[Nasional-e] [Nasional] Islamic Extremist in Indonesia - AL-QAEDA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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EMBARGOED FOR 17:00 JAKARTA TIME

8/8/02                                                                           
ASIA Briefing

Jakarta/Brussels. TK 8 August 2002

AL-QAEDA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE CASE OF THE "NGRUKI NETWORK" IN INDONESIA
 

OVERVIEW
One network of militant Muslims has produced all the Indonesian nationals so far
suspected of links to al-Qaeda. This briefing paper explains how that network
emerged, its historical antecedents, and the political dynamics over the last two
decades that led some of its members from Indonesia to Malaysia to Afghanistan. It
is part of an occasional series that ICG intends to issue on the nature of radical
Islam in Southeast Asia. 

The network has as its hub a religious boarding school (pesantren or pondok) near
Solo, Central Java, known as Pondok Ngruki, after the village where the school is
located. The "Ngruki network" began to coalesce in the late 1970s as Indonesian
intelligence operatives embarked on an operation to expose potential political
enemies of then President Soeharto from the Muslim right. It drew in additional
members in the early 1980s, many of whom had served time in prison for
anti-government activities. An inner core of the network, led by the two founders
of Pondok Ngruki - Abdullah Sungkar (now dead) and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir - and
radicalised by repression at home, fled to Malaysia in 1985.  Some associated with
the Ngruki network returned to Indonesia after Soeharto's resignation in 1998;
others stayed in Malaysia but continued to be in close contact with those who went
back.

Most members of the network share common characteristics: loyalty to Pondok Ngruki
or its founders; commitment to carrying on the struggle of Darul Islam rebellions
of the 1950s; desire to create an Islamic state by first establishing an Islamic
community or jemaah islamiyah, and shared experiences of political detention in
the 1980s. Many are on the executive committee of an organisation formed in
Yogyakarta in 2000 called the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian
Mujahidin Council).

The problem is that the Ngruki network is far wider than the handful of people who
have been accused of ties to al-Qaeda, and includes individuals with
well-established political legitimacy for having defied the Soeharto government
and gone to prison as a result. Many Indonesians have expressed concern that
pressure from the U.S. and Southeast Asian governments on Indonesian authorities
to carry out preventive arrests of suspects without hard evidence could be
seriously counterproductive. It could easily turn the targets of that pressure
into heroes within the Muslim community - as has happened with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir
- to the point that they become the beneficiaries of substantial political and
financial support. And with a combination of a highly politicised national
intelligence agency and law enforcement institutions and courts that are both weak
and corrupt, such pressure could lead to a recurrence of the arbitrary arrests and
detentions that characterised the Soeharto years. 

Indonesia is not a terrorist hotbed. Proponents of radical Islam remain a small
minority, and most of those are devout practitioners who would never dream of
using violence.  But even a tiny group of people can cause an immense amount of
damage. The challenge, both for the Indonesian government and the international
community, is to be alert to the possibility of individuals making common cause
with international criminals, without taking steps that will undermine Indonesia's
fragile democratic institutions.
 

I.	AL-QAEDA LINKS: THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE 
Following the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September
2001, authorities in Singapore, Malaysia, and the United States became convinced
that a terror network linked to al-Qaeda was operating in the region. In December
2001, Singapore authorities arrested fifteen Muslim militants suspected of working
with al-Qaeda. Later, a videotape found in Afghanistan confirmed the Singapore
connection. Thirteen of the Singapore detainees were said to be members of a cell
of an organisation that authorities identified as Jemaah Islamiyah. Eight of the
thirteen reportedly had training in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. They were
believed to be planning to bomb a shuttle bus service carrying U.S. military
personnel, as well as U.S. naval vessels in Singapore.  Singapore authorities said
at the time that the arrested men reported to an Indonesian based in Malaysia
known as Hambali.   

With the naming of Hambali, and with related arrests of alleged Jemaah Islamiyah
members in Malaysia, including several Indonesian nationals, attention shifted to
an Indonesian preacher named Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. In a speech in Singapore in May
2002, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew stated:

Interrogation [of the suspects detained in Singapore] disclosed that Abu Bakar
Baasyir, the leader of the Indonesian Mujahideen Council in Indonesia, was the
overall leader of the JI organisation, which covered both Malaysia and Singapore.
He was a member of Darul Islam, which aimed at the violent establishment of an
Islamic state in Indonesia since the late 1940s. He was in Malaysia for 14 years
to avoid detention by the Soeharto government and returned in 1999 after Soeharto
fell from power.  

Ba'asyir, the founder of a religious school in Ngruki, outside Solo, Central Java,
tried unsuccessfully to sue the Singapore government for defamation after similar
statements from Minister Lee in February 2002. He is teaching openly at his school
and has gained many admirers both for defying attempts to connect him to al-Qaeda
and questioning U.S. motives in the war against terrorism. For the last two
decades, he has been associated with small groups called jemaah islamiyah whose
teachings had both religious and political content. 

Through a complex network described in this report, Ba'asyir also is linked to the
small handful of Indonesians who have been accused of having direct or indirect
ties to al-Qaeda. Four men in particular stand out among those arrested or
currently being sought:

q	Fathur Rahman al-Gozi, detained in Manila since January 2002 on the charges of
illegal possession of explosives and falsification of documents. He reportedly
confessed to having taken part in a series of bombings in Manila in December 2000,
and Philippines authorities have said he took part in the plans to attack American
assets in Singapore. Al-Gozi, 30, is from Madiun, East Java, and is a former
Ngruki student. 

q	Hambali, alias Riduan Isamuddin, alias Nurjaman who is thought to be al-Qaeda's
main Indonesian contact. From Cianjur, West Java, he remains at large but may be
in Indonesia. He has been linked by Southeast Asia intelligence sources and the
Indonesian police to a wave of bombings in Indonesia in December 2000; the Manila
bombings in which al-Gozi reportedly participated; and plans to attack American
navy personnel at a Singapore train station.  Minister Lee referred to Hambali as
"Ba'asyir's right-hand man."


q	Abu Jibril, alias Fikiruddin (Fihiruddin) Muqti, alias Mohamed Iqbal bin
Abdurrahman, in detention in Malaysia under the Internal Security Act since
January 2002. Jibril appears on a videotape recruiting fighters for the Moluccan
conflict, but Southeast Asian intelligence sources also claim he was a financial
conduit for al-Qaeda in the region.  He is from Lombok, east of Bali.

q	Agus Dwikarna, detained in Manila since March 2002 on charges of illegal
possession of explosives. The evidence appears to have been planted in Dwikarna's
suitcase. Philippine authorities have said that based on information from al-Gozi
and some of the men detained as terrorist suspects in Singapore, Dwikarna is
thought to have been involved in bombings in Manila and Jakarta and to have had
communication with Fathur Rohman al-Gozi.  The precise nature of any suspected
links to al-Qaeda have never been made public.

It is important to underscore that with the exception of Fathur Rahman al-Gozi,
who has been sentenced by a Philippines court to two terms of twelve and six years
respectively, and Hambali, who has not been apprehended, no convincing evidence of
involvement in terrorist activities has been made public against these suspects. 
Fikiruddin, alias Abu Jibril, is detained under the Internal Security Act in
Malaysia on charges of having undergone military training in Afghanistan a number
of years ago, working to establish a "Nusantara Islamic State" (Daulah Islamiah
Nusantara), endangering the safety of Malaysia by preaching jihad and the
desirability of dying as a martyr (mati syahid), and giving lectures to members of
a Malaysia militant group, three members of which subsequently underwent military
training in Maluku.  The official indictment contains no reference to al-Qaeda.

All the men named above are linked in one way or another to the group of
Indonesian exiles in Malaysia throughout the late 1980s and most of the 1990s
under the spiritual guidance of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar. Ba'asyir
was not involved in the Darul Islam rebellions of the 1950s, but those
rebellions   constitute a crucial element of the Ngruki network's heritage.

II.	THE ORIGINS: DARUL ISLAM
The Ngruki network's interest in establishing an Islamic state draws heavily on
the experience of the Darul Islam rebellions. These rebellions, in Aceh, South
Sulawesi, and West Java, were only three of numerous regional political movements
that broke out in the aftermath of Indonesia's successful guerrilla war against
the Dutch. In each case, they were led by charismatic militia commanders from
"modernist"  Muslim backgrounds who controlled significant territory during the
revolution and were reluctant to surrender their authority to the new central
government. In each case, whatever the original cause of the rebellion, they ended
up demanding an Islamic state.

The leader in West Java, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo, remains the primary
political inspiration for Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, his associates, and the thousands of
others - but still a minority - in Indonesia who desire implementation of Islamic
law. Kartosuwirjo had been active in Muslim nationalist politics in the Dutch East
Indies before the Second World War. He had helped organise Hizbullah, a volunteer
militia set up under the auspices of Masjumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia,
All-Indonesia Muslim Council), during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, and
helped turn Masjumi into a political party after the war's end.  But he became
deeply disillusioned with the pre-independence political manoeuvring of Masjumi's
components, and in 1947 began gathering his militia members together in West
Java.  

In January 1948, after the Indonesian nationalists were forced to reach a
much-hated agreement with the Dutch to withdraw forces from parts of Java,
Kartosuwirjo announced the establishment of the Islamic Army of Indonesia (Tentara
Islam Indonesia, TII). At that point, he regarded the Dutch government, not the
newly declared Indonesian republic, as the enemy and had not yet declared a
separate state.  But, as he consolidated his authority in West Java and began to
set up political and administrative structures, clashes with the new republican
army were inevitable. On 7 August 1949, Kartosuwirjo officially proclaimed the
Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia or NII), and proceeded to fight
the Indonesian republic for the next thirteen years.  The areas of West Java under
NII control were called Darul Islam, "Abode of Islam", hence the name of the
movement. Kartosuwirjo was finally arrested in 1962.

In South Sulawesi, the rebellion broke out as a result of the new Indonesian
army's refusal to incorporate local militia units en bloc as a separate brigade.
The commander of those militias was Kahar Muzakkar (also spelled Qahhar
Mudzakkar), from Luwu, in the northern part of South Sulawesi. Like Kartosuwirjo,
he came from the modernist stream of Indonesian Islam and was educated in
Muhammadiyah schools, first in Sulawesi, then in Solo, Central Java; he was also
active in the wartime Hizbullah. But the rebellion he led only took on a
distinctly Islamic cast in 1952, after Kartosuwirjo made contact, and the two
movements joined forces, at least on paper. 

Kahar Muzakkar had impeccable nationalist credentials. He had been one of
Sukarno's bodyguards in 1945. From Java, he helped recruit guerrillas from among
Sulawesi youths studying there and infiltrated them back into Sulawesi. Despite a
noteworthy clash in 1947 with a young Javanese lieutenant colonel named Soeharto
that led to a temporary demotion, he remained an important figure in the
revolution. He was sent back to South Sulawesi in 1950 and worked to establish the
authority of the young republic. For this, he expected his forces to be rewarded
with positions in the newly established Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). Instead,
the army leadership, determined to demobilise as many of the militia fighters as
possible, not only rejected a separate brigade led by Muzakkar but also seemed to
treat the Sulawesi fighters as poor cousins to their counterparts in Java and
Sumatra. As a result, Kahar Muzakkar broke with the new republic and led a
rebellion that lasted until he was tracked down and shot by the military in
February 1965.

Kahar Muzakkar never really articulated a vision of an Islamic state; he was
always more focused on Sulawesi, and on South and Southeast Sulawesi in
particular. At different times, however, he did reach out to other parts of
Indonesia. In 1953, he proclaimed Sulawesi part of the "Negara Republik Islam
Indonesia" (NRII, Indonesian Islamic Republic).  

Meanwhile regional dissatisfaction with Jakarta resulted in rebellions in several
parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi and the formation of a rebel government - PRRI - in
1958. The PRRI and a related rebellion in Sulawesi were soon brought under control
by the central government but not fully defeated. In February 1960, the Republic
of the Union of Indonesia was announced, comprising Kahar Muzakkar's NRII and the
remnant forces of the PRII.  But these efforts were always largely more against
the central government than in support of an Islamic state.

The third of the rebellions known as Darul Islam, in Aceh, has less direct
relevance to the Ngruki network, although it is noteworthy that the Free Aceh
rebel movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) emerged in 1976, at exactly the same
time that Komando Jihad operations were underway, and initially drew many of its
recruits from the families of former Darul Islam fighters.

Following the defeat of the regional rebellions by the mid-sixties, the key
figures disappeared from public view. Many surrendered to the government and were
given amnesty; some were even incorporated into the army. Some fled to Malaysia.
And some remained quietly out of sight in Indonesia, including Kahar Muzakkar's
defence minister, Sanusi Daris, who in the mid-1980s reappeared as a link between
the South Sulawesi radicals and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's group.

III.	EMERGING IN THE 1970s
A little over a decade later after they were crushed, the Darul Islam movements
came back into focus. President Soeharto - Kahar Muzakkar's old enemy - had been
in power since 1966.  As elections were approaching in 1977, the one permitted
Muslim party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP) was gathering strength as the
loyal opposition. A vote for the PPP (or the nationalist PDI) was the only way
ordinary Indonesians in the tightly controlled state could express dissatisfaction
with the government. To pre-empt the possibility of a large PPP vote, Gen. Ali
Moertopo, in charge of covert operations for Soeharto, reactivated Darul Islam,
although some people close to old Darul Islam leaders say that he merely moved in
to manipulate a movement that had already shown signs of revival. 

Through the intelligence agency, BAKIN, former Darul Islam fighters, primarily but
not exclusively from Java, who had been incorporated into the Indonesian army and
government, were persuaded to contact their old comrades.  The argument provided
by BAKIN was that, with the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, Indonesia was in danger
of Communist infiltration across the Indonesian-Malaysian border in Borneo, and
that only the reactivation of Darul Islam could protect Indonesia. Whether through
coercion or money or a combination of both, a number of DI leaders rose to the
bait, and by mid-1977, the government had arrested 185 people whom it accused of
belonging to a hitherto unknown organisation called Komando Jihad, committed to
following the ideals of Kartosuwirjo and establishing the Islamic state of
Indonesia (NII).  In realty, the Komando Jihad was Ali Moertopo's creation.

Two men accused of being leading Komando Jihad figures were Haji Ismail Pranoto,
more commonly known by the acronym Hispran, and Haji Danu Mohamad Hasan. Both had
been close associates of Kartosuwirjo. In 1983, Haji Danu told a court trying him
on subversion charges that he had been recruited by BAKIN as early as 1971, and
that under instructions from the West Java (Siliwangi) division of the army, he
had called his former comrades-in-arms together to discuss how to counter the
communist threat. One such meeting, he said, had taken place at the Siliwangi
headquarters in Bandung. The prosecutor said that between 1970 and 1977, Haji Danu
and six others, including Kartosuwirjo's son, had set up an elaborate
administrative structure which paralleled that of the old Darul Islam movement.
Even though their activities apparently ceased in 1977, the seven were not
arrested until 1981 when a new government-sponsored campaign against political
Islam was beginning as the 1982 general election approached. 

Hispran, who became linked to Abu Bakar Bas'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar, was a
native of Brebes in Central Java, near the border of West and Central Java. He had
been a commander under Kartosuwirjo. Arrested on 8 January 1977 and put on trial
in September 1978, he was charged with having tried since 1970 to regroup the old
Darul Islam forces to overthrow the government. His lawyers tried unsuccessfully
to have Ali Moertopo called as a witness.  

>From the beginning, Komando Jihad and what government prosecutors called Jemaah
Islamiyah (Islamic community) intersected, although it was never clear whether the
government was attributing more structure to the latter than was in fact the case.
Komando Jihad was the label applied by the government and the Indonesian media to
the former Darul Islam fighters, who never used it themselves. The term "Jemaah
Islamiyah" appears in court documents from the 1980s to refer to the new
organisation that the Darul Islam men thought they were setting up. But while the
Darul Islam members certainly talked in terms of establishing Islamic communities
in a generic sense, government prosecutors offered little hard evidence that
Jemaah Islamiyah was in fact an organisation with an identifiable leadership. 

It was a premise of the Darul Islam movement, later adopted by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir
and his followers, that setting up a Jemaah Islamiyah was a necessary precursor to
the establishment of an Islamic state. The various incarnations of Darul Islam
through the 1970s and 80s, as will be seen below, saw the establishment of small
jemaah committed to living under Islamic law as an essential part of their overall
strategy. When suspects "confessed" to being members of Jemaah Islamiyah, they may
have been referring to this phenomenon.

The government's case that Komando Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah were linked surfaced
early on in the case of Gaos Taufik in Medan, North Sumatra. Gaos was allegedly a
Komando Jihad leader for Medan. Once a fighter in the West Java Darul Islam, he
had moved with other ex-DI members to a village in North Sumatra after DI's defeat
in the early 1960s. In 1975, according to one indictment, Gaos Taufik invited a
young Muslim teacher from eastern Flores named Abdullah Umar to attend a meeting
at the home of a well-known community leader in Medan. 

At the meeting, according to the prosecution, Taufiq discussed how the Soeharto
government had violated Islamic law, suggested that those in attendance join an
organisation called Jemaah Islamiyah committed to the strict implementation of
Islamic law, and invited them to swear an oath. The meeting was reported to
Indonesian authorities, and in July 1977, Taufik and the man at whose house the
meeting was held were arrested. Abdullah Umar, the teacher, was arrested in 1979.  
A.	ABU BAKAR BAS'ASYIR AND ABDULLAH SUNGKAR
The Komando Jihad - Jemaah Islamiyah link appears most prominently in the trial of
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar. 

Ba'asyir and Sungkar came from strikingly similar backgrounds. Both of Yemeni
descent, they were born a year apart, Sungkar in 1937 in Solo, Central Java,
Bas'asyir a year later in Jombang, East Java.  In the mid-fifties, both became
leaders of Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (GPII, Indonesian Muslim Youth
Movement), an independent and activist student group that had close ties to the
Masjumi, the main 'modernist' Islamic political party that was banned in 1960. In
1963, after two years at Pondok Gontor, a pesantren that pioneered the blending of
a modern curriculum with standard religious teachings, the younger man moved to
Solo where he met Sungkar. 

Both men were deeply involved in dakwah (proselytisation) activities, Sungkar with
Masjumi, Ba'asyir with the al-Irsyad organisation.  In 1967, they joined forces,
together with a man named Hasan Basri, to found a radio station called Radio
Dakwah Islamiyah Surakarta, the Islamic Proselytisation Radio of Surakarta (Solo).
Four years later, in 1971, they founded Pesantren al-Mu'min, which moved to its
current home in the village of Ngruki, outside Solo, in 1973 and became known as
Pondok Ngruki. 

>From his Masjumi involvement onward, Sungkar was always the more overtly political
of the two men. In 1975, the radio station was shut down by the internal security
apparatus for its political content and anti-government tone. Two years later,
Sungkar was arrested and detained for about six weeks for urging his followers not
to vote in the 1977 elections. He publicly lamented at the time that Muslim
political aspirations in Indonesia had never been met because of pressure from
civil authorities. 

While Sungkar and Ba'asyir were never part of the original Darul Islam, they were
deeply sympathetic to its aims. They were arrested on 10 November 1978 in
connection with meetings they had with Haji Ismail Pranoto, and at their trial,
four years later, the government made an explicit link between Komando Jihad and
Jemaah Islamiyah.

The government charged that in 1976, Hispran inducted them into Darul Islam by
having them swear an oath used in 1948 by Kartosuwirjo. The alleged induction took
place at Sungkar's house in Sukohardjo district, Central Java.  After a second
visit in February 1977, the prosecutors said, Sungkar was installed as military
governor of NII for Central Java and made head of a group called Jemaah Mujahidin
Anshorullah. The indictment stated that from that point on, Sungkar and Ba'asyir
began recruiting and inducting others into Jemaah Islamiyah. It is not clear how
Jemaah Mujahidin Anshorullah metamorphosed into Jemaah Islamiyah, but the
indictment suggests that in the government's estimation, the two names were
interchangeable. 

At the trial, Sungkar admitted having Hispran as a guest in 1976 and that they
agreed to form a jemaah as a way of confronting the new communist threat arising
from the fall of Vietnam. He and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir denied ever taking the oath
used by Kartosuwirjo, however, and the only evidence to the contrary is the
written testimony of Hispran, who never appeared in court and thus could not be
cross-examined.  (During his trial, Sungkar said one intelligence agent told him,
"My task is to make you admit you swore an oath to Hispran - if you don't, you'll
be in prison for the rest of your life".) 

The government's case against the two men rests far more on the content of
statements urging disobedience to secular authority than on any evidence of an
underground organisation. Sungkar, for example, is accused of urging people not to
acknowledge the validity of the Indonesian constitution because it was made by
man, not by God. 

Both men were accused of circulating a book called Jihad and Hijrah, by Pondok
Ngruki lecturer Abdul Qadir Baraja, to fellow members of Jemaah Islamiyah in Solo.
The book reportedly urged Muslims to go to war against enemies of Islam who
resisted the application of Islamic law.  They refused to fly the Indonesian flag
at their pesantren. They rejected Pancasila as the state ideology. The charges
were standard fare for the time, broadly worded accusations against two men who
dared to criticise the Soeharto government, with nothing to suggest that they
advocated violence or were engaged in criminal activity. Their arrests served only
to heighten their reputation within the growing Muslim political opposition.
B.	"TEROR WARMAN"
After they were detained, however, a series of violent crimes took place, all tied
in one way or another to people from Pondok Ngruki - and to what the government
was calling Jemaah Islamiyah. The first of these was the murder in January 1979 of
the assistant rector of Sebelas Maret University in Solo. According to court
documents, the victim was accused of revealing the existence of Jemaah Islamiyah
to the authorities and therefore being directly responsible for the arrest of
Sungkar and Ba'asyir. 

The murder was carried out by a shadowy underworld figure, known for extortion of
Chinese shopkeepers, named Musa Warman, who reportedly had ties to the army; a
Muslim Papuan named Hasan Bauw;  Abdullah Umar, the Ngruki teacher drawn into the
Komando Jihad network (see above); and a man named Farid Ghozali. Warman was also
reportedly planning to kill the judge and prosecutor responsible for the
conviction of Hispran, who was sentenced to life in prison for his Komando Jihad
activities in 1978.  If, in 1977-1978, the Indonesian government used the terms
Komando Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah interchangeably, by 1979 the same people were
also being referred to as "Teror Warman" or Warman's terrorists.

On 15 January 1979, Farid Ghozali was killed by Indonesian authorities allegedly
while trying to flee. Two days later, Hasan Bauw was shot and killed by a group
led by Warman, who accused Bauw of having informed the military of Ghozali's
impending departure. Information from Bauw, according to Warman, also was
responsible for the arrest of Abdul Qadir Baraja, the author of the book on jihad
who resurfaces repeatedly as a member of the Ngruki inner circle. 

Two robbery attempts followed, both led by Warman and both involving Abdullah
Umar, the Ngruki teacher. The first was successful. On 1 March 1979, a team led by
Warman robbed a car transporting salaries of teachers at the State Islamic
Institute in Yogyakarta. Warman reportedly promised his accomplices 20 per cent of
the Rp.3.9 million haul (U.S.$5,570 at the then exchange rate), with the rest to
be turned over to the heads of Jemaah Islamiyah. The second attempt, on 21 March
1979, at a teacher training institute (IKIP) in Malang, East Java, failed. The
noteworthy aspect of these two attempts, however, was that the perpetrators
justified them in terms of the Islamic concept fa'i, raising funds by attacking
enemies of Islam.  

At the end of 1979, it remained unclear whether Jemaah Islamiyah was a construct
of the government, a revival of Darul Islam, an amorphous gathering of like-minded
Muslims, or a structured organisation led by Sungkar and Ba'asyir. To some extent,
it was all of the above, and the name seems to have meant different things to
different people.  

There is some evidence that the Central Java jemaah was being more systematically
organised than groups elsewhere.  One witness in the trial of suspects in the
assistant rector's murder told the court that in 1979, Jemaah Islamiyah had about
100 members in the Yogyakarta area, many from the State Islamic Institute. The
organisation was divided into district (kabupaten), regional (daerah) and
provincial (wilayah) commands and focused on collection of funds and arms. The
five districts, he said, in which Jemaah Islamiyah had representatives were the
city of Yogyakarta itself, Kolon Progo, Sleman, Bantul, and Gunung Kidul. 

The operation set in motion by Ali Moertopo and Indonesian intelligence in the
1970s had several unintended consequences. It renewed or forged bonds among Muslim
radicals in South Sulawesi, Sumatra, and Java. It promoted the idea of an Islamic
state in a way that the original Darul Islam leaders had perhaps not intended, and
in doing so, tapped into an intellectual ferment that was particularly pronounced
in university-based mosques. That ferment was only beginning when Komando Jihad
was created, but through the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was fuelled by the
Iranian revolution, the availability of Indonesian translations of writings on
political Islam from the Middle East and Pakistan; and anger over Soeharto
government policies.

To university students at the time, the Darul Islam rebellions of the 1950s seemed
like an authentically Indonesian effort to fight repression while upholding
Islamic values. These ideas, combined with anger generated by arrests made in the
name of Komando Jihad and relationships made among prisoners, helped radicalise a
new generation. It is worth noting that the father of Fathur Rahman al-Gozi,
currently detained in Manila, was imprisoned in the late 1970s for alleged
membership in Komando Jihad.

IV.	EXILE IN THE 1980s
A.	JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH AND USROH, 1983-1985 
Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir were tried in 1982 and sentenced to nine
years in prison for subversion. They had been in detention since November 1978.
When in late 1982, their sentences were reduced on appeal to three years and ten
months, equivalent to their pre-trial detention, both men were released, and they
returned to Pondok Ngruki, while the prosecution appealed the reduced sentence.

The Ngruki founders had two years of freedom in Central Java before fleeing in
1985 to Malaysia, and those two years saw an extraordinary degree of organising
and network building.  The foundations for what in 2002 would be called the Jemaah
Islamiyah in Malaysia were laid during this period. It was a time of heightened
opposition across Indonesia to the Soeharto government, especially after the
policy of azas tunggal or "sole basis" was announced, requiring all organizations
to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideological basis - as opposed to, say, Islam or
Christianity.  

Muslim organisations in particular were outraged. In September 1984, a major riot
broke out in the Tanjung Priok port area of Jakarta, and army troops opened fire
on Muslim protestors, killing dozens. The riot led to an intensified government
crackdown on the Muslim opposition, and to intensified anti-government activity on
the part of militant Muslim groups, including some bombings and other acts of
violence, in which men linked to Ngruki were involved. 
B.	STUDENT ACTIVISM
By the time Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir were freed, the university
town of Yogyakarta in Central Java had become the centre of an Islamic
resurgence.  The Iranian revolution was a source of inspiration to many of the
thousands of college students in the area; Islamic discussion groups grew up on
many campuses. Mesjid Sudirman, or Mesjid Colombo, in the Sleman area of the city,
became known for its militant preachers (muballigh), as devoted to opposition to
the Soeharto government as they were to the strict implementation of Islamic law.
Among the well-known muballigh associated with Mesjid Sudirman were two men who
later joined Ba'asyir and Sungkar in Malaysia: Fikiruddin, originally from Lombok,
and Muchliansyah. 

Another member of the Ngruki inner circle, Irfan Suryahardy, now known as Irfan S.
Awwas, came to national attention at this time. The brother of the above-mentioned
Fikiriddin, he is at present the chair of the executive committee of Majelis
Mujahidin Indonesia. In 1981 he began publishing a militant Muslim newsletter,
ar-Risalah (The Bulletin), that was distributed at the Sudirman mosque and
contained everything from quotations from Ayatollah Khomeini to interviews with
former leaders of Darul Islam and criticism of particular policies of the Jakarta
government. 

In 1982, Irfan became head of the Yogyakarta office of a Muslim activist
organisation called Badan Koordinasi Pemuda Mesjid (BKPM, Coordinating Body of
Mosque Youth). As head of BKPM, he published and circulated in 1982 the full court
documents of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's and Abdullah Sungkar's trial, with commentary
from leading human rights activists. Because these publishing activities were such
a daring challenge to government attempts to suppress freedom of expression, Irfan
became a hero among student activists - even more so after the BKPM office was
raided in 1983 and he was arrested. He was sentenced in February 1986 to thirteen
years in prison on subversion charges, a heavy sentence even by Soeharto-era
standards. 

At his trial, the prosecution claimed among other things that Irfan wanted to
establish an Islamic state and was using ar-Risalah to "invite Muslims throughout
the world to bring the Islamic revolution to fruition" using the Iranian
revolution as a model. Authorities had confiscated copies of the Iranian embassy's
newsletter, Yaum al-Quds, and they accused Irfan of receiving funding from the
Middle East.  Prosecutors also accused Irfan of having been Komando Jihad's deputy
commander for the Yogyakarta area in 1979, when he was sixteen years old. No
serious evidence was produced to substantiate that claim. 

Before he was arrested, Irfan developed close associations with many other
like-minded students through the BKPM, which had an equivalent on many Indonesian
college campuses. Among the student leaders he met and became close friends with
was Agus Dwikarna, the man from Makassar who has been in detention in Manila since
March 2002. 
C.	USROH
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir used his new-found freedom to set up a new network of small
cells devoted to the implementation of Islamic teaching. He began in 1983 by
bringing former detainees to Ngruki in monthly meetings, saying that his aim was
"to collect the members of Jamaah Islamiyah who had been scattered by the arrests
of the previous years." 

Again, information about what came to be known as the usroh movement comes
primarily from the court documents prepared for the trials of usroh members who
eventually were arrested on charges of trying to establish an Islamic state.  The
defendants said they were required to swear an oath of obedience to Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir as long as his orders did not conflict with the will of God and his
Prophet.   They received instructions form Ba'asyir during meetings at Ngruki
about how to form small groups of between eight and fifteen members in their
villages or neighbourhoods, with the aim to enforce Islamic law and uphold an
Islamic way of life. 

The groups do not appear to have been particularly secretive. Members were
required to follow Islamic law as outlined in a manual written by Ba'asyir called
Usroh, derived from the teachings of Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt. A key teaching was that usroh members should avoid any
non-Islamic institutions, such as schools or courts, and that all laws other than
sharia were heathen and should thus be disobeyed.  The groups were also supposed
to collect money (infaq) to help fellow members who were sick or otherwise in
need, but 30 per cent of the collection was to be turned over to Ba'asyir for the
movement. The funds collected were insignificant. When Ba'asyir fled to Malaysia
in early 1985, the usroh movement collapsed, and most members were arrested.
D.	THE CONNECTION TO SOUTH SULAWESI
One other development during this period is worth noting, because it provides one
of several links between the Ngruki circle and men linked to the Darul Islam
rebellion in South Sulawesi. In 1982, after decades living a clandestine life,
Sanusi Daris, one of Kahar Muzakkar's deputies in that rebellion, came out of
hiding.  He was arrested almost immediately and put on trial in Makassar in 1984. 
He served only a few months before he was released, reportedly after an
intervention of Gen. Mohamad Yusuf, a former defence minister.   

Sanusi then travelled almost immediately to Java in the company of a Ngruki
student named Andi Mohamed Taqwa. Taqwa reportedly brought Sanusi to meet Abdullah
Sungkar, and the two agreed to work to reinstate the Republic Persatuan Indonesia,
the old fusion of the West Java, South Sulawesi, and South Sumatra rebellions.
Some time later Sanusi stayed briefly with Sungkar in Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia,
and eventually moved to Sabah where he reportedly maintained ties to the Ngruki
network. He died there in 1988.  

Taqwa himself was a link to other strands of the Ngruki network. After introducing
Sanusi Daris to Sungkar, Taqwa apparently joined his uncle, a former explosives
expert for the original South Sulawesi Darul Islam rebellion, in travelling
through Java and Sumatra making quiet contact with Darul Islam leaders who had not
been rearrested. In 1985, they met with Daud Beureueh, the leader of the Darul
Islam rebellion in Aceh, a meeting that reportedly had a profound effect on
Taqwa.  (The uncle, Mohamad Jabir, was arrested in late 1985 in Makassar on
charges of plotting to kill Soeharto; he was brought to Jakarta where he died in
custody, possibly as a result of torture, in January 1986.)   

Taqwa then joined Sungkar and Ba'asyir in Malaysia, and in 1986 was put in charge
of recruiting Indonesians to fight in Afghanistan as a way of strengthening the
military capacity of Jemaah Islamiyah.  He reportedly was able to find only six
volunteers. (The goal was 30.) He spent some time in Afghanistan himself,
according to ICG sources in Makassar. In 1988, he left Malaysia for Sweden, where
he was granted political asylum. He apparently went back and forth to Malaysia; an
ICG contact reported meeting him there in 1993. Apparently inspired by the
Acehnese struggle for independence, he was later reported to have proclaimed the
state of independent Sulawesi (Negara Sulawesi Raya) although there is no
indication that he ever gained any followers.
E.	THE HIJRAH TO MALAYSIA
In February 1985, the Indonesian Supreme Court heard the prosecution's appeal
against the reduced sentence of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar. The court
ruled in the prosecution's favour and issued a summons to the two men. As their
re-arrest appeared imminent, they decided to leave for Malaysia, in their view not
in flight from justice, but on a religiously-inspired hijrah (emigration) to
escape from the enemies of Islam, similar to the Prophet's hijrah from Mecca to
Medina.

Most information on the first years of the Ngruki network in Malaysia comes from
the trial documents of a young man named Muzahar Muhtar, who accompanied the two
Ngruki founders there in April 1985 and subsequently served as their courier
between Indonesia and their new home. Muzahar himself embodied some of the
elements of the Ngruki network outlined above. In 1982, he was a high school
student who belonged to a youth group (remaja mesjid) at the Sudirman mosque in
Yogyakarta; the head of the youth group was the Ngruki-linked preacher,
Fikiruddin. Muzahar enrolled in the State Islamic Institute in Yogyakarta in 1983
but later that year dropped out and in September enrolled as a student at Pondok
Ngruki. He told prosecutors that shortly thereafter, he took an oath at Pondok
Ngruki to support the Islamic state of Indonesia (NII). He also became a member of
an usroh group.

In April 1985, he said, he was ordered by Muchliansyah - the other Ngruki-linked
preacher associated with the Sudirman mosque - to accompany a group of the Ngruki
circle to Malaysia. All were going illegally; that is, without full documentation
or with false passports. The group included Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir,
Fikiruddin, Agus Sunarto, Ahmad Fallah, Rusli Aryus, Mubin Bustami, Fajar Sidiq 
and Agung Riyadi. The latter, a brother of Fajar Sidiq, is one of those arrested
in Malaysia in January 2002 under the Internal Security Act and charged with being
a member of Jemaah Islamiyah.

In August 1985, Muzahar reported, the Ngruki exiles held a series of meetings at
which they decided that they would get funds for the movement by asking "jemaah
members" in Solo to recruit fellow members to work in designated companies in
Malaysia and turn over 20 per cent of their salaries to the jemaah.  Abdullah
Sungkar had already identified a number of sympathetic Malaysian businessmen
willing to take on Indonesian workers and help the effort to establish an Islamic
state at the same time. 

The exiles also decided to send Sungkar and Ba'asyir to Saudi Arabia to seek
additional funds. At the same time, they decided to strengthen the jemaah
militarily by sending volunteers from Jakarta to train in Afghanistan. Andi
Mohamad Taqwa and a man named Abdullah Anshori, also known as Ibnu Thoyib, were to
recruit the volunteers. Anshori, whose brother, Abdur Rohim, was a Ngruki teacher,
returned to Indonesia before 1988 and appeared as a witness in Muzahar's trial. 
He then returned to Malaysia.

Sometime in August 1985, Fikiruddin and Muchliansyah ordered Muzahar to go back to
Indonesia and accompany their wives to Malaysia. He returned in September with the
women. In October 1985, Muzahar went back to Indonesia on orders of Agus Sunarto
to pick up four workers recruited from Solo; the second wife of Muchliansyah; and
the wife of Mubin Bustami. At the beginning of November, Muzahar brought the new
group safely to Malaysia. At the end of November, he was ordered to return to
Indonesia to bring back four more workers from Solo, which he did the following
month.  Muzahar went back to Indonesia again to pick up Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's wife.
She apparently was not ready to leave, so Muzahar began trading in batik to earn
enough money to return to Malaysia. He was arrested in Jakarta on 2 August 1986.

Even though very little hard information about the Ngruki network is available
from the 1990s, several points are worth noting from the Muzahar trial documents.
The link between the Ngruki network in Indonesia and the exile community in
Malaysia remained strong, not only because of teacher-student ties but because
many exiles had relatives back in Indonesia who were part of the network's inner
circle. These included the exile Abdullah Anshori, whose brother taught at Ngruki;
Fikiruddin, whose brother, Irfan Suryahardi, was released from prison in 1993 and
returned to Yogyakarta; Muchliansyah, whose wife was the sister of Fikiruddin and
Irfan; and Ba'asyir, whose wife is related to Abdul Qadir Baraja. 

Secondly, Ba'asyir and Sungkar continued to give instructions to their followers
in Jakarta through couriers. For example, it emerged during the trial that
Sungkar, through a message carried by Muzahar and delivered in August 1985, had
ordered a leading usroh figure to reactivate usroh groups in Central Java. 

Thirdly, by 1987, the network was already becoming international. At least six
Ngruki followers had left for Pakistan and Afghanistan, and more were to follow.
Several witnesses in the Muzahar trial testified that the group had decided to
send members to "Moro [Philippines], Afghanistan and Pattani [Thailand]", although
there is no reference in the documents to anyone actually having gone to Thailand
or the Philippines.  

One member of the ar-Risalah editorial board, Zakaria Qudah, also known as
Zakariya Kuddah, then 27, was in Saudi Arabia.  More than a dozen men and women
had left for Malaysia. As already noted, Andi Mohamad Taqwa, from Bone, Sulawesi
was in Malaysia and later left for Sweden. The son-in-law of Kahar Muzakkar, a man
named Kadungga, based first in Germany, then in Holland, became a key
international contact with links to a radical Egyptian group. He returned
periodically to Malaysia.

Given those international connections, it is not surprising that someone like
Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, who had been a student at Pondok Ngruki after Ba'asyir
fled to Malaysia and is now detained in Manila, could have gone from Ngruki
through Malaysia to Lahore, even though he was a generation or two younger than
the original exiles. 
F.	THE JAKARTA CONNECTION
By the time the two Ngruki founders fled to Malaysia, their network extended into
several different but connected groups. One was the old Darul Islam circle and the
people drawn into it by the activities of the late 1970s. Another was the BKPM
network of student activists and preachers centred around the Sudirman mosque in
Yogyakarta in the early 1980s that in turn was linked to the usroh network.
Another was the Ngruki circle of students and alumni. Finally, there were
individuals drawn in by the proselytisation efforts of the group's main preachers,
including Sungkar, Ba'asyir, Fikiruddin, and Muchliansyah. 

Despite the central Java locus of Pondok Ngruki and the Sudirman mosque, the
network had a wide geographic reach: the Darul Islam connections extended through
West Java, North Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and to a lesser extent Aceh. Students
from South Sulawesi, Lombok, Ambon, West Sumatra, and Lampung were key members of
BKPM in Yogyakarta; and the pattern of arrests under the Soeharto government
forced many in the network to seek refuge in Jakarta.

It was Jakarta, not central Java, that became the main backup point in Indonesia
for the Ngruki exile community in Malaysia in the mid-1980s. Muchliansyah, the
Yogyakarta preacher, was instrumental in building up the community in Jakarta from
late 1983 until he left for Malaysia in mid-1985. Couriers like Muzahar went back
and forth between Malaysia and Jakarta, Jakarta donors were an important source of
funds, and a loosely-knit congregation was established there consisting of some of
the different elements of the Ngruki network outlined above.  

The congregation was less a tightly organised underground structure committed to
establishment of an Islamic state, as the Indonesian government maintained, than a
collection of people who were being hunted for different reasons by the government
and therefore had to operate more or less clandestinely. Most were committed to
the application of Islamic law in Indonesia, many looked to Darul Islam for
inspiration, and all were opposed to the Soeharto government. But the group does
not seem to have engaged in any serious discussion, let alone planning, for
achieving specific political ends. A main focus of its concerns in 1985, for
example, was the possibility that some members were attracted to the Shiite strand
of Islam.  It did, however, attract some criminal elements, who committed robbery
and murder in the name of fa'i, not unlike the Warman group in 1978-79.

Following the raid on the ar-Risalah office in late 1983 and arrest of Irfan
Suryahardy, many of the young men involved in Irfan's immediate circle, or
connected more generally with the BKPM network, fled to Jakarta and shared a house
in the Pisangan Lama (East Jakarta) neighbourhood. The house was known as a haven
for Darul Islam and usroh fugitives - virtually anyone on the run from
Soeharto-era charges of trying to establish an Islamic state could find a
welcome.  It became the place where people en route to or returning from visiting
the Ngruki exiles in Malaysia would stay.

If Pisangan Lama was the unofficial residence of the Jakarta-based Ngruki group,
its unofficial headquarters was the house of a wealthy Jakarta contractor, Hasnul
Ahmad, in the elite south Jakarta suburb of Kebayoran Baru. Hasnul Achmad had
become a committed anti-Soeharto militant after hearing Muchliansyah preach, and
subsequently opened his house, and his chequebook, to anyone associated with
Muchliansyah. From at least 1984 onwards, training for jemaah members was
conducted in Hasnul's house along the lines of the cadre philosophy that has been
a key element of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's teachings since the late 1970s.  The
training consisted of religious instruction but with some discussion of politics.

Government prosecutors in the trial of Muzahar Muhtar tried to get witnesses to
describe the structure of the Islamic State of Indonesia or Jemaah Islamiyah
organisation, but no two versions were identical. What they had in common was
Muchliansyah as the overall coordinator, and a vague division of tasks that
included proselytisation (dakwah) and finance. In some versions of the structure,
the Tanjung Priok-based preacher from South Sulawesi, Mohamed Jabir, also played a
key role. 

The group seems to have held regular religious meetings (pengajian) in which the
main themes were the need to work for the enforcement of Islamic law, rejection of
Soeharto government policies such as the Pancasila-only doctrine, and
establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. The participants represented a
variety of approaches that ranged from Darul Islam's commitment to the
establishment of an Islamic state through armed struggle to the usroh approach of
using a cell structure to develop new cadres with a deeper commitment to an
Islamic way of life. 

A senior member of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia who was familiar with the Jakarta
group looked at the various versions of the alleged structure of the Jakarta group
at ICG's request and said there was nothing sinister about it. It was natural for
any religious organisation to have a structure and division of labour; there was
nothing, he said, to suggest that the individuals involved at the time were
engaged in Islamic rebellion. 

But there were several incidents of violence linked directly or indirectly to the
Jakarta group. One was the murder of a taxi driver and the theft of his car in
June 1985. The murder was apparently committed on the initiative of a member of
the Jakarta group named Syahroni, alias Ahmad Hikmat. Another jemaah member, Safki
Syahroni, was a gang leader with ties to leading figures in the Jakarta
underworld, who began attending the religious meetings at Hasnul Ahmad's house and
claimed he repented of his criminal deeds. He  expressed admiration for the Red
Brigades and the Japanese Red Army and reportedly advocated blowing up the
Indonesian parliament. Syahroni and Safki became committed to the idea of raising
funds for jemaah activities through fa'i, or confiscating the property of
unbelievers. The idea reportedly was endorsed, if not initiated, by Muchliansyah,
but was explicitly condemned by Abdullah Sungkar who took Muchliansyah to task in
Malaysia when he realised what had happened. 

Syahroni and Safki fled to Malaysia immediately after the murder and joined the
Ngruki circle but left in October 1985.  They were involved in the murder a year
later of Hasnul Ahmad's driver and another man. The driver had been the go-between
in a dispute over a loan made by Hasnul Ahmad to a business associate, and
Syahroni killed him because he was afraid he would go the police and endanger the
jemaah. Syahroni and Safki were arrested for the murder; Safki later committed
suicide.

In addition to Hasnul Ahmad, the other major donor of the Jakarta group (and on
whose property the murder of the taxi driver took place) was Dody Ahmad Busubul.
Dody was an Indonesian of Arab descent, who had a longstanding business
relationship with Mohammed Jabir, the South Sulawesi preacher with Darul Islam
connections mentioned above. He also appears to have had a business relationship
with a senior army officer then serving as a close personal assistant of President
Soeharto.  

By 1987, most members of the Jakarta group either had been arrested, fled to
Malaysia, or gone underground.
G.	BOROBODUR AND LAMPUNG
Two other violent incidents in the 1980s had indirect links to the Ngruki network.
In the aftermath of the Tanjung Priok riot of September 1984, Java was wracked by
a series of bomb explosions that Jakarta blamed on Muslim extremists. On 21
January 1985, one of these explosions damaged nine stupas at the newly restored
Borobodur temple in central Java, the largest Buddhist monument in the world after
Angkor Wat.  Among the seven men arrested and charged with involvement was a cloth
trader and itinerant preacher, Abdul Qadir Baraja. As noted above, Baraja, then a
lecturer at Pondok Ngruki, had been arrested in 1979 in connection with the murder
and robberies linked to the Warman group, although it is not clear on what
evidence. He was sentenced to five years in prison. When Sungkar and Bas'asyir
were tried in 1982, one minor charge was that they had circulated Baraja's book,
Jihad and Hijrah, which then was considered subversive. 

After serving his sentence in Java, Baraja, originally from Sumbawa in eastern
Indonesia, went to Telukbetung, Lampung, where he was arrested in May 1985. The
prosecution charged that in April or May 1984, Baraja met with one of the others
accused in the bombing case, a blind preacher named Husein Ali al-Habsyi, and
agreed that Islam was in danger from Christianisation and the growth of vice. 

He allegedly expressed his willingness to obtain explosives to use to demonstrate
Muslim anger against the government. In a letter produced by the prosecutors,
Baraja informed the preacher of the price of explosives in Telukbetung. In his
defence, Baraja did not deny the letter but said explosives were bought and sold
in Lampung for use in fishing, and he was supplying information at the preacher's
request, without questioning how the bombs were to be used.  Baraja was sentenced
to thirteen years in prison, increased to fifteen years on the prosecutor's
appeal.

After his release, Baraja again became part of the Ngruki inner circle and holds a
prominent position as a respected Muslim cleric in the Majelis Mujahidin
Indonesia. At his speech at the first Mujahidin Congress in August 2000, Baraja
spoke of how Kartosuwirjo, in proclaiming the Islamic state of Indonesia in 1949,
intended to restore the Muslim caliphate that had been destroyed in 1924 in a
Western conspiracy against Islam. 

In 1989, a bloody shootout at a Muslim school in Way Jepara, Lampung, became, like
Tanjung Priok, another entry on the long list of Muslim grievances against the
Soeharto government. The linkage to Ngruki was indirect. In 1985, as it became
increasingly clear that Sungkar and Bas'asyir might face reimprisonment, the
former  left Java for Lampung. He stayed briefly in a hamlet called Siderejo, in
the subdistrict of Way Jepara. As the result of his teachings, his followers, led
by a man named Warsidi, set up a jemaah islamiyah, on land donated as wakf
(endowed for religious use) by Sungkar. 

The jemaah attracted Muslims from elsewhere in the country, primarily central and
east Java.  In a meeting that took place in Cibinong, Jakarta on 12 December 1988,
a group of students decided to emigrate (hijrah) to Way Jepara to join the jemaah.
The group had developed close contacts with former Darul Islam members from Aceh
and West Java - and through a man called Ridwan, with Abdul Qadir Baraja. 

The jemaah attracted the attention of local authorities because of its hardline
teachings, including refusal to salute the Indonesian flag and rejection of
secular authority. In February 1989, Warsidi was summoned by the military and
refused to respond. The subdistrict military command then detained nine of his
followers. Believing the compound around Warsidi's school would be attacked, his
followers prepared homemade weapons and swore to resist. 

The subdistrict military commander went to meet Warsidi and was hacked to death.
The next day, the military, led by Col. Hendropriyono as head of the Korem 043
regional military command, attacked the compound.  An unknown number, believed to
be close to 100, died. Many of those who survived were detained, as were students
in Jakarta who had taken part in the 1988 meeting. The Way Jepara jemaah was
effectively destroyed, and it is unclear whether any members joined the Ngruki
exiles in Malaysia.

V.	RETURNING IN THE 1990s. 
	The Ngruki network became radicalised in the mid-1990s, largely through one of
its main international links: Abdul Wahid Kadungga, the son-in-law of Kahar
Muzakkar. 
	
	Kadungga was the man who met Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar upon their
arrival in Malaysia and arranged a place for them to stay. Part of the Darul Islam
network, he had fled to Europe and by 1971 was a student in Cologne, Germany.
There he helped found the Muslim Youth Association of Europe (PPME, Persatuan
Pemuda Muslim se-Eropa).  Through that association, he became friendly with Muslim
activists from the Middle East and gradually became more radical; he also
developed close ties to PAS in Malaysia. 
	
	Sometime in the 1980s, Kadungga moved to the Hague, and in 1989, he developed a
close friendship with Usama Rushdi, or Rashid, of Gama Islami, a breakway faction
of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan ul-Muslimin) - led by Sheikh Umar Abdul
Rahman, later convicted in the U.S. in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing case. 
Kadungga focused on providing religious training to Indonesian students studying
in Germany. He also traveled around Europe, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and
Southeast Asia during this period and stayed in regular contact with Ba'asyir and
Sungkar. 
	
	In an October 2000 article published in an Indonesian magazine, Kadungga was
described as difficult to find because he had no fixed residence. "Occasionally
he's in the Netherlands, then he's talking with top officials of PAS in Kelantan
or Trengganu, and not long after, he's conversing with Osama bin Laden in the
depths of Afghanistan."  
	
	A split occurred among the Ngruki exiles when Sungkar and Bas'asyir became close
to Gama Islami in 1995. They were reportedly introduced to the movement through
Kadungga.  As a result of their new affiliation, they moved beyond their
commitment to an Islamic state within Indonesian boundaries and took a more
radical stance which promoted the return of an international Islamic caliphate.
Fikiruddin and Muchliansyah retained their commitment to the Darul Islam vision of
an Islamic Indonesia. Only after Soeharto's resignation, when Ba'asyir and Sungkar
returned to Indonesia, did a reconciliation between the two groups take place,
through the efforts of Irfan Suryahardy.   
	
The reconciliation between the two factions of the Ngruki network apparently
involved the radicalization of Fikiruddin and those around him. Both Fikiruddin,
who adopted the name Abu Jibril, and Abdullah Anshori, who changed his name to Abu
Fatih, went to Afghanistan and Pakistan some time in the 1990s. Faiq Hafidz,
another member of the network who had been part of the Sudirman mosque group in
the early 1980s, was arrested by Malaysian authorities in January 2002; he also
spent several years in Afghanistan after leaving Indonesia. 
	
After President Soeharto resigned, not only Ba'asyir and Sungkar, but also
Muchliansyah, Agus Sunarto, Nursalim, and several other exiles returned to
Indonesia. Sungkar died a month after his return. Ba'asyir went back to Pondok
Ngruki. Muchliansyah settled in Banjarmasin, Kalimantan, Nursalim in Bandung.
	
On 5-7 August 2000, members of the Ngruki network held an extraordinary gathering
in Yogyakarta called the Mujahidin Congress, bringing together representatives of
virtually every major group committed to the implementation of Islamic law in
Indonesia. The Congress gave rise to the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian
Mujahidin Council or MMI), whose top leadership reads like a who's who of the
Ngruki network.
	
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was chosen as "commander" or Amir ul-Mujahidin of the governing
council, Ahlul Halli wal 'Aqdi. (AHWA) committed, among other things, to laying
the foundation for a new international caliphate.  Abdul Qadir Baraja was
appointed to the fatwa division of the AHWA. Muchliansyah and Fikiruddin, under
his Malaysian name of Abu Jibril, were appointed to the department of the
executive committee in charge of strengthening mujahidin resources (Departemen
Peningkatan Sumber Daya Mujahid), as was Mahasin Zaini, a former political
prisoner arrested for his connections to the usroh movement. Aris Rahardjo,
arrested in connection with the 1979 "Teror Warman" crimes, was appointed to the
department in charge of inter-mujahidin communications. Another former usroh
prisoner, Shobbarin Syakur, a veteran of the Sudirman mosque days, was made
secretary-general of the executive committee, with Irfan Awwas Suryahardy as
chair.    
A.	THE SOUTH SULAWESI CONNECTION - AGAIN
Another name that appears on the executive committee of Majelis Mujahidin
Indonesia is Agus Dwikarna, the man arrested in Manila in March 2002 and charged
with having explosive materials in his suitcase. The evidence was almost certainly
planted, and he was arrested on suspicion of having links to al-Qaeda, although it
is not clear what the concrete evidence against him is.

Agus Dwikarna's connection to the Ngruki network was initally through Irfan Awwas
Suryahardy, a close friend from the days when both were student activists working
against the Pancasila-only policy. The organisational links, however, are more
interesting, because they go back to old Darul Islam associations. Agus Dwikarna
is the head of Laskar Jundullah, the security unit associated with a
Makassar-based organization called Komite Pengerak Syariat Islam (KPSI, Committee
for Upholding Islamic Law).  The head of the organisation, Abdul Aziz Qahhar
Muzakkar, is the son of Kahar Muzakkar, the former rebel commander. The secretary
general of KPSI told ICG that for many members, KPSI was a way of continuing the
Darul Islam struggle through constitutional means.  

Much of the leadership of KPSI is from the district of Luwu, where Kahar Muzakkar
was born. (Agus Dwikarna is not among them.) The younger Muzakkar, who heads KPSI,
runs a religious boarding school (pesantren) in Makassar that also serves as the
Makassar branch of the Hidayatullah network. This network, which publishes the
militant Muslim magazine Hidayatullah, is based in Balikpapan, Kalimantan. The
founder of the Hidayatullah network, Muhsin Qahhar, also known as Abdullah Said,
was not directly associated with Kahar Muzakkar but considered himself the rebel
leader's spiritual heir.  

The most interesting figure associated with KPSI, however, is Abdul Wahid
Kadungga, Kahar Muzakkar's son-in-law, who assisted Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and
Abdullah Sungkar when they first reached Malaysia and who is believed to have had
direct communication with al-Qaeda through his ties to the Egyptian-led Gama
Islami. (Communication alone, however, is not evidence of criminal activity.) At
KPSI's first congress in Makassar in May 2000, Kadungga appeared as an honored
guest, bringing with him the deputy head of PAS-Malaysia.

B.	ISLAMIC LAW, ISLAMIC STATE OR CALIPHATE
In some ways, the themes of preachers linked to the Ngruki network have been
remarkably consistent over two decades. The call for the application of Islamic
law, the harkening back to the days of Darul Islam and the pioneering efforts of
Kartosuwirjo, the obligation to disobey secular authorities whose policies
undermine or conflict with Islamic law - these have all been constants.  As long
as Soeharto was in power, the focus of speeches by Ba'asyir and Sungkar was
overwhelmingly on the iniquities of his government and its efforts to divide and
destroy the Indonesian ummat.   It was the Soeharto government, according to the
Ngruki founders, that was the main obstacle to establishment of an Islamic state
in Indonesia and the achievement of Kartosuwirjo's aims.

Ba'asyir in particular has also been consistent in his call for establishing
Islamic communities (jemaah islamiyah) as the necessary precondition of an Islamic
state (dawlah islamiyah) and jihad as one of the means toward that end. The speech
he gave at the first Mujahidin Congress in August 2000 was no different from
themes he had propounded in the late 1970s.   

But other members of the Ngruki network began moving away from the notion of an
Indonesian Islamic state per se and toward the idea of an international caliphate
- a favourite theme of Hizb-ut Tahrir, the Jordan-based militant organisation that
has a growing presence in Indonesia. (It was well represented at the Mujahidin
Congress.).  The theme of a caliphate was picked up by Irfan Suryahardy and others
in their statements to the media at the Congress. 

Much has been made by Malaysian and Singaporean authorities of the call for the
establishment of a caliphate, either internationally or in Southeast Asia, as
evidence of possible links to al-Qaeda. The Malaysian government's accusations
against Fikiruddin, alias Abu Jibril, for example, are based on his alleged call
for a Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara involving Indonesia, the southern Philippines and
Malaysia.  But the call for a caliphate has become such a common theme among
militant groups in Indonesia that it is hard to see, how by itself, it indicates
much of anything
VI.	CONCLUSION
The Ngruki network, committed to continuing what its members saw as the struggle
of the Darul Islam rebellion to establish a state based on Islamic law, was
radicalised by Soeharto government policies of the 1980s. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir,
inspired by Hasan al-Banna, may have been the main architect of the notion of
setting up jemaah islamiyah as a precursor to an Islamic state, but Abdullah
Sungkar was the political driving force of the network, first in Indonesia, and
then in exile in Malaysia. He seems to have been succeeded in that role by
Fikiruddin, alias Abu Jibril.

It was determination to get the funds and training to fight the Indonesian
government that first led members of the network to Afghanistan in the mid-1980s.
But it was almost certainly the residence of the exiles in Malaysia - in the
1990s, a meeting place for representatives of Muslim guerrilla groups of all kinds
- that moved some beyond anti-Soeharto activities to more sinister activities that
may have included planning attacks on targets in Singapore and Indonesia. 

The dilemma is what to do now. Association with the Ngruki network is not
equivalent to terrorism, and yet the possibility remains that some members of the
exile group who have since returned to Indonesia may be sources of support for
criminal activities. But repression helped give birth to the network, and it would
be a major mistake to encourage the Indonesian government, or other governments in
the region, to re-institute the kind of arbitrary practices that Soeharto's
resignation was supposed to bring to an end. 

The claim by Agus Dwikarna and the other two arrested with him in March 2002 that
the evidence in their suitcase in Manila was planted appears to be well-founded,
but the U.S. government still wants to reward Indonesian intelligence for working
with Philippine authorities to bring off the arrest. Such tactics are likely to
backfire - Agus Dwikarna has already become a hero to many in South Sulawesi, to
the point that local and national politicians vie to get him released.

Pressure on Indonesia to arrest Ba'asyir led the government to drag out his old
case file from 1982 and see if he could still be charged, since he fled the
country before the Supreme Court's decision to re-institute his original nine-year
sentence could be implemented. In the intervening years, the anti-subversion law
under which he had been charged was repealed, and all Soeharto-era political
prisoners released. The Supreme Court decided rightly that it could not pursue the
case.

Indonesian officials interviewed by ICG have lamented the lack of an Internal
Security Act, similar to those used in Malaysia and Singapore to carry out
preventive arrests, claiming they would be better able to fight the war on terror
if they had such a tool. The danger is that in Indonesia it could well create more
terrorists than it stops, just as the indiscriminate application of the
Anti-Subversion Law (revoked after Soeharto's resignation) hardened the
determination of some activists, including some members of the Ngruki network, to
bring down the Soeharto government. 

The anti-terrorism law now being drafted has raised concerns that an all-powerful
internal security agency will be recreated. Many involved in writing the law are
determined to avoid this, and the draft produced in June 2002 is less sweeping
than the Malaysian or Singaporean laws.  To charges by several non-governmental
organisations that U.S. pressure was driving the process, one member of the
drafting committee told ICG that Indonesia was going ahead with the legislation in
response to its obligations as a member of the United Nations and in response to
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373.  

Defining terrorism, or distinguishing between terrorism and other forms of
military, guerrilla, or criminal activity, is highly subjective.  The bombings
that took place in Manila and throughout Indonesia that have been attributed to
Indonesian nationals, and the plans to attack targets in Singapore and Jakarta,
are clearly criminal and punishable under the Indonesian Criminal Code, just as
Fathur Rahman al-Gozi was sentenced under the Philippine criminal code, not
special terrorism legislation.

In the current climate, with many Indonesian Muslims organisations fearing they
will become the target of anti-terrorism legislation, it would lessen the chance
of turning criminal suspects into heroes if the label "terrorist" was dropped
altogether.
       
                    Jakarta/Brussels, TK August 2002











J 





Glossary of Names 

Abdul Aziz Qahhar Mudzakkar: son of former Darul Islam commander Kahar Muzakkar;
head of KPSI, Komite Pengerakan Syariat Islam, in Makassar; head of Hidayatullah
pesantren in Makassar; member of the Suara Hidyatullah editorial board  

Abdul Qadir Baraja. Former Ngruki lecturer, member of the executive committee of
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia. Born in Sumbawa, later lived in Telukbetung, Lampung.
Author of Hijrah dan Jihad. Arrested in January 1979 in connection with "Terror
Warman", served three years, arrested again in connection with bombings in East
Java and Borobodur, in 1985.

Abdul Rachman, alias Gunung Windu Sanjaya,  recruited by Ngruki group to work in
Malaysia, 1986.

Abdullah Anshori, alias Ibnu Thoyib, alias Abu Fatih. Left for Malaysia in June
1986. Reportedly helped Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's Jemaah Islamiyah group in exile
recruit volunteers for Afghanistan 1985-86. Reported to be important figure in
Southeast Asian structure that was planning attacks in Singapore. From Pacitan,
East Java, he is the brother of Abdul Rochim, a teacher at Ngruki.

Abdullah Sungkar, co-founder of Pondok Ngruki, born in 1937 to a well-known family
of batik traders of Yemeni (Hadramaut) descent in Solo. Detained in 1977, arrested
with Ba'asyir in 1978, fled to Malaysia in 1985, died in Indonesia 1999. 

Abdullah Umar, born in Lamahala, Flores in 1949, fled Medan after Komando Jihad
arrests there in 1977, became Ngruki teacher, arrested for involvement in Terror
Warman crimes carried out in the name of Jemaah Islamiyah, according to Indonesian
government. Was detained in Nusakambangan Prison throughout the 1980s, executed by
firing squad in 1989.

Abdur Rohim (Rochim), teacher at Ngruki, said to have been inducted into Jemaah
Islamiyah by Abdullah Umar in Pacitan, East Java. Brother of Abdullah Anshori.
Accused of being part of Jemaah Islamiyah's fa'i division (raising funds by
confiscating property of enemies of Islam) in 1984-85.


 Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, co-founder of Pondok Ngruki, active in al-Irsyad
organization, born in 1938 in Jombang, East Java. Arrested in 1978, released in
1982, fled to Malaysia in 1985, returned to Indonesia 1998. Currently commander of
the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia.

Abu Fatih, see Abdullah Anshori

Abu Jibril, see Fikiruddin

Agung Riyadi, member of the Ngruki network, fled to Malaysia in April 1985 with
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, arrested in January 2002 in Malaysia under the ISA. Brother of
Fajar Sidiq.

Agus Dwikarna, arrested in Manila in March 2002. Active in the PAN political
party, former member of HMI-MPO, the conservative wing of the Islamic Students'
Association, and a businessman, he is also head of Laskar Jundullah, the security
unit of the Committee to Uphold Islamic Law (KPSI) in Makassar. He also serves as
secretary of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council. In his role as head of the aid
agency KOMPAK, reportedly funded through Muslim Aid in Britain, he went frequently
to Poso, Sulawesi. He was arrested once before in Makassar for attacking a karaoke
bar at the Country Inn. 

Agus Sunarto, a member of the editorial board of the ar-Risalah newsletter in the
early 1980s, Sunarto fled to Malaysia in 1985. He returned to Indonesia in 1998.
He was imprisoned for a year in 1979.

Andi Mohamed Taqwa, from Bone, Sulawesi, studied in Yogyakarta and Pondok Ngruki
in the early 1980s. Nephew of Mohamad Jabir. Introduced South Sulawesi Darul Islam
figure Sanusi Daris to Abdullah Sungkar in 1984. Part of the Malaysian exile group
from Ngruki, reportedly in charge of trying to recruit volunteers for Afghanistan
in 1986. Resident in Sweden, from where he tried to declare an independent state
of Sulawesi (Negara Sulawesi Raya).

Aris Rahardjo, teacher at Pondok Ngruki, arrested in 1978 in connection with
Komando Jihad. Serves on executive committee of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia in the
Inter-Mujahidin Communications Department.

Ba'asyir. See Abu Bakar Ba'asyir

Bauw, Hasan. Papuan from Fakfak linked to Pondok Ngruki, killed in Solo in 1979
for informing on activities of the Warman group.

Danu, See Haji Danu Mohamad Hasan 

Fajar Sidiq (Fadjar Shadiq), member of the editorial board of ar-Risalah in
Yogyakarta in the early 1980s; joined the Ngruki exiles in Malaysia in 1986.
Brother of Agung Riyadi, arrested in Malaysia in January 2002 under the Internal
Security Act for alleged membership in Jemaah Islamiyah. 

Fathur Rahman al-Gozi, from Madiun, East Java, arrested in Manila in January 2002
and convicted for illegal possession of explosives, former Ngruki student who
studied in Pakistan, spent some time in Malaysia and married a Malaysian woman.
His father, Zaenuri, served time in prison for alleged links to Komando Jihad.

Fikiruddin (Fihiruddin) Muqti, alias Mohamed Iqbal bin Abdurrahman, also known as
Abu Jibril, born in Tirpas-Selong village, East Lombok. Became well-known preacher
(muballigh) at the Sudirman Mosque in Yogyakarta in early 1980s. Fled to Malaysia
in 1985, later joined by wife. Arrested by Malaysian authorities and charged with
membership in Jemaah Islamiyah in 2002. Made frequent trips to Indonesia, appears
on a tape recruiting volunteers to fight in Maluku conflict. Became a member of
executive committee of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia in August 2000.

Gaos Taufik, West Java Darul Islam fighter who settled outside Medan; became
caught up in Komando Jihad, reportedly inducted Abdullah Umar and Timsar Zubil,
among others.

Haji Danu Mohamad Hasan, close associate of Kartosuwirjo in the original West Java
Darul Islam, key figure in Komando Jihad. Reportedly employed by state
intelligence agency, BAKIN, in the mid-1970s and had close ties to the Siliwangi
division of the army. 

Hambali, alias Riduan Isamuddin, alias Nurjaman,  accused of being the Indonesian
most closely associated with al-Qaeda. Linked to members of the Ngruki network in
exile in Malaysia.

Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, inspired Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir to develop his usroh groups.

Hasnul Ahmad, businessman at whose house many of the Jemaah Islamiyah activities
of the mid-1980s were conducted. Close ties to the Ngruki network in Malaysia
through Muchliansyah.

Hispran, See Pranoto, Haji Ismail


Irfan Suryahardy (Irfan Awwas S.), born in Tirpas-Selong village, East Lombok, 4
April 1960. Attended Gontor pesantren. Edited ar-Risalah newsletter in early
1908s, founded activist Muslim student organization called Badan Komunikasi Pemuda
Mesjid (BKPM). Arrested on subversion charges, sentenced on 8 February 1984 to 13
years in prison, served nine, the last six of them at one of Indonesia's most
notorious prisons, Nusakambangan. Head of executive committee of Majelis Mujahidin
Indonesia. Brother of Fikiruddin. 

Jabir, Mohamad. Former South Sulawesi Darul Islam fighter who died in custody in
1986 after being arrested on charges of plotting to murder Soeharto. A
businessman, he was a popular imam in the Tanjung Priok area of Jakarta and was
named in trial documents as a key figure in the Jakarta branch of Jemaah
Islamiyah. The uncle of Andi Mohamed Taqwa, Jabir was married to the daughter of a
West Java Darul Islam leader.
 
Kadungga, Abdul Wahid, son-in-law of Kahar Muzakkar, founded Islamic students
organization called PPME in 1971 while studying in Cologne, Germany. Helped Abu
Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar establish themselves in Malaysia in 1985,
moved to the Hague in the 1980s, developed close friendship with Usama Rushdi of
Gama Islami, a split-off of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Involved in the
initial meeting setting up the KPSI organization in Makassar in 2000. Has close
ties to Malaysian PAS leaders. .

Kahar Muzakkar, leader of the Darul Islam rebellion in South Sulawesi from 1950 to
1965. Born La Domeng in Luwu, South Sulawesi in 1921, he rebelled after the
Indonesian army refused to incorporate his forces as a separate brigade. Died in
1965 after being shot in a raid carried out by Mohamad Jusuf, later Indonesian
Defense Minister.

Kartosuwirjo, Sekarmadji Maridjan, leader of the West Java Darul Islam rebellion
1948-62.  Born in Cepu, Java in 1905, married a woman from Solo.

Mahasin Zaini, student activist in Yogyakarta, early 1980s, arrested as part of
the usroh network. Now on the executive committee of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
in the same department (Strengthening Mujahidin Resources) as Muchliansyah.

Mardjoko, sent to Malaysia form Solo in December 1985 as one of the labor recruits
for the Ngruki network.

Moertopo Ali, Indonesian army general and personal adviser to Soeharto who led
Komando Jihad operations to revive Darul Islam as a top official of BAKIN, the
state intelligence agency. 

Mohamad Yusuf, former Defense Minister, regional military commander in South
Sulawesi who led the final assault on Kahar Muzakkar in 1965. Reportedly helped
arrange the release of Sanusi Darwis in 1984.

Mubin Bustami, staff member of ar-Risalah in Yogya in the early 1980s, fled to
Malaysia with the Ngruki network and later brought his wife over.

Muchliansyah, also known as Solihin. Well-known muballigh active in Yogyakarta at
Sudirman mosque in early 1980s. Helped found the newsletter ar-Risalah. Close to
Abu Bakar Ba'syir and Abdullah Sungkar, was key member of the Ngruki network in
Malaysia, where he lived with his family, including two wives brought over from
Indonesia in 1985. Named by Indonesian prosecutors as the coordinator of Jemaah
Islamiyah operations in Jakarta in 1983-85. Returned to Indonesia with Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir in November 1999, settled in Banjarmasin, Kalimantan, but travels
frequently to Jakarta. 

Mursahid, one of the labourers recruited by the Ngruki network to work in
Malaysia, 1986.

Muzahar Muhtar, young Ngruki student who accompanied Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and
Abdullah Sungkar to Malaysia when they first fled in April 1985 and subsequently
acted as a courier between Malaysia and Indonesia for the Ngruki network. Tried on
subversion charges in 1986.

Pranoto, Haji Ismail, Former senior commander of the West Java Darul Islam, used
by Ali Moertopo to  reactivate Darul Islam as Komando Jihad in the mid-1970s. He
was arrested in January 1977, tried in 1978 and sentenced to life in prison on
subversion charges. He died in Cipinang  Prison,  Jakarta.

Ridwan, labourer from Solo recruited to work in Malaysia by Ngruki network, 1986.

Rusli Aryus, member of the editorial staff of ar-Risalah newsletter in Yogyakarta
in early 1980s, accompanied Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar to Malaysia in
April 1985.

Safki, member of the Jemaah Islamiyah network in Jakarta in 1984-85, involved in
several violent crimes, fled to Malaysia briefly in 1985, then returned to Jakarta
where he was arrested. He later committed suicide.

Sanusi Daris, "Minister of Defense" for Kahar Muzakkar, arrested in 1982 in South
Sulawesi, tried in 1984, joined Abdullah Sungkar in Java after his release through
the efforts of Andi Mohamed Taqwa, then moved to Malaysia, first to Negeri
Sembilan, then to Sabah.

Shobbarin Syakur, member of the usroh network, arrested in the mid-1980s, now
secretary-general of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia

Solihin, see Muchliansyah

Syahroni, Ahmed, gang leader in South Jakarta in mid-1980s, close to Hasnul Ahmad
and Muchliansyah, involved in violent crimes with Safki as a member of what the
government alleged were Jemaah Islamiyah operations in Jakarta. Fled briefly to
Malaysia to join Ngruki exiles  in 1985.

Taqwa. See Andi Mohamed Taqwa
 
Warman, Musa. Involved in a series of violent crimes in 1979 including the murder
of the assistant rector of a university in Solo whom Warman held responsible for
the 1978 arrests of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar.Warman was reportedly
captured and killed in 1981.

Warsidi, head of a religious school in Way Jepara, Lampung. Warsidi had
established a Jemaah Islamiyah in 1985 in accordance with the teaching of Abdullah
Sungkar, who had stayed there en route to Malaysia. The school in 1989 became the
site of a bloody siege by the army led by then Col. Hendropriyono.

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