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SSL_CTX_SET_OPTIONS(3)	 BSD Library Functions Manual	SSL_CTX_SET_OPTIONS(3)

NAME
     SSL_CTX_set_options, SSL_set_options, SSL_CTX_clear_options,
     SSL_clear_options, SSL_CTX_get_options, SSL_get_options,
     SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support — manipulate SSL options

SYNOPSIS
     #include <openssl/ssl.h>

     long
     SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options);

     long
     SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, long options);

     long
     SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options);

     long
     SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, long options);

     long
     SSL_CTX_get_options(SSL_CTX *ctx);

     long
     SSL_get_options(SSL *ssl);

     long
     SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(SSL *ssl);

DESCRIPTION
     Note: all these functions are implemented using macros.

     SSL_CTX_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in options to ctx.
     Options already set before are not cleared!

     SSL_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in options to ssl.
     Options already set before are not cleared!

     SSL_CTX_clear_options() clears the options set via bitmask in options to
     ctx.

     SSL_clear_options() clears the options set via bitmask in options to ssl.

     SSL_CTX_get_options() returns the options set for ctx.

     SSL_get_options() returns the options set for ssl.

     SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() indicates whether the peer sup‐
     ports secure renegotiation.

NOTES
     The behaviour of the SSL library can be changed by setting several
     options.  The options are coded as bitmasks and can be combined by a bit‐
     wise OR operation (|).

     SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() affect the (external) proto‐
     col behaviour of the SSL library.	The (internal) behaviour of the API
     can be changed by using the similar SSL_CTX_set_mode(3) and
     SSL_set_mode(3) functions.

     During a handshake, the option settings of the SSL object are used.  When
     a new SSL object is created from a context using SSL_new(3), the current
     option setting is copied.	Changes to ctx do not affect already created
     SSL objects.  SSL_clear() does not affect the settings.

     The following bug workaround options are available:

     SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG
	     As of OpenBSD 5.8, this option has no effect.

     SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG
	     As of OpenBSD 5.8, this option has no effect.

     SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
	     As of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c, this option has no effect.

     SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
	     As of OpenBSD 5.8, this option has no effect.

     SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
	     As of OpenBSD 5.8, this option has no effect.

     SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
	     As of OpenBSD 5.8, this option has no effect.

     SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
	     As of OpenBSD 5.8, this option has no effect.

     SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
	     As of OpenBSD 5.8, this option has no effect.

     SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
	     As of OpenBSD 5.8, this option has no effect.

     SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
	     Disables a countermeasure against a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol vul‐
	     nerability affecting CBC ciphers, which cannot be handled by some
	     broken SSL implementations.  This option has no effect for con‐
	     nections using other ciphers.

     SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING
	     Adds a padding extension to ensure the ClientHello size is never
	     between 256 and 511 bytes in length.  This is needed as a work‐
	     around for some implementations.

     SSL_OP_ALL
	     All of the above bug workarounds.

     It is usually safe to use SSL_OP_ALL to enable the bug workaround options
     if compatibility with somewhat broken implementations is desired.

     The following modifying options are available:

     SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
	     Disable version rollback attack detection.

	     During the client key exchange, the client must send the same
	     information about acceptable SSL/TLS protocol levels as during
	     the first hello.  Some clients violate this rule by adapting to
	     the server's answer.  (Example: the client sends a SSLv2 hello
	     and accepts up to SSLv3.1=TLSv1, the server only understands up
	     to SSLv3.	In this case the client must still use the same
	     SSLv3.1=TLSv1 announcement.  Some clients step down to SSLv3 with
	     respect to the server's answer and violate the version rollback
	     protection.)

     SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
	     Always create a new key when using temporary/ephemeral DH parame‐
	     ters (see SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)).	 This option must be
	     used to prevent small subgroup attacks, when the DH parameters
	     were not generated using “strong” primes (e.g., when using DSA-
	     parameters, see openssl(1)).  If “strong” primes were used, it is
	     not strictly necessary to generate a new DH key during each hand‐
	     shake but it is also recommended.	SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE should
	     therefore be enabled whenever temporary/ephemeral DH parameters
	     are used.

     SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
	     Always use ephemeral (temporary) RSA key when doing RSA opera‐
	     tions (see SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)).  According to the
	     specifications, this is only done when a RSA key can only be used
	     for signature operations (namely under export ciphers with
	     restricted RSA keylength).	 By setting this option, ephemeral RSA
	     keys are always used.  This option breaks compatibility with the
	     SSL/TLS specifications and may lead to interoperability problems
	     with clients and should therefore never be used.  Ciphers with
	     EDH (ephemeral Diffie-Hellman) key exchange should be used
	     instead.

     SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
	     When choosing a cipher, use the server's preferences instead of
	     the client preferences.  When not set, the SSL server will always
	     follow the client's preferences.  When set, the SSLv3/TLSv1
	     server will choose following its own preferences.	Because of the
	     different protocol, for SSLv2 the server will send its list of
	     preferences to the client and the client chooses.

     SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
	     As of OpenBSD 5.8, this option has no effect.

     SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
	     As of OpenBSD 5.8, this option has no effect.

     SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
	     As of OpenBSD 5.6, this option has no effect as SSLv2 support has
	     been removed.  In previous versions it disabled use of the SSLv2
	     protocol.

     SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
	     Do not use the SSLv3 protocol.

     SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
	     Do not use the TLSv1.0 protocol.

     SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
	     Do not use the TLSv1.1 protocol.

     SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
	     Do not use the TLSv1.2 protocol.

     SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
	     When performing renegotiation as a server, always start a new
	     session (i.e., session resumption requests are only accepted in
	     the initial handshake).  This option is not needed for clients.

     SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
	     Normally clients and servers will, where possible, transparently
	     make use of RFC4507bis tickets for stateless session resumption.

	     If this option is set this functionality is disabled and tickets
	     will not be used by clients or servers.

     SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
	     As of OpenBSD 5.6, this option has no effect.  In previous ver‐
	     sions it allowed legacy insecure renegotiation between OpenSSL
	     and unpatched clients or servers.	See the SECURE RENEGOTIATION
	     section for more details.

     SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
	     Allow legacy insecure renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched
	     servers only: this option is currently set by default.  See the
	     SECURE RENEGOTIATION section for more details.

SECURE RENEGOTIATION
     OpenSSL 0.9.8m and later always attempts to use secure renegotiation as
     described in RFC5746.  This counters the prefix attack described in
     CVE-2009-3555 and elsewhere.

     The deprecated and highly broken SSLv2 protocol does not support renego‐
     tiation at all; its use is strongly discouraged.

     This attack has far-reaching consequences which application writers
     should be aware of.  In the description below an implementation support‐
     ing secure renegotiation is referred to as “patched”.  A server not sup‐
     porting secure renegotiation is referred to as “unpatched”.

     The following sections describe the operations permitted by OpenSSL's
     secure renegotiation implementation.

   Patched client and server
     Connections and renegotiation are always permitted by OpenSSL implementa‐
     tions.

   Unpatched client and patched OpenSSL server
     The initial connection succeeds but client renegotiation is denied by the
     server with a no_renegotiation warning alert if TLS v1.0 is used or a
     fatal handshake_failure alert in SSL v3.0.

     If the patched OpenSSL server attempts to renegotiate a fatal
     handshake_failure alert is sent.  This is because the server code may be
     unaware of the unpatched nature of the client.

     N.B.: a bug in OpenSSL clients earlier than 0.9.8m (all of which are
     unpatched) will result in the connection hanging if it receives a
     no_renegotiation alert.  OpenSSL versions 0.9.8m and later will regard a
     no_renegotiation alert as fatal and respond with a fatal
     handshake_failure alert.  This is because the OpenSSL API currently has
     no provision to indicate to an application that a renegotiation attempt
     was refused.

   Patched OpenSSL client and unpatched server
     If the option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT is set then initial connec‐
     tions and renegotiation between patched OpenSSL clients and unpatched
     servers succeeds.	If neither option is set then initial connections to
     unpatched servers will fail.

     The option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT is currently set by default even
     though it has security implications: otherwise it would be impossible to
     connect to unpatched servers (i.e., all of them initially) and this is
     clearly not acceptable.  Renegotiation is permitted because this does not
     add any additional security issues: during an attack clients do not see
     any renegotiations anyway.

     As more servers become patched the option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
     will not be set by default in a future version of OpenSSL.

     OpenSSL client applications wishing to ensure they can connect to
     unpatched servers should always set SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT

     OpenSSL client applications that want to ensure they can not connect to
     unpatched servers (and thus avoid any security issues) should always
     clear SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT using SSL_CTX_clear_options() or
     SSL_clear_options().

RETURN VALUES
     SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() return the new options bit‐
     mask after adding options.

     SSL_CTX_clear_options() and SSL_clear_options() return the new options
     bitmask after clearing options.

     SSL_CTX_get_options() and SSL_get_options() return the current bitmask.

     SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() returns 1 is the peer supports
     secure renegotiation and 0 if it does not.

SEE ALSO
     openssl(1), ssl(3), SSL_clear(3), SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3),
     SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3), SSL_new(3)

HISTORY
     SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE and
     SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION have been added in OpenSSL
     0.9.7.

     SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG has been added in OpenSSL 0.9.6 and was automati‐
     cally enabled with SSL_OP_ALL.  As of 0.9.7, it is no longer included in
     SSL_OP_ALL and must be explicitly set.

     SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS has been added in OpenSSL 0.9.6e.
     Versions up to OpenSSL 0.9.6c do not include the countermeasure that can
     be disabled with this option (in OpenSSL 0.9.6d, it was always enabled).

     SSL_CTX_clear_options() and SSL_clear_options() were first added in
     OpenSSL 0.9.8m.

     SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION, SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
     and the function SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() were first added
     in OpenSSL 0.9.8m.

     SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 and SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION were changed
     to have no effect in OpenBSD 5.6.

BSD				April 18, 2024				   BSD
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