ckfsec man page on OSF1

Man page or keyword search:  
man Server   12896 pages
apropos Keyword Search (all sections)
Output format
OSF1 logo
[printable version]

ckfsec(1)							     ckfsec(1)

NAME
       ckfsec - Check file and directory security

SYNOPSIS
       ckfsec [-aeh] [-i flag...] [-mnsvw] directory [directory ...]

OPTIONS
       “All”  mode;  has  the  same effect as a combination of -e, -v, and -w.
       Explain mode; appends explanatory text to lines of  the	report.	  Dis‐
       plays  a usage message.	Suppresses reporting and checking as specified
       by one or more of the following flags: Do not  report  in  the  summary
       whether	Access Control Lists (ACLs) are enabled on the system.	Do not
       check for GID mismatches between a link and its target.	Do  not	 check
       for hardlinks (files with link count greater than 1).  Do not check for
       symbolic links whose targets do not exist.  Do  not  check  for	world-
       writable	 directories on which the sticky bit is not set.  Do not check
       for UID mismatches between a link and its target.

	      When specifying multiple flags, do not separate  them  by	 using
	      spaces.  Restricts processing to files that are in the same file
	      system as directory.  Ignores file systems mounted through  NFS.
	      Suppresses  the summary lines that are otherwise included at the
	      end of the report. The summary lines report the total number  of
	      directories  that	 were  processed, the number of world-writable
	      directories that were found, the total number of potential prob‐
	      lems  that  were found, and (unless the a flag is specified with
	      -i) whether ACLs are  enabled  on	 the  system.	Verbose	 mode;
	      includes	in  the	 report	 all  files  and directories that were
	      checked, not just those that have a potential problem.  Displays
	      in  the  report the pathnames of all world-writable directories,
	      not just those found to be vulnerable.

	      If -w is not specified, the total count of world-writable direc‐
	      tories  that  were processed is included in summary lines at the
	      end of the report (unless -s is specified to omit the  summary).
	      This  count  always includes all world-writable directories that
	      were found, whether or not they had the sticky bit set  or  con‐
	      tained vulnerable files.

OPERANDS
       The pathname of the top-level directory of the file tree to be checked.
       A space-separated list of multiple pathnames may be specified to	 check
       more than one tree.

DESCRIPTION
       The  ckfsec  tool searches a directory tree for world-writable directo‐
       ries and, in each of these, searches for and reports on	the  following
       potential vulnerabilities: A symbolic link whose target has an owner or
       group different from the link A symbolic link  whose  target  does  not
       exist  A	 world-writable writable directory without the sticky bit set,
       including the specified directory, if applicable A pipe A file  with  a
       link count greater than 1 (a file with “hard links”)

       Potential vulnerabilities are reported in the following format:

       code type [uid] [gid] mtime file[ -> target] [explanatory_text]

       In  this	 format:  Indicates the problem. Each code value begins with W
       (warning) or E (error) to indicate the severity,	 followed  by  one  to
       three of the following letters to indicate why file is potentially vul‐
       nerable: The GID of a symbolic link does not match the GID of its  tar‐
       get.  This might mean that a nonprivileged user created a symbolic link
       to point to a privileged file.  The file has a link count greater  than
       1.  This	 might	mean that a nonprivileged user created a hardlink that
       specifies a privileged file.  The symbolic link specifies a target that
       does not exist. This might allow a nonprivileged user to trick a privi‐
       leged process into creating a privileged file. By itself,  this	condi‐
       tion  is	 treated  as  a	 warning.   A pipe was found.  The mode of the
       directory (if world-writable) is missing the sticky bit.	 The UID of  a
       symbolic	 link  does  not  match the UID of its target. This might mean
       that a nonprivileged user created a symbolic link to point to a	privi‐
       leged  file.   The  directory is world-writable, which allows nonprivi‐
       leged users to create links that can  trick  privileged	programs  into
       writing	or overwriting privileged files. A world-writable directory is
       reported as a warning, unless its sticky bit is not set, in which  case
       the directory is reported as an error.  Specifies what file represents.
       Type identifiers are as follows: Directory Regular file (shown only  if
       -v is specified) Hardlink Symbolic link Pipe Identifies the owner (UID)
       of file.	 Identifies the group (GID) of file.  Specifies the time  that
       file  was  last	modified.   Specifies  the pathname of the file system
       object that is potentially vulnerable.  If file	is  a  symbolic	 link,
       specifies its target.  Includes additional information about the poten‐
       tial problem. This additional information is appended to	 report	 lines
       only if -e is specified on the command line.

       While  traversing the specified directory tree, ckfsec does not process
       any files found	in  secure  subdirectories;  however,  the  tool  does
       process all subdirectories.

       The main body of the report that the tool produces lists files that are
       potential vulnerabilities. If the -a or -v  option  is  specified,  the
       body of the report lists all directories and files that were processed.

       Unless  the  -s option is specified, the report ends with summary lines
       as follows:

       Total directories: count
       World-writable dirs: count
       Total problems: count
       ACLs_statement

       Unless omitted by the a flag for the -i option, ACLs_statement  is  one
       of  the	following:  This  system  has ACLs enabled. ACLs may introduce
       additional security risks.

	      The ckfsec utility does not check ACLs. ACLs, depending on  what
	      they  contain, can either tighten or relax the security provided
	      by directory or file permissions alone. This informational  mes‐
	      sage  is displayed to remind you that ACLs have not been checked
	      and that you should make sure that no  world-writable  directory
	      has  an  ACL that makes the system more vulnerable than it would
	      be otherwise.  ACLs are not enabled on this system.

	      This message is what you would expect if ACLs are not being used
	      to manage system security.

					Note

       ACL reporting is not supported for releases prior to Tru64 UNIX Version
       5.0A. If the ckfsec tool is installed and run on	 Tru64	UNIX  versions
       prior to Version 5.0A, ACLs_statement is not included in the report.

       The  tool's report must be checked manually to determine whether any of
       the files and directories identified as vulnerable represent an	actual
       breach of system security or are likely to be used in that way.

EXAMPLES
       The  following  example	shows  a  report  from	a  ckfsec command that
       includes no options: #	 ckfsec / Ews  d  0777	   0	 0  2002/02/11
       /tmp/one	    [1]	 Eh  h 0644 8941    0 2002/02/11 /tmp/backdoor	[2] Eg
       l 0777 8941    0 2002/02/11 /tmp/one/two/a.txt -> /home/brians/.profile
       [3]  Eu	 l  0777     0	   0  2002/02/11  /tmp/one/two/three/a.txt  ->
       /tmp/one/two/a.txt    [4]   Eg	 l   0777   8941       0    2002/02/11
       /tmp/one/two/a.txt  ->  /home/brians/.profile  [5] Eug l 0777 8941   33
       2002/02/09  /tmp/README	->  /etc/fstab	 [6]  Wm   l  0777  8941     0
       2002/02/09  /tmp/core  ->  /etc/nologin	 [7] Total directories:	     9
       World-writable dirs:	5  Total  problems:	     7	ACLs  are  not
       enabled on this system.

       In this example, the lines that start with error codes show the follow‐
       ing: Reports a world-writable directory that does not have  the	sticky
       bit set. The sticky bit prevents users (other than the directory owner,
       the file owner, or the superuser) from deleting or  renaming  files  in
       that  directory.	  Reports  a  file  system object (in a world-writable
       directory) with a link count greater than 1. The ls  -i	command	 might
       reveal,	for  example,  that backdoor is a hardlink to (has the same i-
       number as) the one directory.  Reports a GID mismatch.  Reports	a  UID
       mismatch.   Trace  links two levels deep; therefore, Line 5 is indented
       accordingly.  These  lines  show	 that  vulnerabilities	are  sometimes
       masked  through multiple links between different directories and files.
       Reports both a UID and GID mismatch. In this case, the link might cause
       a privileged file to be overwritten.  Reports a symbolic link to a file
       that does not currently exist. In this case, the link target would be a
       problem if it were created in the future.

SEE ALSO
       Commands: dirclean(8)

       Functions: mktemp(3), safe_open(3)

       Others: sys_attrs_sec(5)

								     ckfsec(1)
[top]
                             _         _         _ 
                            | |       | |       | |     
                            | |       | |       | |     
                         __ | | __ __ | | __ __ | | __  
                         \ \| |/ / \ \| |/ / \ \| |/ /  
                          \ \ / /   \ \ / /   \ \ / /   
                           \   /     \   /     \   /    
                            \_/       \_/       \_/ 
More information is available in HTML format for server OSF1

List of man pages available for OSF1

Copyright (c) for man pages and the logo by the respective OS vendor.

For those who want to learn more, the polarhome community provides shell access and support.

[legal] [privacy] [GNU] [policy] [cookies] [netiquette] [sponsors] [FAQ]
Tweet
Polarhome, production since 1999.
Member of Polarhome portal.
Based on Fawad Halim's script.
....................................................................
Vote for polarhome
Free Shell Accounts :: the biggest list on the net