[Nasional-m] Re: [Nasional] Ulil Abshar adalah "Dr. Hashem Aghajari"-nya Indonesia

[nasional-m@polarhome.com]

Yangmal1@aol.com schrieb:
> 
> Seperti Dr. Hashem Aghajari, maka Ulil Abshar pun mengalami 'fatwa' dari
> sekelompok di Indonesia.  "Kejahatan" dari pada Dr. Aghajari sehingga ia di
> vonis hukum mati adalah karena pidatonya dimana ia mengatakan a.l. bahwa
> "Islam/ke-Islaman" dan "pendapat/pernyataan ulama/kiai mengenai Islam" adalah
> tidak sama, dan juga bahwa setiap generasi berhak untuk membaca dan
> menginterpretasikan Kuran tanpa merasa takut.
> 
> Moga2 pemerintah Indonesia tidak akan membawa Ulil Abshar ke pengadilan  seperti
> yang diminta sebagian kelompok di Indonesia tsb.
> 
> Saya belum melihat (or I might have missed it) suara2 dari pada tokok2 di
> pemerintahan, termasuk ibu Presiden.  Di Iran saja Pres. Khatami pun mengatakan
> bahwa putusan pengadilan atas Dr. Hashen Afghajari tsb. adalah "improper".
> 
> Mojahed, kepala dari pada salah satu cabang dari Pro Reform Participation Party
> di Iran yang berani menyuarakan supportnya untuk Dr. Aghajari tsb. baru2 ini
> dihukum 2 1/2 tahun penjara dan dirajam 74 kali.  Moga2 ini pun tidak terjadi di
> NKRI tercinta.
> 
> Berikut adalah ulasan mengenai pidato Dr. Aghajari tsb. dan sesudah itu adalah
> terjemahan dari pada pidatonya.
> 
> Yang menarik bagi saya, selain isi pidato tsb., yang menurut saya sangat logis,
> (but who am ? ),adalah sejarah dari pada Dr. Aghajari tsb.  Dia adalah salau
> satu dari pada 'mahasiswa' yang menduduki kedutaan Amrik di Tehran, dan kakinya
> hilang satu, waktu ia berjuang di perang Iran Iraq.
> 
> Selamat membaca.
> 
> MEMRI: Print this article
> 
> Special Dispatch Series - No. 445
> December 01, 2002No.445
> 
>         The Call for Islamic Protestantism: Dr. Hashem Aghajari's Speech and
> Subsequent Death Sentence
>         By: Ayelet Savyon
> 
> Dr. Hashem Aghajari, a University of Hamedan history lecturer, journalist, and
> active member of the reformist Islamic Revolution's Mujahideen Organization
> (IRMO), was arrested in August 2002 and sentenced to death on November 6, 2002,
> because of a June address he gave commemorating the 25th anniversary of the
> death of Dr. 'Ali Shari'ati, one of the ideologues of the Islamic Revolution. In
> his speech, Aghajari built on the foundation of Shari'ati's thoughts to achieve
> legitimacy for his own ideas, but actually presented his own perception of
> "Islamic Protestantism" and reform in Islam;[i] he also criticized Iran's ruling
> religious establishment.
> 
> In his speech, Aghajari argued that a mediating echelon of clerics had developed
> in Islam that stood between God and the believers - something which runs
> completely counter to the nature of Islam, which differs from Christianity in
> this aspect. Aghajari sharply criticized this echelon, which is today in power
> in Iran, for its conservativism and petrifaction,    for blocking society's
> advancement, and for exploiting the name of God. He also attacked it for its
> willingness to accept technology, usually rejected on religious grounds, in
> special cases - such as when it comes in the form of luxury cars. These clerics,
> says Aghajari, see themselves as above the people, as sanctified; they exploit
> their status in the regime      to ensure their own survival and their hold on
> power, while corrupting Islam and Islamic values.
> Agharaji maintained that these corrupt clerics are blocking the people's, and
> primarily the young people's, access to the Koran and to understanding it, and
> preventing them from developing independent thought. He claimed that they have
> created a state monopoly on the religion. Worst of all, they are changing the
> essential nature of Shi'ite Islam by imposing a single government interpretation
> of the religion that perpetuates their status, and by denying other high-ranking
> clerics' the right to issue religious rulings on the basis that their rulings
> "are not Islam."
> 
> Aghajari was directing his criticism at the low-level clerics who despite their
> under-qualification nonetheless hold key positions throughout the regime and
> presume to lead the country in the spirit of Islam. These clerics range from
> Supreme Leader 'Ali Khamenei and former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, now head
> of the extremely powerful Expediency Council,[ii] down to the lowest echelons of
> the regime.
> 
> In his speech, Aghajari suggested differentiating between what he calls "core
> Islam," the best of the Islamic religious ideas, and "traditional Islam," which
> includes various additions to "core Islam" that have occurred over the years. In
> his opinion, these additions are damaging and are not genuinely based on "core
> Islam." He said that Islam could be interpreted in accordance with the
> zeitgeist, and that changes over time necessarily dictated changes in
> interpreting Islamic precepts.
> Agharahji spoke against the "principle of emulation" (Taqlid) in Shi'ite
> Islam,[iii] saying that because of it, the people would always remain enslaved
> by the clerics' interpretation and would never be able to develop independent
> thought. He called for a new kind of emulation to underpin the relationship
> between the clerics and the people: the new model would be the relationship
> between teacher and pupil - in which the pupil eventually becomes independent -
> instead of imitation, that is, the relationship between master and servant.
> Further, Aghajari said that an essential part of "core Islam" was "Islamic
> humanism," which would give equal rights to men and women, and to Muslims and
> non-Muslims, and respect the rights of all. He said that the essence of Islamic
> humanism is the principle of human rights - treating every person as a human
> being, even if he is a political dissident. Aghajari also criticized the regime
> for violating the human rights of political activists, particularly with the use
> of torture. Click here to read the text of the speech, or scroll down.
> 
> *Ayelet Savyon is Director of the Iranian Media Project
> 
> [i] Aghajari clarified that religion had always occupied a central role in
> Iranian society. For the past two centuries, Shi'ite clerics have enjoyed the
> status of guardians of the Iranian public.
> [ii] Supreme Leader Khamenei, who holds the low rank of Hujjat ul-Islam, was
> pushed upwards to the rank of Ayatollah when he was appointed Iran's Spiritual
> Leader, because according to Ayatollah Khomenei's doctrine of       "Rule of the
> Jurisprudent," the jurisprudent who is a source of authority, knowledge and
> justice is the one worthy of leading the country. No jurisprudent with such
> qualifications could be found to succeed Khomenei after his death. As will be
> recalled, Ayatollah Hussein 'Ali Montazari was ousted from his position as
> Khomenei's successor for criticizing the regime. Rafsanjani is also a Hujjat
> ul-Islam, even though the conservative press refers to him as an Ayatollah.
> [iii] According to taqlid (the "principle of emulation") in Shi'ite Islam,
> society is divided between two categories of religious status. The first group
> is highly exclusive - the Maraje Taqlid, or "sources of emulation," several
> Mujtaheds of the rank of Ayatollah Ozma (Grand Ayatollah). These Mujtaheds have
> the right of Ijtehad. Each of them may issue independent rulings, which applies
> only to his particular followers. The second group, the "emulators," is the
> masses. Each Shi'ite Muslim chooses a Marja-e Taqlid, and follows his rulings.
> In practice, the right of Ijtehad, or the right to issue fatwas, and the
> principle of emulation contributed to a close relationship between the follower
> and the leader he chose, and       reinforced the Ayatollahs' power to defend
> society, socially and morally, against oppression by the ruler. It is worth
> noting that Shi'ite Islam never endorsed any one interpretation of an issue, and
> no one Ayatollah was officially more senior than another.
> 
> Click here to read the complete text.
> 
> Dr. Hashem Aghajari, a University of Hamedan history lecturer, journalist, and
> active member of the reformist Islamic Revolution's Mujahideen Organization
> (IRMO), is a disabled veteran of the Iran-Iraq war. In June 2002, Aghajari
> delivered an address commemorating the 25th anniversary of the death of Dr. 'Ali
> Shari'ati, a prominent intellectual and one of the ideologues of the Islamic
> Revolution.[1] In August 2002, Aghajari was arrested; on November 6 he was
> sentenced to death by a Hamedan court for blaspheming the Prophet Muhammad,
> insulting the Shi'ite imams, and       insulting top state religious
> authorities.[2] n his speech, Aghajari used Shar'iati's legacy to express his
> own criticism of the relations between the state and religion in contemporary
> Iran. He began his speech by addressing the need to rejuvenate Islam with
> "Islamic Protestantism" (which Shari'ati had advocated[3]), and reviewed Iran's
> contemporary history, including the period from the 1905 Constitutional
> Revolution through the late 1960s and 1970s, saying:       "Some people thought
> that a military overthrow of the Shah's regime would bring the dawn of a new
> era… because in Iranian society and Iranian culture, religion is and has been
> the main core throughout the ages, before Islam [began] and after, before the
> Safavid dynasty[4] [early 16th century] and after, when the majority of Iranians
> became Shi'ite Muslims.
> 
> The following is the text of his speech.[5]
> 
> The Concept of Protestantism
> 
> In his address, Dr. Aghajari described Christianity prior to Protestantism,
> focusing on the Church hierarchy and the corruption rampant among the clergy. He
> said that Islam is in a different position than Christianity: "The Protestant
> movement wanted to rescue Christianity from the clergy and the Church hierarchy
> - [Christians] must save religion from the pope. We [Muslims] do not need
> mediators between us and God. We do not need mediators to understand God's holy
> books. The Prophet [Jesus] spoke to the people directly… We don't need to go
> to the clergy; each person is his own clergy."
> "Shari'ati maintained that all the religious messages offered by formal and
> traditional religious organizations were antiquated, and that any protest
> against [these traditional religious organizations] was [regarded by the clerics
> as] a protest against Islam itself.
> 
> "Core Islam" and "Traditional Islam"
> "Part of Dr. Shari'ati's work was to separate [what he called] 'core Islam' from
> [what he called] 'traditional Islam.' Many additions were added to Islam's core,
> [but] they were not part of the core; they were merely historical additions. It
> must be kept in mind that 70 or 80 years ago, the Shi'ite Muslim clergy was
> opposed to eliminating public       bathhouses where one could immerse oneself
> in large containers of water and replacing them with showers and modern bathing
> facilities. But, of course, they have made some concessions to modernity when it
> comes to their own lifestyles, such as owning a car."
> 
> The Role of the Traditional Clerics
> "At the time of the Constitutional Revolution [1905-1907], the Islamic clergy
> was opposed to modern sciences such as chemistry and physics… [In their eyes],
> chemistry meant that there is no God. But in today's world the clerics take what
> suits them. If I drive a Peykan [a cheap Iranian-made car] they drive the latest
> model luxury cars (audience       applause). Is this right? They have made these
> concessions because they use [modernity for their own benefit]; they taste it
> and then decide that it isn't such a bad thing (smiles in the audience). Seventy
> or 80 years ago, they opposed these things in the name of Islam; they called it
> Haraam [forbidden in Islam]. Up until very recently, learning English in Islamic
> religious institutes of higher learning was forbidden."
> 
> The Need to Separate "Core Islam" from "Traditional Islam"
> "Dr. Shari'ati would have said that this clergy has not descended from Heaven;
> it is contemporary, but their minds are medieval. As long as this mindset does
> not change, and these leaders do not change, the people who follow their
> interpretation will continue to think that Shi'ite Islam cannot be a modern
> religion, and [Shi'ite Islam] will be used by the misguided. Instead of serving
> as a driving force for progress and advancement, it will become a cause of
> continued backwardness."
> "Dr. Shari'ati sought to fight this attitude. He wanted to separate 'core Islam'
> from the 'traditional Islam' which is comprised of interpretation of Islam by
> the leaders of previous generations - because he believed that 'traditional
> Islam' was merely the result of the experiences of some people from generations
> past and that it should not be sanctified. [The clerics'] thinking is inflexible
> and incomplete. In our tradition, Shi'ites wear a ring on the middle finger of
> the left hand. This is a symbol of being a Muslim. If you ask one of these
> clerics [about it], they say it is an obligation and a religious principle. Look
> at the writings of Alameh Majlesi and the book of Halieh Al-Motaqin - the book
> that guided       Muslims 1400 years ago. Now imagine that today a Muslim wants
> to dress like they did then, eat like they used to, act like they used to. Is
> this Islam?"
> "[The way in which] the religious scholars of previous generations understood
> and interpreted Islam is not Islam. It was their interpretation of Islam;
> [however] just as they had the right to interpret the Koran [in their way], we
> have the same right. Their interpretation of Islam is not an article of faith
> for us. We must return to the separation of 'core Islam' and 'traditional
> Islam.' Part of Shari'ati's struggle concerned the interpretation of Islam and
> how someone who wants to be a Muslim in the 20th and 21st centuries [cannot do
> so in accordance with] the Islam that prevailed in Mecca and Medina 1400 years
> ago - [towns] with fewer residents than some of today's smaller Iranian
> villages."
> 
> Islam Must Suit the Thoughts and Reality of Today
> "The Islam of today is different. It is very clear that we have a different
> understanding of it in all areas, including economics. It has to suit the
> thoughts and realities of today… Just as people at the dawn of Islam conversed
> with the Prophet, we have the right to do this today. Just as they interpreted
> what was conveyed [to them] at historical junctures, we must do the same. We
> cannot say: 'Because this is the past we must accept it without question.' This
> is putting too much emphasis on the past. This is not logical…"
> "For years, young people were afraid to open a Koran. They said, 'We must go ask
> the Mullahs what the Koran says,' [since] it was used primarily in mosques and
> cemeteries. The new generation was not allowed to come near the Koran; [young
> people] were told that [first] they needed [training in] 101 methods of thought
> and they did not possess them. Consequently, [the young people] feared reading
> the Koran. Then came Shari'ati, and he told the young people that these ideas
> were bankrupt; [he said] you could understand the Koran using your own methods -
> you could understand as well as the religious leaders who claim to have a ton of
> knowledge. The religious leaders taught that if you understand the Koran on your
> own, you have committed a crime. They feared that their racket would cease to
> exist       if young people learned [Koran] on their own…"
> 
> The Clerics Have Become a Ruling Class
> "In Islam, we never had a class of clergy; some clerical titles were created as
> recently as 50 or 60 years ago. Where did we have a clerical class in the
> Safavid dynasty? [Today's titles for Islamic clergy] are like the Church
> hierarchy - bishops, cardinals, priests. This type of hierarchy in [contemporary
> Shi'ite Islam] is an imitation of the Church. [Today], this clerical hierarchy
> is headed by the Ayatollah Ozma [i.e. the 'Grand Ayatollah']… And a level down
> you have an ayatollah, Hujjat ul Islam,  Thaqqat ul Islam, and so on."
>      "In the past few years, [the religious institutions] have become a sort of
> government institution, and the issue has become more sensitive. Is there anyone
> in our society who understands the distinction between a Hujjat ul Islam and an
> Ayatollah?[6] Shari'ati said that in Islam we do not have a class of religious
> leaders. This is not the 'core Islam.' It is a     development of historical
> Islam, and, fortunately, we have not yet seen [in Iran the establishment of] a
> single central apparatus based on the ranks of clerical titles. For years, there
> were many parallel [Marja-e Taqlid] institutions,[7] and each Marja-e Taqlid
> [Ayatollah Ozma] [Grand Ayatollah] had his own structure."
> "Today, [the ruling clergy] in Iran wants to consolidate all the Ayatollah Ozma
> organizations under a single rule. (The audience applauds wildly.) Shari'ati
> said that in Iran, we have never had a true clerical class. This is what they
> want to do in our country. I doubt whether they will succeed because of our
> independence and the elements that we have in Shi'ite Islam. The divisions and
> the hierarchies they wanted to create are Catholic [and not Islamic]… Some of
> the clergy are so engrossed in what they are trying to do that they start
> thinking of themselves as icons…"
> 
> A Cleric is Not a Divine Being
> "Shari'ati used to say that the relationship between [the clergy] and the people
> should be like the relationship between teacher and pupil - not between leader
> and follower, not between icon and imitator; the people are not monkeys who
> merely imitate. The pupils understand and react, and they try to expand their
> own understanding, so that someday they will not need the teacher. The
> relationship that the fundamentalist religious people [seek] is one of master
> and follower; the master must always remain master and the follower will always
> remain follower. This is like shackles around the neck [i.e. eternal slavery].
> We must understand that the master is not a holy, divine being, and we cannot
> grant him that status. They [the Iranian ruling clergy], however, want to
> exercise total power. Shari'ati did something about it; he told the religious
> leaders: 'You are not imams, you are not prophets, [you] cannot consider the
> people a subhuman species.' They are born the same way we all are, their blood
> is the same color as yours; they are born like you; they issue from their
> mothers' wombs… They are the same creatures of God that you are…'"
> 
> Non-Muslims Too Have Inalienable Rights
> "If we, as Muslims of divine and perfect Islam, value mankind, and say that
> [people] are human beings regardless of religion, even if they are not Muslims,
> even if they are not Iranians, such as Turks, Kurds and Lurs,[8] whatever they
> may be - [we should say that] they are human and they have inalienable rights.
> Dr. Shari'ati believed that in the Western
> world, humanism is not strongly rooted because it is not based on religious
> principles. But in Islam, humanism is God's creation; it is by God's grace that
> we are here. These should not be merely nice words that we utter, like saying
> people have rights. Such words are vitally important - they are crowns on our
> heads. [Therefore], when [ordinary people] want to express an opinion, [the
> clerics cannot say] they haven't the power to decide and don't know what's good
> for them."
> "Today's Islam [should be] 'core Islam,' not 'traditional Islam.' Islamic
> Protestantism is logical, practical and humanist. It is thoughtful and
> progressive. In contrast to the days of Shari'ati and his followers - who were
> religious reformists, both clergy and non-clergy, in religious and university
> circles, such as [Ayatollah] Taleqani[9] and [Mahdi]       Bazargan,[10]
> [Ayatollah] Beheshti[11] and [Ayatollah] Mottahari,[12] and the leader of them
> all, the great leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini [here,
> Aghajari did not pause long enough to allow the audience to praise Khomeini's
> name the customary three times, but only once], all of whom tried to say that
> Islam is connected to life, and is not indifferent to society and people, today
> we are facing a difficulty.
> Many people who were not even part of the Islamic Revolution have now come to
> center stage and say that 'traditional Islam' is true Islam. The difference
> between our time and Shari'ati's time is that then, the clergy did not have
> power. Today, Islam is in power; clerics are in the government. That is why
> Islamic Protestantism has become much more important today."
> 
> We Need a Religion that Respects the Rights of All
> "We need a religion that respects the rights of all - a progressive religion,
> rather than a traditional religion that tramples the people. We cannot say
> 'Anyone who is not with me is against me.' One can be whatever one wants to be.
> One must be a good person, a pure person. We must not say that if you are not
> with us we can do whatever we want to you. By behaving as we do, we are
> trampling our own religious principles…"
> 
> The Clerics Don't Observe the Constitution - Flogging is Torture
> "When someone says, 'I'm an [observant] Muslim,' you can no longer curse him,
> insult him, this is haraam, haraam [forbidden]. In our culture we need Islamic
> humanism; we need both religious culture and community culture. Every human
> being is worth something; none can be trampled. This principle is stated in our
> constitution. But unfortunately in the past decade, it has penetrated the minds
> of the people in the Islamic Republic that it needn't be so. This was their
> excuse for torture. They [the ruling clergy] say: 'We arrested someone, he has
> some information, he is a member of some group, he has been active in something.
> Under ordinary interrogation he isn't confessing, so we must torture him so he
> sings like a canary.' This is exactly what the constitution condemns - but the
> rulers do not observe it. Whipping is torture. They say that if someone is
> accused of a crime, he should be made to suffer so he doesn't do it again."
> 
> A Call for Islamic Humanism and Islamic Protestantism
> "Today, more than ever, we need the 'Islamic humanism' and 'Islamic
> Protestantism' that Dr. Shari'ati advocated. Today, we need it more than ever.
> While [the leaders] of the Islamic Republic apparently do not recognize human
> rights, this principle has been recognized by our constitution. In many
> non-Islamic countries, they at least recognize these principles in dealing with
> their own people. Maybe when it comes to other people, they oppress them -
> [like] what Bush is doing, and most Western nations, if they had the power.
> Human rights have become so vital in some       foreign countries that some of
> our own clergy, whom I see going for two or three weeks of medical treatment,
> become enchanted with how the authorities of those countries act towards their
> own people. About 150 years ago, [a Muslim cleric] went to Europe; when he came
> back, he said, 'I saw no Muslims in Europe, but I saw Islam' [i.e. he saw
> righteousness]. In our time, we see Muslims, but we don't see Islam (audience
> applause)."
> 
> Without Respect for Human Beings, There is No Islam
> "The regime divides people into insiders and outsiders. They [the ruling clergy]
> can do whatever they want to the outsiders. They can go to their homes, steal
> their property, slander them, terrorize them, and kill them - like [the
> intellectual activists] Said Hejjarian, and the late [Dariush] Forouhar and his
> wife [Parvaneh Eskandari][13] - because they were outsiders. Is this Islamic
> logic? When there is no respect for human beings?" "
> When [Imam] 'Ali [the Prophet Muhammad's son in law and successor, according to
> Shi'ite Islam] sent an emissary to Egypt, he told him, 'You are a powerful man.
> Be good and just to the people. There are two groups of these people: Either
> they are Muslims, and therefore your brothers, or they are your fellow human
> beings. Behave towards them according to Islam.' Islam does not say Muslims and
> non-Muslims…"
> 
> A Call for Ijtehad; Men and Women are Equal
> "Finally, Islamic Protestantism is something we need because when our religious
> understanding and thought are betrayed, we must constantly refer back to our own
> religious frame of reference. In Shi'ite Islam they call it Ijtehad.[14]
> Shari'ati had some serious thoughts about Ijtehad. First, Ijtehad is not limited
> to one group. Second, Ijtehad does not mean that only one cleric is the
> well-versed expert [Marja-e Taqlid]. Unfortunately dishonesty, deception, and
> petrifaction happen when religiously observant people go to a Marja-e Taqlid
> ['Source of Emulation'] [of their choice],  who issues a fatwa, and then other
> clergymen attack him or the fatwa. You saw what happened with Ayatollah Saneii.
> Some of the clergy say that a Mujtahed [high-ranking Ayatollah] can issue a
> fatwa. Then, when he issues a fatwa [that is counter to the ruling clerics'
> views] they [the ruling clergy] say: 'You may not do so and reinterpret [the
> Koran].' A Marja-e Taqlid may say: 'I have performed Ijtehad [and issued a
> fatwa] that contradicts what has been said before,' 'Women have as many rights
> as men and men and women have equal rights.' Then someone else [of the
> ruling       clergy] attacks this Marja-e Taqlid, telling him, 'Who says that
> your opinion represents Islam? This is not Islamic.' So I [Aghajari] ask: 'Why
> is one more Islam than the other?"
> Voices from the Audience:
> Someone shouts: "Because one fatwa is the word of the Koran and the other is
> not." Someone else protests, calling "Aghajari namard" (you are not a man,
> therefore you are a scoundrel), and repeats, "You are a liar," "namard," and
> "You accuse God and the prophets of lying." At this point, Aghajari leaves the
> meeting.
> 
> [1] Shari'ati (b. 1933) was a political activist who called for moves against
> the Shah to be based on Islam, even though he was not a cleric. His
> anti-imperialist approach and condemnation of both liberal capitalism and
> Marxism attracted a strong student following. Shari'ati said that the solution
> for the oppressed peoples of the Middle East was "Islamic       humanism." He
> attacked the traditionalist clergy and their fatalism towards and appeasement of
> the Shah's regime. Even though he rejected Marxism as a political system, he was
> profoundly influenced by Marx, and adopted his terminology. Shari'ati died in
> 1977 under mysterious circumstances.
> [2] IRNA, November 13, 2002. According to IRNA, he was also sentenced to 74
> lashes and eight years' mprisonment in desert cities, and banned from teaching
> for 10 years.
> [3] The transcript of the speech includes the transcriber's comments on the
> audience's response to Aghajari's comments on various issues.
> [4] From the time Shi'ite Islam was endorsed as Iran's state religion in 1501 by
> the Shah Isma'il, the founder of the Safavid dynasty (1501-1722), coexistence
> and peace reigned between the religious and political establishments. Not only
> did the shah reign, but he also sought religious legitimacy for his rule, and
> the clergy was given central posts in the    government. During the Qajar
> Dynasty (1796-1925), major shifts became evident in the interrelations between
> state and religion; since the 19th century, the clergy has been at the forefront
> of popular anti-regime movements. These shifts were largely the result of
> changes in the religious establishment, as it increased the clergy's standing
> and power and encouraged it towards fundamentalism and political activism.
> [5] For the complete speech see: http://news.gooya.com/2002/07/02/0207-22.php
> [6] i.e. between low-ranking religious scholars and the highest rank of all.
> Apparently hinting to the fact that several political leaders of Iran such as
> 'Ali Khamenei, Iran's spiritual Leader, and 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani,
> Iran's former president and currently head of powerful 'Expediency Council,'
> carry the rank of Hujjat ul Islam without having the       religious scholarly
> qualifications.
> [7] Ijtehad is the right to issue fatwas based on the independent thinking and
> interpretation by an authorized cleric. According to taqlid (the "principle of
> emulation") in Shi'ite Islam, society is divided between two categories of
> religious status. The first group is highly exclusive - the Maraje Taqlid, or
> "sources of emulation," several Mujtaheds of the rank of Ayatollah Ozma (Grand
> Ayatollah). These Mujtaheds have the right of Ijtehad. Each of them may issue
> independent rulings, which apply only to his particular followers. The second
> group, the "emulators," is the masses. Each Shi'ite Muslim chooses a Marja-e
> Taqlid, and follows his rulings. In practice, the right of Ijtehad and the
> principle of emulation
> contributed to a close relationship between the follower and the religious
> leader he chose, and reinforced the ayatollahs' power in society, socially and
> morally, against oppression by the ruler. It is worth noting that Shi'ite Islam
> never endorsed any one interpretation of an issue, and no one Ayatollah was
> officially more senior than another
> [8] One of Iran's ethnic minorities.
> [9] Ayatollah Sayyed Mahmoud Taleqani, a well-liked liberal, progressive, and
> intellectual cleric. He was Ayatollah Khomenei's ally during the Islamic
> Revolution, although he had reservations about Khomenei's thought.
> [10] The first prime minister under the Islamic regime, and one of the important
> intellectuals who supported the Islamic Revolution. He was later deposed by
> Ayatollah Khomenei.
> [11] Another high-ranking Ayatollah who supported the Islamic Revolution.
> [12] Ayatolla Morteza Mottahari, a leading cleric who was imprisoned by the
> Shah.
> [13] The last two were murdered in November 1998 with the involvement of "rogue
> agents of the Intelligence Ministry." No one has been sentenced for the crime.
> Iran Daily (English), November 23, 2002.
> [14] For explanation of terms, see Footnote No. 7.