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     XSECURITY(1)	X Version 11 (Release 6.4)	  XSECURITY(1)

     NAME
	  Xsecurity - X display access control

     SYNOPSIS
	  X provides mechanism for implementing many access control
	  systems.  The sample implementation includes five
	  mechanisms:
	      Host Access		    Simple host-based access control.
	      MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1	    Shared plain-text "cookies".
	      XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1	    Secure DES based private-keys.
	      SUN-DES-1			    Based on Sun's secure rpc system.
	      MIT-KERBEROS-5		    Kerberos Version 5 user-to-user.

     ACCESS SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS
	  Host Access
	       Any client on a host in the host access control list is
	       allowed access to the X server.	This system can work
	       reasonably well in an environment where everyone trusts
	       everyone, or when only a single person can log in to a
	       given machine, and is easy to use when the list of
	       hosts used is small.  This system does not work well
	       when multiple people can log in to a single machine and
	       mutual trust does not exist.  The list of allowed hosts
	       is stored in the X server and can be changed with the
	       xhost command.  When using the more secure mechanisms
	       listed below, the host list is normally configured to
	       be the empty list, so that only authorized programs can
	       connect to the display.

	  MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1
	       When using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1, the client sends a 128
	       bit "cookie" along with the connection setup
	       information.  If the cookie presented by the client
	       matches one that the X server has, the connection is
	       allowed access.	The cookie is chosen so that it is
	       hard to guess; xdm generates such cookies automatically
	       when this form of access control is used.  The user's
	       copy of the cookie is usually stored in the .Xauthority
	       file in the home directory, although the environment
	       variable XAUTHORITY can be used to specify an alternate
	       location.  Xdm automatically passes a cookie to the
	       server for each new login session, and stores the
	       cookie in the user file at login.

	       The cookie is transmitted on the network without
	       encryption, so there is nothing to prevent a network
	       snooper from obtaining the data and using it to gain
	       access to the X server.	This system is useful in an
	       environment where many users are running applications
	       on the same machine and want to avoid interference from
	       each other, with the caveat that this control is only
	       as good as the access control to the physical network.

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     XSECURITY(1)	X Version 11 (Release 6.4)	  XSECURITY(1)

	       In environments where network-level snooping is
	       difficult, this system can work reasonably well.

	  XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1
	       Sites in the United States can use a DES-based access
	       control mechanism called XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1.  It is
	       similar in usage to MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 in that a key is
	       stored in the .Xauthority file and is shared with the X
	       server.	However, this key consists of two parts - a 56
	       bit DES encryption key and 64 bits of random data used
	       as the authenticator.

	       When connecting to the X server, the application
	       generates 192 bits of data by combining the current
	       time in seconds (since 00:00 1/1/1970 GMT) along with
	       48 bits of "identifier".	 For TCP/IP connections, the
	       identifier is the address plus port number; for local
	       connections it is the process ID and 32 bits to form a
	       unique id (in case multiple connections to the same
	       server are made from a single process).	This 192 bit
	       packet is then encrypted using the DES key and sent to
	       the X server, which is able to verify if the requestor
	       is authorized to connect by decrypting with the same
	       DES key and validating the authenticator and additional
	       data.  This system is useful in many environments where
	       host-based access control is inappropriate and where
	       network security cannot be ensured.

	  SUN-DES-1
	       Recent versions of SunOS (and some other systems) have
	       included a secure public key remote procedure call
	       system.	This system is based on the notion of a
	       network principal; a user name and NIS domain pair.
	       Using this system, the X server can securely discover
	       the actual user name of the requesting process.	It
	       involves encrypting data with the X server's public
	       key, and so the identity of the user who started the X
	       server is needed for this; this identity is stored in
	       the .Xauthority file.  By extending the semantics of
	       "host address" to include this notion of network
	       principal, this form of access control is very easy to
	       use.

	       To allow access by a new user, use xhost.  For example,
		   xhost keith@ ruth@mit.edu
	       adds "keith" from the NIS domain of the local machine,
	       and "ruth" in the "mit.edu" NIS domain.	For keith or
	       ruth to successfully connect to the display, they must
	       add the principal who started the server to their
	       .Xauthority file.  For example:
		   xauth add expo.lcs.mit.edu:0 SUN-DES-1 1.expo.lcs.mit.edu@our.domain.edu
	       This system only works on machines which support Secure

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     XSECURITY(1)	X Version 11 (Release 6.4)	  XSECURITY(1)

	       RPC, and only for users which have set up the
	       appropriate public/private key pairs on their system.
	       See the Secure RPC documentation for details.  To
	       access the display from a remote host, you may have to
	       do a keylogin on the remote host first.

	  MIT-KERBEROS-5
	       Kerberos is a network-based authentication scheme
	       developed by MIT for Project Athena.  It allows
	       mutually suspicious principals to authenticate each
	       other as long as each trusts a third party, Kerberos.
	       Each principal has a secret key known only to it and
	       Kerberos.  Principals includes servers, such as an FTP
	       server or X server, and human users, whose key is their
	       password.  Users gain access to services by getting
	       Kerberos tickets for those services from a Kerberos
	       server.	Since the X server has no place to store a
	       secret key, it shares keys with the user who logs in.
	       X authentication thus uses the user-to-user scheme of
	       Kerberos version 5.

	       When you log in via xdm, xdm will use your password to
	       obtain the initial Kerberos tickets.  xdm stores the
	       tickets in a credentials cache file and sets the
	       environment variable KRB5CCNAME to point to the file.
	       The credentials cache is destroyed when the session
	       ends to reduce the chance of the tickets being stolen
	       before they expire.

	       Since Kerberos is a user-based authorization protocol,
	       like the SUN-DES-1 protocol, the owner of a display can
	       enable and disable specific users, or Kerberos
	       principals.  The xhost client is used to enable or
	       disable authorization.  For example,
		   xhost krb5:judy krb5:gildea@x.org
	       adds "judy" from the Kerberos realm of the local
	       machine, and "gildea" from the "x.org" realm.

     THE AUTHORIZATION FILE
	  Except for Host Access control, each of these systems uses
	  data stored in the .Xauthority file to generate the correct
	  authorization information to pass along to the X server at
	  connection setup.  MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and XDM-
	  AUTHORIZATION-1 store secret data in the file; so anyone who
	  can read the file can gain access to the X server.  SUN-
	  DES-1 stores only the identity of the principal who started
	  the server (1.hostname@domain when the server is started by
	  xdm), and so it is not useful to anyone not authorized to
	  connect to the server.

	  Each entry in the .Xauthority file matches a certain
	  connection family (TCP/IP, DECnet or local connections) and

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     XSECURITY(1)	X Version 11 (Release 6.4)	  XSECURITY(1)

	  X display name (hostname plus display number).  This allows
	  multiple authorization entries for different displays to
	  share the same data file.  A special connection family
	  (FamilyWild, value 65535) causes an entry to match every
	  display, allowing the entry to be used for all connections.
	  Each entry additionally contains the authorization name and
	  whatever private authorization data is needed by that
	  authorization type to generate the correct information at
	  connection setup time.

	  The xauth program manipulates the .Xauthority file format.
	  It understands the semantics of the connection families and
	  address formats, displaying them in an easy to understand
	  format.  It also understands that SUN-DES-1 and MIT-
	  KERBEROS-5 use string values for the authorization data, and
	  displays them appropriately.

	  The X server (when running on a workstation) reads
	  authorization information from a file name passed on the
	  command line with the -auth option (see the Xserver manual
	  page).  The authorization entries in the file are used to
	  control access to the server.	 In each of the authorization
	  schemes listed above, the data needed by the server to
	  initialize an authorization scheme is identical to the data
	  needed by the client to generate the appropriate
	  authorization information, so the same file can be used by
	  both processes.  This is especially useful when xinit is
	  used.

	  MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1
	       This system uses 128 bits of data shared between the
	       user and the X server.  Any collection of bits can be
	       used.  Xdm generates these keys using a
	       cryptographically secure pseudo random number
	       generator, and so the key to the next session cannot be
	       computed from the current session key.

	  XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1
	       This system uses two pieces of information.  First, 64
	       bits of random data, second a 56 bit DES encryption key
	       (again, random data) stored in 8 bytes, the last byte
	       of which is ignored.  Xdm generates these keys using
	       the same random number generator as is used for MIT-
	       MAGIC-COOKIE-1.

	  SUN-DES-1
	       This system needs a string representation of the
	       principal which identifies the associated X server.
	       This information is used to encrypt the client's
	       authority information when it is sent to the X server.
	       When xdm starts the X server, it uses the root
	       principal for the machine on which it is running

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     XSECURITY(1)	X Version 11 (Release 6.4)	  XSECURITY(1)

	       (1.hostname@domain, e.g.,
	       "unix.expire.lcs.mit.edu@our.domain.edu").  Putting the
	       correct principal name in the .Xauthority file causes
	       Xlib to generate the appropriate authorization
	       information using the secure RPC library.

	  MIT-KERBEROS-5
	       Kerberos reads tickets from the cache pointed to by the
	       KRB5CCNAME environment variable, so does not use any
	       data from the .Xauthority file.	An entry with no data
	       must still exist to tell clients that MIT-KERBEROS-5 is
	       available.

	       Unlike the .Xauthority file for clients, the authority
	       file passed by xdm to a local X server (with ``-auth
	       filename'', see xdm(1)) does contain the name of the
	       credentials cache, since the X server will not have the
	       KRB5CCNAME environment variable set.  The data of the
	       MIT-KERBEROS-5 entry is the credentials cache name and
	       has the form ``UU:FILE:filename'', where filename is
	       the name of the credentials cache file created by xdm.
	       Note again that this form is not used by clients.

     FILES
	  .Xauthority

     SEE ALSO
	  X(1), xdm(1), xauth(1), xhost(1), xinit(1), Xserver(1)

     Page 5					     (printed 7/20/06)

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