[Nasional-e] [Nasional] IBRAHIM ISA -- SELECTED INDONESIAN NEWS--- LYDIA'S NEWSBULLETIN, 14.11.MORNING.

[munindo]

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AMROZI  LIED TO ESCAPE  FIRING SQUAD

INDONESIA  -  THE FEAR FACTOR
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Lydia's Newsbulletin
14-11-2002 Morning Edition

This bulletin is dedicated to the memory of Lydia Klijn, for more than 20
years active member of the Dutch Section of Amnesty International and
responsible for the "Indonesia & Oost-Timor Bulletin", who passed away
on  1-6-2001

Amrozi lied to escape firing squad                              1
What the bomber told the police interrogator                    2
10-Yr Sentence Sought For 3 Indonesians In E Timor Trial        3
Indonesia: the fear factor                                      4
"WAR ON TERROR" IMPERILING ACTIVISTS, SAYS U.N.                 9


Sydney Morning Herald
november 15, 2002

Amrozi lied to escape firing squad

By Darren Goodsir and Wayne Miller

The man who built the Bali bombs, Amrozi - whose laughing confession has
outraged Australians - lied during the public interrogation with national
police chief D'ai Bachtiar to minimise his role and avoid a firing squad.

"In the name of God [Allah], I did not plant the bomb," Amrozi told the
police chief in the surreal 50-minute interview.

But instead of simply constructing the devices, Indonesian investigators and
Australian Federal Police believe Amrozi was one of three operatives who
planted the bombs in Paddy's Irish pub and the van parked outside the Sari
Club on October 12.

Witnesses have identified Amrozi, who had shoulder-length hair at the time,
as being in Jalan Legian shortly before the blasts.

As the manhunt for about 10 gang members intensified, Indonesian police
yesterday said their inquiries had extended to Malaysia and other nations in
the region - with Interpol playing a co-ordinating role.

Indonesian police spokesman Brigadier-General Edward Aritonang
said the mastermind of the Bali attacks was a man called Imam Sumadra, alias
Hudama, who is thought to be the head of one of four Jemaah Islamiah chapters
in South-East Asia.

Intelligence officers believe Sumadra met with Asia's most wanted man, senior
Jemaah Islamiah operative Hambali, near the Thai-Malay border early this year
to plan the attacks.

Sumadra then orchestrated the bombings.

Amrozi has told Indonesian police he travelled to Malaysia in 1985, 1992 and
again in 1994, where he fell under the influence of his radical brother
Muklas, Abu Bakar Bashir - the spiritual leader of the banned terrorist
organisation - and another cleric, Ja'afar Umar Thalib.

He decided "to fight against everyone who suppressed Islam", he told the
general.

Amrozi has said he met Sumadra two years ago and was asked to buy explosives
for bombings in Ambon.

Amrozi's other younger brother, Ali Imron, is also a major suspect. The
Herald has learnt that Imron rented a unit in Jalan Marlboro, on the
outskirts of Denpasar, on September 29, under the name Jhoni Hendrawan.

Three other men were seen in the unit by the caretaker, Sariyati Banyuwangi,
who also saw a wrapper for a mobile phone SIM card lying on the floor.

On October 8, Imron bought a SIM card for a mobile phone from a nearby shop.

Police believe the bombers stayed in touch by text messaging each other on
mobile phones.

Imron was last seen at the unit on October 10, two days before the blasts
which claimed almost 200 lives.

Police plan to release on Sunday pictures of the gang members still at large.

Yesterday, five more bodies were identified: three Australian, one from
France and one from the Netherlands.

Today a cleansing service will be held at the Sari Club bomb site, attended
by families of the victims, including 27 Australian families, and dignitaries
from around the world.

------------------------------------
Sydney Morning Herald
November 15, 2002

What the bomber told the police interrogator

Extracts of the interview between Amrozi, the confessed Bali bomber, and the
Indonesian national police chief, D'ai Baktiar, in a public interrogation at
Bali police headquarters, Denpasar, on Wednesday.

B: D'ai Baktiar

A: Amrozi

B: How are you feeling now?

A: I am getting used to it. At least I can pray and fast.

B: Were you really involved in the bombing of the Sari Club and Paddy's?

A: I was just involved in preparing the bomb.

B: How did you become involved then?

A: In 2000, Hudama asked for my help to buy some explosive material. I bought
the material in Surabaya.

I was invited to Solo by Hudama. There I met Idris (a suspect) and Martin (a
suspect). A couple of months later, we met at a market. Hudama said he
planned to explode the bombs in Bali. He would send money to me to buy the
material and a car.

B: When did you find out a bomb had exploded in Bali?

A: On October 13.

B: How did you feel?

A: I was delighted.

B: Did you feel regret?

A: I asked for the forgiveness from the God (Allah).


***

10-Yr Sentence Sought For 3 Indonesians In E Timor Trial

JAKARTA, Nov. 14 (AP)--Prosecutors on Thursday sought 10-year jail terms for
three former Indonesian officials charged with crimes against humanity in
East Timor in 1999.

The suggested sentences are the minimum for the charges under Indonesian law
and will likely further anger rights activists who have complained that
trials for massacres in East Timor have been a sham.

The three men - army Lt. Col. Asep Kuswani, police Lt. Col. Adios Salova and
district head Leonita Martins - are charged with failing to prevent
pro-Jakarta militias from attacking a church in Liquica on April 6 and
killing at least 22 people.

The three are among 18 Indonesian military and police officials held
responsible for failing to stop at least five massacres in the province
before and after it voted to break away from Indonesian rule.

Six have already been acquitted of any crimes. Only Abilio Jose Osorio
Soares, the last Indonesian governor of the province, was found guilty and
sentenced to three years in prison.

The church massacre was one of a series of bloody incidents that occurred
across the territory before and after a U.N.-organized ballot that resulted
in the independence of the half-island territory.

As many as 1,000 people were killed in the rampage that stopped when
international peacekeepers arrived.

In his demands, prosecutor Peter Silalahi said the three defendants had been
proven to have committed crimes against humanity for failing to prevent the
massacre.

"Based on that, we suggest this human rights court punish the defendants each
to 10 years in jail," Silalahi said.

Kuswani and Salova still serve in the Indonesian military. Martins lives in a
refugee camp in West Timor.

The trial was adjourned until next week. A verdict in the trial is expected
in one month's time.

East Timor gained full independence in May, after a period of transitional
rule by the United Nations following Indonesia's brutal 24-year occupation.

***

Le Monde diplomatique
November 2002

FROM WAR ON TERROR TO PLAIN WAR

Indonesia: the fear factor

Attacks attributed to Islamist groups are shaking the Philippines and
Indonesia. The Bali bombing in October has weakened President Megawati,
leading to economic difficulties and the risk that the army may intervene.

by SIDNEY JONES [director of the Indonesia project for the International
Crisis Group, Brussels and Jakarta]

THE Bali bombings on 12 October were not Indonesia's first encounter with
international terrorism, but no attack on this scale had happened before, and
no Indonesian believed that peaceful Bali would ever be a target (1). There
were ever more urgent warnings from the United States throughout September
that al-Qaida operatives were planning attacks in Indonesia, but mostly they
fell on deaf ears. Indonesians were very sceptical about the reality of the
terrorist threat. The government neither wanted to be seen as capitulating to
US pressure, nor to be viewed as returning to the Suharto-era arbitrary
arrests of political suspects. There was concern that any move against
hardline Muslims, such as the cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, would be politically
divisive, when President Megawati Sukarnoputri knew that she needed support
from Muslim parties if she was to win another term in 2004.

The atmosphere changed dramatically with the bombings: the cabinet approved a
new anti-terrorism decree on 18 October and next day Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, head
of the Jemaah Islamiyyah, was arrested. But the impact on Indonesia goes far
beyond this. President Megawati has been seriously affected by the events.
Before them she was widely regarded as unbeatable in the elections. That has
changed. There is a now a serious effort to look for a suitable contender,
both from within her Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party (Partai Demokrasi
Indonesia Perjuangan or PDIP), and from outside. Her lack of leadership had
already made PDIP members unhappy, but her performance after the bombings
appalled many. Indonesians saw no effort to direct policy, or to force her
cabinet members to speak with one voice. A senior PDIP parliamentarian told
us that she had let the country drift, and even after the bombings, there was
no sign of focus. She had become a liability: "It used to be that Megawati's
name attracted people; now it repels them."

The Indonesian armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI), whose
influence had waned with the fall of General Suharto in 1998, could be the
major beneficiary of her weakness, even though General Endriartono Sutarto,
the TNI commander, has said repeatedly that the military has no interest in a
more prominent role (2); it could, in fact, benefit in three ways.

Since the police were separated from the armed forces in 1999, they have had
primary responsibility for internal security. The army, particularly at local
level, chafed as the police usurped its role and took the opportunities for
graft and corruption that came with it. The poor performance of the police in
handling serious violence has intensified the army's resentment. Nowhere was
the incompetence of the police more obvious than in Bali, where officers
failed to seal off the bombsite and allowed anyone to tramp through it with
no concern for forensic evidence.

The new anti-terrorism regulation, adopted on 18 October, gives the military
only a small formal role as part of a task force to create strategy to combat
terrorism. But under the new law's looser rules of evidence, suspects can be
detained on the basis of intelligence reports - and a great fear of the
political reform movement in Jakarta is that the role of military
intelligence will increase, without effective checks by civilian authorities.
Both Sutarto and the army chief of staff, General Ryamizard Ryacudu, are
pressing for a new national intelligence co-ordinating body (3). The need for
better co-ordination is not disputed; the concern is how the intelligence
will be used.

Indonesians committed to military reform consider that a gradual elimination
of the territorial command structure, through which the army has posts at
provincial, district, and subdistrict levels, is critical in getting the army
out of politics. The structure brings direct influence over local politics:
the military commander is near-equal, and sometimes superior, to the civilian
executive in local decision-making. When Suharto resigned in 1998, advocates
of military reform, even within the army, agreed that the territorial
structure had to go.

Over the last two years there has been steady retreat from that position,
because of communal, ethnic and separatist violence, and the importance of
local commands as a source of revenue for military operations. New regional
commands were created in the Moluccas (Maluku in Indonesian) in 2000 and in
Aceh in 2001. After Bali, more could follow, and the army has explicitly
advocated this so it can be "closer to the people" (4). Since there is
insecurity among ordinary Indonesians after the bombings and a new nostalgia
for the Suharto era, the army might find political support for the move. This
would be a serious blow to political reform and civilian supremacy in a
democratising government.

Western governments, whose citizens or installations could again be targeted
by al-Qaida, desperately want an effective partner in the war on terror,
which could lead to increased funding and training of the TNI. But there are
great pitfalls to this: the army is still a highly politicised organisation,
and it leaks both information and weapons. Rebel movements still get most of
their arms from corrupt soldiers (and police), and the extent of the army's
involvement with the criminal world is only slowly emerging. Enforcement of
discipline is extremely weak: an attack by soldiers in September on a police
post in North Sumatra, in which a ton and a half of marijuana disappeared, is
just one of TNI's smaller problems. Trials of army officers for crimes
against humanity in East Timor have been farcical, and have undermined,
rather than strengthened, any prospect of accountability for soldiers
responsible for serious crimes.

The threat of terrorism is real, yet only a few Muslims are radicals, and
even fewer advocate violence. The best-known radical groups - Laskar Jihad,
Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defenders Front) and the Jemaah Islamiyyah
networks - have problems, but not all as a result of the bombings. And the
new heightened security may not have much of an impact on radical Islam. Most
of these groups are convinced, as are many other people in Indonesia, that
the US government planned the Bali attack to bully countries previously
reluctant to join its anti-terrorist operations to support a war on Iraq. So
reactions against the bombings are not likely to lead to a change in the
extent or content of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia.

Who are the Muslim radicals?

The Jemaah Islamiyyah is the only network with significant ties to
international terrorism, but it seems to be an elusive coalition of
underground groups, rather than a single organisation that can be easily
banned or broken up (5). The danger it poses is unlikely to be much affected
by the arrest of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, one of its alleged leaders, particularly
when the man thought to be its operational commander, Riduan Isamuddin, alias
Hambali, remains at large.

Laskar Jihad is a militia based in Yogyakarta, known for its violence in the
Moluccas and Poso (Central Sulawesi). It was formally disbanded a week before
the bombings, a decision announced over Laskar Jihad radio in Ambon on 15
October; departures began the next day. The leader of Laskar Jihad, Ja'far
Umar Thalib, is currently on trial for incitement after a violent attack in
Ambon in April. One source said Laskar Jihad was torn by internal dissent,
short of funds and infiltrated by intelligence. The disbanding of Laskar
Jihad is good news for Ambon and Poso, but what will happen to young men
recruited locally, and where are the weapons it had?

The Front Pembela Islam (FPI) is known for smashing nightclubs and
discotheques and any other places it judges to be dens of iniquity. But most
of its members are young thugs with a few Islamic leaders, headed by a cleric
named Habib Rizieq, who was detained on 16 October. He was charged with
incitement connected with an FPI raid in Jakarta on 4 October; his arrest
warrant seems to have been issued before the bombing.

All three organisations used violence, but had fundamental ideological
differences. Laskar Jihad and FPI believed that it was forbidden under
Islamic law to revolt against a Muslim government, no matter how repressive
or wayward. Laskar Jihad was ultra-nationalist, committed to Indonesia's
territorial integrity and convinced its mission was to fight Christian
separatists because the security forces were incapable of doing it. But Abu
Bakar Ba'asyir and the men of the Jemaah Islamiyyah believe that jihad
against enemies of Islam is obligatory, even if those enemies are Muslim, and
that the only acceptable government is a restoration of the caliphate.

It is too early to assess the economic impact of the bombings, but it will
obviously be serious. In the two days after, the central bank had to buy up
millions of dollarsworth of rupiahs to prevent the currency's value from
plummeting. That staved off a crash, but the bigger issue is the loss of
jobs, and the general sense of fear, particularly for foreign companies. As
an executive noted, there was not much new investment coming in, and the real
question was whether businesses already here would leave. Most were
determined to stay, despite non-essential diplomatic staff and dependents
being ordered home

Bali is likely to be deeply scarred anyway, economically and socially. Kuta,
the centre of the tourist district, is already a ghost town. Within a week of
the bombing, the occupancy of hotels dropped from 90% to 27%. The service
sector will suffer, and so will exports, as many tourists were small-scale
exporters buying handicrafts to retail abroad. These sales accounted for
almost half of Balinese exports, according to the local press (5). Local
officials expect the loss of 150,000 jobs and perhaps $20m in tax revenues
(6). Most big foreign tourist agencies have put travel to Bali on hold, and
it will take a long time for the industry to recover.

Bali may see worsening communal relations with migrants from other parts of
Indonesia, although local leaders are doing their best to ensure this does
not happen. Anti-migrant sentiment has been building for years, and because
many of the migrants are Muslim, there was a fear that the local Balinese
civilian security groups, pecalang, might take their anger out on
non-Balinese.

The bombings have temporarily displaced Indonesia's other problems: rebellion
in Aceh and Papua, and sectarian conflict in Maluku and Poso, with hundreds
of thousands of internally displaced people. And there are also problems of
decentralisation. But every response of the Megawati government to the
bombings will affect its ability to handle other challenges. After initial
arrests of Jemaah Islamiyyah suspects the government could make suspected
Acehnese guerrillas the next target under the new laws.

The government will have to address the radical Muslim groups not merely by
cracking down on them, but by providing alternatives to the way of life they
offer. This is not just an economic question, since many of the recruits come
from the educated middle class as well as from the poor. If the government
does not address the demobilisation of groups like Laskar Jihad, which may be
temporary, it may face worse problems in the future. The Indonesian
government was already in serious trouble on 12 October: the events in Bali
have deepened that.

--------------------

* Sidney Jones is director of the Indonesia project for the International
Crisis Group, Brussels

Notes:

(1) For an analysis of earlier incidents, see International Crisis Group,
"Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims," Indonesia Briefing,
Jakarta/Brussels, 10 October 2001.
(2) See, for example, "Ditandatangani, 2 Perpu Antiterorisme," Kompas,
Jakarta, 19 October 2002.
(3) "Pemerintah akan Bentuk Badan Baru Intelijen," Republika, Rabu, 17
October 2002.
(4) "KASAD: Tak Ada Lagi Kodam Bubar," Kompas, 17 October 2002.
(5) "Ekspor secara Cangkingan Terpukul," Bali Pos, Bali, 19 October 2002.
(6) Taking account that the central government granted Bali tax relief
through December 2002; see "Bali Kehilangan Pajak Rp 190 Milyar," Bali Pos,
19 October 2002 and "150 Ribu Naker Pariwisata Terancam Nganggur," Bali Pos,
18 October 2002.

Original text in English
also: Press Briefing by Special Representative for Human Rights Defenders

***

Inter Press Service
November 12, 2002

"WAR ON TERROR" IMPERILING ACTIVISTS, SAYS U.N.

By Thalif Deen

UNITED NATIONS,

   The so-called war against terrorism is endangering human rights activists,
says a senior U.N. official.

   "Some human rights defenders have been killed, while others have either
disappeared or been arrested and detained arbitrarily," said Hina Jilani, U.N.
special representative for human rights defenders.

   Jilani said that in some countries -- which she declined to name -- national
security laws that had undermined human rights in the past, have been
strengthened in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the
United States.

   In one country, people fighting and struggling against land evictions were
being charged under anti-terrorist laws, and in another, media laws were amended
to make it a crime to report statements made by "so-called terrorists," putting
journalists and human rights defenders at risk.

   "I am afraid that these laws and policies are affecting human rights in
general, and have resulted in gross violations of the rights of human rights
defenders," she added.

   The official said that human rights defenders, and in some cases their
families, were targets of intimidation and harassment.

   "As a result, many of those human rights defenders had to flee their home
countries," she told reporters last week.

   In a 15-page report released here, Jilani complained that U.N. member states
are not cooperating with her, either blocking on-site visits or dragging their
feet over requests to investigate complaints.

   At least 14 countries have not responded to her request for visits: Bhutan,
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Tunisia and Uzbekistan. More
recently, additional requests and reminders were sent to six countries: Belarus,
Chad, Nigeria, Togo, Turkey and Zimbabwe. But there have been no responses
to date.

   Jilani said that the "most serious conditions" she found during her visits
were in Latin America, where there had been a dramatic increase in threats to
the security and safety of human rights defenders.

   "The militarization of public security has increased noticeably in the
region. This has promoted the dominance of military logic, military legislation
and military practices in approaches to social control," the study noted.

   In many African countries, on the other hand, a common trend is to target
those who strive for democratic rights and criticize undemocratic governance, or
who expose corruption and abuse of power. African governments also tend to use
the judicial system as a means of harassing and punishing human rights
defenders, says the report.

   In several Asian countries, national security laws have been imposed in the
"severest forms." Repressive anti-terrorist or security laws existed in some of
these nations before the Sept. 11 attacks, "but Asian governments are using the
present circumstances to justify these practices".

   "These laws are being used in a manner that has further eroded due process
and the rule of law," the study said.

   In June, former U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson called
for an independent expert or a new international body to monitor the impact of
anti-terrorism measures on human rights worldwide.

   Robinson regretted that no international institution was assessing whether
measures taken by member states to combat terrorism are in violation of human
rights standards that those states have accepted.

   She said that a new counter-terrorism committee created by the U.N. Security
Council late last year does not believe it has a mandate to monitor these
excesses.

    The great concern now is that where mature democracies blur the lines or set

a bad example, undemocratic regimes consider they are given a green light to
pursue repressive policies, secure in the belief that any excesses will be
ignored, Robinson added.

   Several nations, particularly the United States, Britain, Germany and Canada,
along with Egypt, Russia and Uzbekistan, have introduced far-reaching
anti-terrorism measures, some of which are in violation of basic human rights.

   These include detention of non-citizens, tightening of immigration laws,
electronic surveillance without court order, deportation of those overstaying
their visas, and monitoring of mail and communications between a prisoner and an
attorney.

   The new restrictive measures also cover privacy rights, fair trial, the right
to seek asylum, political participation, freedom of expression and peaceful
assembly.

   Robinson said that the post-Sept. 11 environment is reinforcing a fortress
mentality within Europe , as controls are tightened and there is a coarsening
of debate and of language used in speaking of asylum seekers and immigrants.

   Jilani told reporters last week that she was also "very concerned" that
governments were using the war on terrorism "to justify the policy of detaining
asylum seekers."

   She said that far too many governments were formulating new laws defining
ordinary forms of civil disobedience as "terrorism" by creating new offences
related to "incitement", restricting rights of assembly and suspending normal
legal guarantees by extending the period allowed for detentions without trial.

   U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has also warned member states that there
should be no trade-off between the fight against terrorism and the protection of
human rights.

   Although Annan refused to identify countries by name, he said that the
anti-terrorism measures now being adopted by some countries should not unduly
curtail human rights or give others a pretext to do so".

   In its annual report this year, London-based Amnesty International (AI)
specifically criticized the United States and Britain for undermining human
rights in its fight against terrorism. AI Secretary General Irene Khan said that
the U.S.-led coalition was riding roughshod over international humanitarian law
and principles.

   AI also listed several significant human rights failings  by the United
States, including authorization of military tribunals to try alleged terrorists;
selective application of Geneva Convention guarantees for Taliban and al-Qaeda
prisoners held at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, and
indefinite detention of foreigners held without charge or access to lawyers.

=====================

UN Press Office
November 12, 2002

Headquarters Press Briefing by Special Representative for Human Rights
Defenders

Concerns that post-11 September anti-terrorism laws, policies and strategies
had been used to undermine human rights across the world were evoked at a
press briefing this morning by Hina Jilani, Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Human Rights Defenders.

Ms. Jilani, who presented her report on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders to the Third Committee of the General Assembly yesterday, told
correspondents that the report was an overview of consultations she had held
with human rights defenders in different regions of the world.

She said that existing national security laws, which had undermined human
rights in the past, had now been strengthened and more forcefully enforced in
the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. "I am afraid that
these laws and policies are affecting the work of human rights in general,
but have resulted in gross violations of the rights of human rights
defenders," said Ms. Jilani.

In one country she had been told that people fighting and struggling against
land evictions were being charged under anti-terrorist laws, and that in
another country media laws were amended to make it a crime to report
statements made by "so-called terrorists", putting journalists and human
rights defenders at risk.

The Special Representative was concerned that there were many instances where
governments had used the campaign against terrorism to take action against
pro-independence movements. She added that anti-terrorism campaigns had given
governments a pretext for extending military operations to occupied
territories and using force.

There was one particular country, she said, where internal security laws had
been reinforced using security threats as a justification. Under such
internal security laws, she noted, pro-democracy activists had been
imprisoned. It had become very easy for governments to target opponents by
labelling them as terrorists, she stated. Smear campaigns had been used by
governments as a means to discredit human rights defenders protesting laws
and policies that fell below the standards essential for the promotion and
maintenance of human rights.

"I am also very concerned that governments are using the war on terrorism to
justify the policy of detaining asylum seekers," she said. She also expressed
concern that far too many governments were adopting laws defining ordinary
forms of civil disobedience as terrorism, by creating new offences related to
"incitement", restricting rights of assembly and suspending normal legal
guarantees by extending the period allowed for detentions without trial.

For her report, she said, she had held consultations in West Africa, Asia,
Latin America, the Middle East and the European Mediterranean regions, and
found similarities in the political, economic and social conditions which
affected the rights and security of human rights defenders throughout those
regions.

Human rights defenders, she said, often operated in situations of armed
conflict and struggles for independence and self-determination. She noted
that the most serious conditions she found during her visits to different
regions were in Latin America, where there had been a dramatic increase in
threats to the security and safety of human rights defenders.

Some had been killed, said Ms. Jilani, while disappearances, arbitrary
arrests and detentions had also been recorded. But human rights defenders
were not the only targets of intimidation and harrassments -- their families,
too, were being targeted for intimidation. As a result, she stated, many of
those human rights defenders had to flee their countries. She noted that
human rights defenders were complaining that it was becoming more and more
difficult for them to gain access to information in case of arbitrary arrests
and detentions, making the work of monitoring human rights and State
practices even more difficult.