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GSS_ACCEPT_SEC_CONTEXT(3)     Programmer's Manual    GSS_ACCEPT_SEC_CONTEXT(3)

NAME
     gss_accept_sec_context — Accept a security context initiated by a peer
     application

SYNOPSIS
     #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>

     OM_uint32
     gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
	 gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
	 const gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle,
	 const gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer,
	 const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
	 const gss_name_t *src_name, gss_OID *mech_type,
	 gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 *ret_flags, OM_uint32 *time_rec,
	 gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle);

DESCRIPTION
     Allows a remotely initiated security context between the application and
     a remote peer to be established.  The routine may return a output_token
     which should be transferred to the peer application, where the peer
     application will present it to gss_init_sec_context(3).  If no token need
     be sent, gss_accept_sec_context() will indicate this by setting the
     length field of the output_token argument to zero.	 To complete the con‐
     text establishment, one or more reply tokens may be required from the
     peer application; if so, gss_accept_sec_context() will return a status
     flag of GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, in which case it should be called again
     when the reply token is received from the peer application, passing the
     token to gss_accept_sec_context() via the input_token parameters.

     Portable applications should be constructed to use the token length and
     return status to determine whether a token needs to be sent or waited
     for.  Thus a typical portable caller should always invoke
     gss_accept_sec_context() within a loop:

     gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;

     do {
       receive_token_from_peer(input_token);
       maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context(&min_stat,
					 &context_hdl,
					 cred_hdl,
					 input_token,
					 input_bindings,
					 &client_name,
					 &mech_type,
					 output_token,
					 &ret_flags,
					 &time_rec,
					 &deleg_cred);
       if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
	 report_error(maj_stat, min_stat);
       };
       if (output_token->length != 0) {
	 send_token_to_peer(output_token);

	 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, output_token);
       };
       if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
	 if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
	   gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat,
				  &context_hdl,
				  GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
	 break;
       };
     } while (maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);

     Whenever the routine returns a major status that includes the value
     GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the context is not fully established and the fol‐
     lowing restrictions apply to the output parameters:

     The value returned via the time_rec parameter is undefined Unless the
     accompanying ret_flags parameter contains the bit GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG,
     indicating that per-message services may be applied in advance of a suc‐
     cessful completion status, the value returned via the mech_type parameter
     may be undefined until the routine returns a major status value of
     GSS_S_COMPLETE.

     The values of the GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG, GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG, GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG,
     GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG, GSS_C_CONF_FLAG, GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and
     GSS_C_ANON_FLAG bits returned via the ret_flags parameter should contain
     the values that the implementation expects would be valid if context
     establishment were to succeed.

     The values of the GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG and GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG bits within
     ret_flags should indicate the actual state at the time
     gss_accept_sec_context() returns, whether or not the context is fully
     established.

     Although this requires that GSS-API implementations set the
     GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG in the final ret_flags returned to a caller (i.e.
     when accompanied by a GSS_S_COMPLETE status code), applications should
     not rely on this behavior as the flag was not defined in Version 1 of the
     GSS-API. Instead, applications should be prepared to use per-message ser‐
     vices after a successful context establishment, according to the
     GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and GSS_C_CONF_FLAG values.

     All other bits within the ret_flags argument should be set to zero.
     While the routine returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the values returned via
     the ret_flags argument indicate the services that the implementation
     expects to be available from the established context.

     If the initial call of gss_accept_sec_context() fails, the implementation
     should not create a context object, and should leave the value of the
     context_handle parameter set to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT to indicate this.	 In
     the event of a failure on a subsequent call, the implementation is per‐
     mitted to delete the "half-built" security context (in which case it
     should set the context_handle parameter to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT ), but the
     preferred behavior is to leave the security context (and the context_han‐
     dle parameter) untouched for the application to delete (using
     gss_delete_sec_context(3) ).

     During context establishment, the informational status bits
     GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN and GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicate fatal errors, and GSS-
     API mechanisms should always return them in association with a routine
     error of GSS_S_FAILURE. This requirement for pairing did not exist in
     version 1 of the GSS-API specification, so applications that wish to run
     over version 1 implementations must special-case these codes.

PARAMETERS
     context_handle
		   Context handle for new context.  Supply GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT
		   for first call; use value returned in subsequent calls.
		   Once gss_accept_sec_context() has returned a value via this
		   parameter, resources have been assigned to the correspond‐
		   ing context, and must be freed by the application after use
		   with a call to gss_delete_sec_context(3).

     acceptor_cred_handle
		   Credential handle claimed by context acceptor.  Specify
		   GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to accept the context as a default
		   principal.  If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is specified, but no
		   default acceptor principal is defined, GSS_S_NO_CRED will
		   be returned.

     input_token_buffer
		   Token obtained from remote application.

     input_chan_bindings
		   Application-specified bindings.  Allows application to
		   securely bind channel identification information to the
		   security context.  If channel bindings are not used, spec‐
		   ify GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS.

     src_name	   Authenticated name of context initiator.  After use, this
		   name should be deallocated by passing it to
		   gss_release_name(3).	 If not required, specify NULL.

     mech_type	   Security mechanism used.  The returned OID value will be a
		   pointer into static storage, and should be treated as read-
		   only by the caller (in particular, it does not need to be
		   freed).  If not required, specify NULL.

     output_token  Token to be passed to peer application.  If the length
		   field of the returned token buffer is 0, then no token need
		   be passed to the peer application.  If a non-zero length
		   field is returned, the associated storage must be freed
		   after use by the application with a call to
		   gss_release_buffer(3).

     ret_flags	   Contains various independent flags, each of which indicates
		   that the context supports a specific service option.	 If
		   not needed, specify NULL.  Symbolic names are provided for
		   each flag, and the symbolic names corresponding to the
		   required flags should be logically-ANDed with the ret_flags
		   value to test whether a given option is supported by the
		   context.  The flags are:

		   GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG

		       True   Delegated credentials are available via the del‐
			      egated_cred_handle parameter

		       False  No credentials were delegated

		   GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG

		       True   Remote peer asked for mutual authentication

		       False  Remote peer did not ask for mutual authentica‐
			      tion

		   GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG

		       True   Replay of protected messages will be detected

		       False  Replayed messages will not be detected

		   GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG

		       True   Out-of-sequence protected messages will be
			      detected

		       False  Out-of-sequence messages will not be detected

		   GSS_C_CONF_FLAG

		       True   Confidentiality service may be invoked by call‐
			      ing the gss_wrap(3) routine

		       False  No confidentiality service (via gss_wrap(3))
			      available.  gss_wrap(3) will provide message
			      encapsulation, data-origin authentication and
			      integrity services only.

		   GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG

		       True   Integrity service may be invoked by calling
			      either gss_get_mic(3) or gss_wrap(3) routines.

		       False  Per-message integrity service unavailable.

		   GSS_C_ANON_FLAG

		       True   The initiator does not wish to be authenticated;
			      the src_name parameter (if requested) contains
			      an anonymous internal name.

		       False  The initiator has been authenticated normally.

		   GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG

		       True   Protection services (as specified by the states
			      of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are
			      available if the accompanying major status
			      return value is either GSS_S_COMPLETE or
			      GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED.

		       False  Protection services (as specified by the states
			      of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are
			      available only if the accompanying major status
			      return value is GSS_S_COMPLETE.

		   GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG

		       True   The resultant security context may be trans‐
			      ferred to other processes via a call to
			      gss_export_sec_context(3).

		       False  The security context is not transferable.

		   All other bits should be set to zero.

     time_rec	   Number of seconds for which the context will remain valid.
		   Specify NULL if not required.

     delegated_cred_handle
		   Credential handle for credentials received from context
		   initiator.  Only valid if GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG in ret_flags is
		   true, in which case an explicit credential handle (i.e. not
		   GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) will be returned; if false,
		   gss_accept_context() will set this parameter to
		   GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL.	 If a credential handle is returned,
		   the associated resources must be released by the applica‐
		   tion after use with a call to gss_release_cred(3).  Specify
		   NULL if not required.

     minor_status  Mechanism specific status code.

RETURN VALUES
     GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED
		   Indicates that a token from the peer application is
		   required to complete the context, and that
		   gss_accept_sec_context must be called again with that
		   token.

     GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN
		   Indicates that consistency checks performed on the
		   input_token failed.

     GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL
		   Indicates that consistency checks performed on the creden‐
		   tial failed.

     GSS_S_NO_CRED
		   The supplied credentials were not valid for context accep‐
		   tance, or the credential handle did not reference any cre‐
		   dentials.

     GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED
		   The referenced credentials have expired.

     GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS
		   The input_token contains different channel bindings to
		   those specified via the input_chan_bindings parameter.

     GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT
		   Indicates that the supplied context handle did not refer to
		   a valid context.

     GSS_S_BAD_SIG
		   The input_token contains an invalid MIC.

     GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN
		   The input_token was too old.	 This is a fatal error during
		   context establishment.

     GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN
		   The input_token is valid, but is a duplicate of a token
		   already processed.  This is a fatal error during context
		   establishment.

     GSS_S_BAD_MECH
		   The received token specified a mechanism that is not sup‐
		   ported by the implementation or the provided credential.

SEE ALSO
     gss_delete_sec_context(3), gss_export_sec_context(3), gss_get_mic(3),
     gss_init_sec_context(3), gss_release_buffer(3), gss_release_cred(3),
     gss_release_name(3), gss_wrap(3)

STANDARDS
     RFC 2743	   Generic Security Service Application Program Interface Ver‐
		   sion 2, Update 1

     RFC 2744	   Generic Security Service API Version 2 : C-bindings

HISTORY
     The gss_accept_sec_context function first appeared in FreeBSD 7.0.

AUTHORS
     John Wray, Iris Associates

COPYRIGHT
     Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).	 All Rights Reserved.

     This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to oth‐
     ers, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or
     assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and dis‐
     tributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided
     that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all
     such copies and derivative works.	However, this document itself may not
     be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or ref‐
     erences to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except
     as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case
     the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process
     must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other
     than English.

     The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
     revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

     This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS
     IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK
     FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
     LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT
     INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FIT‐
     NESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

BSD			       January 26, 2010				   BSD
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