March 2002. Active in the PAN political
party, former member of HMI-MPO, the conservative wing of the Islamic Students'
Association, and a businessman, he is also head of Laskar Jundullah, the
security unit of the Committee to Uphold Islamic Law (KPSI) in Makassar. He also
serves as secretary of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council. In his role as head of
the aid agency KOMPAK, reportedly funded through Muslim Aid in Britain, he went
frequently to Poso, Sulawesi. He was arrested once before in Makassar for
attacking a karaoke bar at the Country Inn. 

Agus Sunarto, a member of the editorial board of the ar-Risalah newsletter in
the early 1980s, Sunarto fled to Malaysia in 1985. He returned to Indonesia in
1998. He was imprisoned for a year in 1979.

Andi Mohamed Taqwa, from Bone, Sulawesi, studied in Yogyakarta and Pondok Ngruki
in the early 1980s. Nephew of Mohamad Jabir. Introduced South Sulawesi Darul
Islam figure Sanusi Daris to Abdullah Sungkar in 1984. Part of the Malaysian
exile group from Ngruki, reportedly in charge of trying to recruit volunteers
for Afghanistan in 1986. Resident in Sweden, from where he tried to declare an
independent state of Sulawesi (Negara Sulawesi Raya).

Aris Rahardjo, teacher at Pondok Ngruki, arrested in 1978 in connection with
Komando Jihad. Serves on executive committee of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia in
the Inter-Mujahidin Communications Department.

Ba'asyir. See Abu Bakar Ba'asyir

Bauw, Hasan. Papuan from Fakfak linked to Pondok Ngruki, killed in Solo in 1979
for informing on activities of the Warman group.

Danu, See Haji Danu Mohamad Hasan 

Fajar Sidiq (Fadjar Shadiq), member of the editorial board of ar-Risalah in
Yogyakarta in the early 1980s; joined the Ngruki exiles in Malaysia in 1986.
Brother of Agung Riyadi, arrested in Malaysia in January 2002 under the Internal
Security Act for alleged membership in Jemaah Islamiyah. 

Fathur Rahman al-Gozi, from Madiun, East Java, arrested in Manila in January
2002 and convicted for illegal possession of explosives, former Ngruki student
who studied in Pakistan, spent some time in Malaysia and married a Malaysian
woman. His father, Zaenuri, served time in prison for alleged links to Komando
Jihad.

Fikiruddin (Fihiruddin) Muqti, alias Mohamed Iqbal bin Abdurrahman, also known
as Abu Jibril, born in Tirpas-Selong village, East Lombok. Became well-known
preacher (muballigh) at the Sudirman Mosque in Yogyakarta in early 1980s. Fled
to Malaysia in 1985, later joined by wife. Arrested by Malaysian authorities and
charged with membership in Jemaah Islamiyah in 2002. Made frequent trips to
Indonesia, appears on a tape recruiting volunteers to fight in Maluku conflict.
Became a member of executive committee of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia in August
2000.

Gaos Taufik, West Java Darul Islam fighter who settled outside Medan; became
caught up in Komando Jihad, reportedly inducted Abdullah Umar and Timsar Zubil,
among others.

Haji Danu Mohamad Hasan, close associate of Kartosuwirjo in the original West
Java Darul Islam, key figure in Komando Jihad. Reportedly employed by state
intelligence agency, BAKIN, in the mid-1970s and had close ties to the Siliwangi
division of the army. 

Hambali, alias Riduan Isamuddin, alias Nurjaman,  accused of being the
Indonesian most closely associated with al-Qaeda. Linked to members of the
Ngruki network in exile in Malaysia.

Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, inspired Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir to develop his usroh groups.

Hasnul Ahmad, businessman at whose house many of the Jemaah Islamiyah activities
of the mid-1980s were conducted. Close ties to the Ngruki network in Malaysia
through Muchliansyah.

Hispran, See Pranoto, Haji Ismail


Irfan Suryahardy (Irfan Awwas S.), born in Tirpas-Selong village, East Lombok, 4
April 1960. Attended Gontor pesantren. Edited ar-Risalah newsletter in early
1908s, founded activist Muslim student organization called Badan Komunikasi
Pemuda Mesjid (BKPM). Arrested on subversion charges, sentenced on 8 February
1984 to 13 years in prison, served nine, the last six of them at one of
Indonesia's most notorious prisons, Nusakambangan. Head of executive committee
of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia. Brother of Fikiruddin. 

Jabir, Mohamad. Former South Sulawesi Darul Islam fighter who died in custody in
1986 after being arrested on charges of plotting to murder Soeharto. A
businessman, he was a popular imam in the Tanjung Priok area of Jakarta and was
named in trial documents as a key figure in the Jakarta branch of Jemaah
Islamiyah. The uncle of Andi Mohamed Taqwa, Jabir was married to the daughter of
a West Java Darul Islam leader.
 
Kadungga, Abdul Wahid, son-in-law of Kahar Muzakkar, founded Islamic students
organization called PPME in 1971 while studying in Cologne, Germany. Helped Abu
Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar establish themselves in Malaysia in 1985,
moved to the Hague in the 1980s, developed close friendship with Usama Rushdi of
Gama Islami, a split-off of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Involved in the
initial meeting setting up the KPSI organization in Makassar in 2000. Has close
ties to Malaysian PAS leaders. .

Kahar Muzakkar, leader of the Darul Islam rebellion in South Sulawesi from 1950
to 1965. Born La Domeng in Luwu, South Sulawesi in 1921, he rebelled after the
Indonesian army refused to incorporate his forces as a separate brigade. Died in
1965 after being shot in a raid carried out by Mohamad Jusuf, later Indonesian
Defense Minister.

Kartosuwirjo, Sekarmadji Maridjan, leader of the West Java Darul Islam rebellion
1948-62.  Born in Cepu, Java in 1905, married a woman from Solo.

Mahasin Zaini, student activist in Yogyakarta, early 1980s, arrested as part of
the usroh network. Now on the executive committee of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
in the same department (Strengthening Mujahidin Resources) as Muchliansyah.

Mardjoko, sent to Malaysia form Solo in December 1985 as one of the labor
recruits for the Ngruki network.

Moertopo Ali, Indonesian army general and personal adviser to Soeharto who led
Komando Jihad operations to revive Darul Islam as a top official of BAKIN, the
state intelligence agency. 

Mohamad Yusuf, former Defense Minister, regional military commander in South
Sulawesi who led the final assault on Kahar Muzakkar in 1965. Reportedly helped
arrange the release of Sanusi Darwis in 1984.

Mubin Bustami, staff member of ar-Risalah in Yogya in the early 1980s, fled to
Malaysia with the Ngruki network and later brought his wife over.

Muchliansyah, also known as Solihin. Well-known muballigh active in Yogyakarta
at Sudirman mosque in early 1980s. Helped found the newsletter ar-Risalah. Close
to Abu Bakar Ba'syir and Abdullah Sungkar, was key member of the Ngruki network
in Malaysia, where he lived with his family, including two wives brought over
from Indonesia in 1985. Named by Indonesian prosecutors as the coordinator of
Jemaah Islamiyah operations in Jakarta in 1983-85. Returned to Indonesia with
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in November 1999, settled in Banjarmasin, Kalimantan, but
travels frequently to Jakarta. 

Mursahid, one of the labourers recruited by the Ngruki network to work in
Malaysia, 1986.

Muzahar Muhtar, young Ngruki student who accompanied Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and
Abdullah Sungkar to Malaysia when they first fled in April 1985 and subsequently
acted as a courier between Malaysia and Indonesia for the Ngruki network. Tried
on subversion charges in 1986.

Pranoto, Haji Ismail, Former senior commander of the West Java Darul Islam, used
by Ali Moertopo to  reactivate Darul Islam as Komando Jihad in the mid-1970s. He
was arrested in January 1977, tried in 1978 and sentenced to life in prison on
subversion charges. He died in Cipinang  Prison,  Jakarta.

Ridwan, labourer from Solo recruited to work in Malaysia by Ngruki network,
1986.

Rusli Aryus, member of the editorial staff of ar-Risalah newsletter in
Yogyakarta in early 1980s, accompanied Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar
to Malaysia in April 1985.

Safki, member of the Jemaah Islamiyah network in Jakarta in 1984-85, involved in
several violent crimes, fled to Malaysia briefly in 1985, then returned to
Jakarta where he was arrested. He later committed suicide.

Sanusi Daris, "Minister of Defense" for Kahar Muzakkar, arrested in 1982 in
South Sulawesi, tried in 1984, joined Abdullah Sungkar in Java after his release
through the efforts of Andi Mohamed Taqwa, then moved to Malaysia, first to
Negeri Sembilan, then to Sabah.

Shobbarin Syakur, member of the usroh network, arrested in the mid-1980s, now
secretary-general of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia

Solihin, see Muchliansyah

Syahroni, Ahmed, gang leader in South Jakarta in mid-1980s, close to Hasnul
Ahmad and Muchliansyah, involved in violent crimes with Safki as a member of
what the government alleged were Jemaah Islamiyah operations in Jakarta. Fled
briefly to Malaysia to join Ngruki exiles  in 1985.

Taqwa. See Andi Mohamed Taqwa
 
Warman, Musa. Involved in a series of violent crimes in 1979 including the
murder of the assistant rector of a university in Solo whom Warman held
responsible for the 1978 arrests of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah
Sungkar.Warman was reportedly captured and killed in 1981.

Warsidi, head of a religious school in Way Jepara, Lampung. Warsidi had
established a Jemaah Islamiyah in 1985 in accordance with the teaching of
Abdullah Sungkar, who had stayed there en route to Malaysia. The school in 1989
became the site of a bloody siege by the army led by then Col. Hendropriyono.