SETKEY(8) BSD System Manager's Manual SETKEY(8)NAMEsetkey — manually manipulate the IPsec SA/SP database
SYNOPSISsetkey [-v] -c
setkey [-v] -f filename
setkey [-aPlv] -D
setkey [-Pv] -F
setkey [-h] -x
DESCRIPTION
The setkey utility adds, updates, dumps, or flushes Security Association
Database (SAD) entries as well as Security Policy Database (SPD) entries
in the kernel.
The setkey utility takes a series of operations from the standard input
(if invoked with -c) or the file named filename (if invoked with -f
filename).
-D Dump the SAD entries. If with -P, the SPD entries are dumped.
-F Flush the SAD entries. If with -P, the SPD entries are flushed.
-a The setkey utility usually does not display dead SAD entries with
-D. If with -a, the dead SAD entries will be displayed as well.
A dead SAD entry means that it has been expired but remains in
the system because it is referenced by some SPD entries.
-h Add hexadecimal dump on -x mode.
-l Loop forever with short output on -D.
-v Be verbose. The program will dump messages exchanged on PF_KEY
socket, including messages sent from other processes to the ker‐
nel.
-x Loop forever and dump all the messages transmitted to PF_KEY
socket. -xx makes each timestamps unformatted.
Configuration syntax
With -c or -f on the command line, setkey accepts the following configu‐
ration syntax. Lines starting with hash signs (‘#’) are treated as com‐
ment lines.
add [-46n] src dst protocol spi [extensions] algorithm ... ;
Add an SAD entry. add can fail with multiple reasons, including
when the key length does not match the specified algorithm.
get [-46n] src dst protocol spi ;
Show an SAD entry.
delete [-46n] src dst protocol spi ;
Remove an SAD entry.
deleteall [-46n] src dst protocol ;
Remove all SAD entries that match the specification.
flush [protocol] ;
Clear all SAD entries matched by the options. -F on the command
line achieves the same functionality.
dump [protocol] ;
Dumps all SAD entries matched by the options. -D on the command
line achieves the same functionality.
spdadd [-46n] src_range dst_range upperspec policy ;
Add an SPD entry.
spddelete [-46n] src_range dst_range upperspec -P direction ;
Delete an SPD entry.
spdflush ;
Clear all SPD entries. -FP on the command line achieves the same
functionality.
spddump ;
Dumps all SPD entries. -DP on the command line achieves the same
functionality.
Meta-arguments are as follows:
src
dst Source/destination of the secure communication is specified as
IPv4/v6 address. The setkey utility can resolve a FQDN into
numeric addresses. If the FQDN resolves into multiple addresses,
setkey will install multiple SAD/SPD entries into the kernel by
trying all possible combinations. -4, -6 and -n restricts the
address resolution of FQDN in certain ways. -4 and -6 restrict
results into IPv4/v6 addresses only, respectively. -n avoids
FQDN resolution and requires addresses to be numeric addresses.
protocol
protocol is one of following:
esp ESP based on rfc2406
esp-old ESP based on rfc1827
ah AH based on rfc2402
ah-old AH based on rfc1826
ipcomp IPComp
tcp TCP-MD5 based on rfc2385
spi Security Parameter Index (SPI) for the SAD and the SPD. spi must
be a decimal number, or a hexadecimal number with ‘0x’ prefix.
SPI values between 0 and 255 are reserved for future use by IANA
and they cannot be used. TCP-MD5 associations must use 0x1000
and therefore only have per-host granularity at this time.
extensions
take some of the following:
-m mode Specify a security protocol mode for use. mode is
one of following: transport, tunnel or any. The
default value is any.
-r size Specify window size of bytes for replay prevention.
size must be decimal number in 32-bit word. If size
is zero or not specified, replay check does not take
place.
-u id Specify the identifier of the policy entry in SPD.
See policy.
-f pad_option
defines the content of the ESP padding. pad_option
is one of following:
zero-pad All of the padding are zero.
random-pad A series of randomized values are set.
seq-pad A series of sequential increasing numbers
started from 1 are set.
-f nocyclic-seq
Do not allow cyclic sequence number.
-lh time
-ls time Specify hard/soft life time duration of the SA.
algorithm
-E ealgo key
Specify an encryption algorithm ealgo for ESP.
-E ealgo key -A aalgo key
Specify a encryption algorithm ealgo, as well as a
payload authentication algorithm aalgo, for ESP.
-A aalgo key
Specify an authentication algorithm for AH.
-C calgo [-R]
Specify a compression algorithm for IPComp. If -R is
specified, the spi field value will be used as the
IPComp CPI (compression parameter index) on wire as
is. If -R is not specified, the kernel will use
well-known CPI on wire, and spi field will be used
only as an index for kernel internal usage.
key must be double-quoted character string, or a series of hexa‐
decimal digits preceded by ‘0x’.
Possible values for ealgo, aalgo and calgo are specified in sepa‐
rate section.
src_range
dst_range
These are selections of the secure communication specified as
IPv4/v6 address or IPv4/v6 address range, and it may accompany
TCP/UDP port specification. This takes the following form:
address
address/prefixlen
address[port]
address/prefixlen[port]
prefixlen and port must be a decimal number. The square brackets
around port are necessary and are not manpage metacharacters.
For FQDN resolution, the rules applicable to src and dst apply
here as well.
upperspec
The upper layer protocol to be used. You can use one of the
words in /etc/protocols as upperspec, as well as icmp6, ip4, or
any. The word any stands for “any protocol”. The protocol num‐
ber may also be used to specify the upperspec. A type and code
related to ICMPv6 may also be specified as an upperspec. The
type is specified first, followed by a comma and then the rele‐
vant code. The specification must be placed after icmp6. The
kernel considers a zero to be a wildcard but cannot distinguish
between a wildcard and an ICMPv6 type which is zero. The follow‐
ing example shows a policy where IPSec is not required for
inbound Neighbor Solicitations:
spdadd ::/0 ::/0 icmp6 135,0 -P in none;
NOTE: upperspec does not work in the forwarding case at this
moment, as it requires extra reassembly at forwarding node, which
is not implemented at this moment. Although there are many pro‐
tocols in /etc/protocols, protocols other than TCP, UDP and ICMP
may not be suitable to use with IPsec.
policy policy is expressed in one of the following three formats:
-P direction discard
-P direction none
-P direction ipsec protocol/mode/src-dst/level [...]
The direction of a policy must be specified as one of: out, in,
discard, none, or ipsec. The discard direction means that pack‐
ets matching the supplied indices will be discarded while none
means that IPsec operations will not take place on the packet and
ipsec means that IPsec operation will take place onto the packet.
The protocol/mode/src-dst/level statement gives the rule for how
to process the packet. The protocol is specified as ah, esp or
ipcomp. The mode is either transport or tunnel. If mode is
tunnel, you must specify the end-point addresses of the SA as src
and dst with a dash, ‘-’, between the addresses. If mode is
transport, both src and dst can be omitted. The level is one of
the following: default, use, require or unique. If the SA is not
available in every level, the kernel will request the SA from the
key exchange daemon. A value of default tells the kernel to use
the system wide default protocol e.g. the one from the
esp_trans_deflev sysctl variable, when the kernel processes the
packet. A value of use means that the kernel will use an SA if
it is available, otherwise the kernel will pass the packet as it
would normally. A value of require means that an SA is required
whenever the kernel sends a packet matched that matches the pol‐
icy. The unique level is the same as require but, in addition,
it allows the policy to bind with the unique out-bound SA. For
example, if you specify the policy level unique, racoon(8) will
configure the SA for the policy. If you configure the SA by man‐
ual keying for that policy, you can put the decimal number as the
policy identifier after unique separated by colon ‘:’ as in the
following example: unique:number. In order to bind this policy
to the SA, number must be between 1 and 32767, which corresponds
to extensions -u of manual SA configuration.
When you want to use an SA bundle, you can define multiple rules.
For example, if an IP header was followed by an AH header fol‐
lowed by an ESP header followed by an upper layer protocol
header, the rule would be:
esp/transport//require ah/transport//require;
The rule order is very important.
Note that “discard” and “none” are not in the syntax described in
ipsec_set_policy(3). There are small, but important, differences
in the syntax. See ipsec_set_policy(3) for details.
ALGORITHMS
The following list shows the supported algorithms. The protocol and
algorithm are almost completely orthogonal. The following list of
authentication algorithms can be used as aalgo in the -A aalgo of the
protocol parameter:
algorithm keylen (bits) comment
hmac-md5 128 ah: rfc2403
128 ah-old: rfc2085
hmac-sha1 160 ah: rfc2404
160 ah-old: 128bit ICV (no document)
keyed-md5 128 ah: 96bit ICV (no document)
128 ah-old: rfc1828
keyed-sha1 160 ah: 96bit ICV (no document)
160 ah-old: 128bit ICV (no document)
null 0 to 2048 for debugging
hmac-sha2-256 256 ah: 96bit ICV
(draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-00)
256 ah-old: 128bit ICV (no document)
hmac-sha2-384 384 ah: 96bit ICV (no document)
384 ah-old: 128bit ICV (no document)
hmac-sha2-512 512 ah: 96bit ICV (no document)
512 ah-old: 128bit ICV (no document)
hmac-ripemd160 160 ah: 96bit ICV (RFC2857)
ah-old: 128bit ICV (no document)
aes-xcbc-mac 128 ah: 96bit ICV (RFC3566)
128 ah-old: 128bit ICV (no document)
tcp-md5 8 to 640 tcp: rfc2385
The following is the list of encryption algorithms that can be used as
the ealgo in the -E ealgo of the protocol parameter:
algorithm keylen (bits) comment
des-cbc 64 esp-old: rfc1829, esp: rfc2405
3des-cbc 192 rfc2451
null 0 to 2048 rfc2410
blowfish-cbc 40 to 448 rfc2451
cast128-cbc 40 to 128 rfc2451
des-deriv 64 ipsec-ciph-des-derived-01
3des-deriv 192 no document
rijndael-cbc 128/192/256 rfc3602
aes-ctr 160/224/288 draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-aes-ctr-03
camllia-cbc 128/192/256 rfc4312
Note that the first 128/192/256 bits of a key for aes-ctr will be used as
AES key, and remaining 32 bits will be used as nonce.
The following are the list of compression algorithms that can be used as
the calgo in the -C calgo of the protocol parameter:
algorithm comment
deflate rfc2394
EXIT STATUS
The setkey utility exits 0 on success, and >0 if an error occurs.
EXAMPLES
Add an ESP SA between two IPv6 addresses using the des-cbc encryption
algorithm.
add 3ffe:501:4819::1 3ffe:501:481d::1 esp 123457
-E des-cbc 0x3ffe05014819ffff ;
Add an authentication SA between two FQDN specified hosts:
add -6 myhost.example.com yourhost.example.com ah 123456
-A hmac-sha1 "AH SA configuration!" ;
Use both ESP and AH between two numerically specified hosts:
add 10.0.11.41 10.0.11.33 esp 0x10001
-E des-cbc 0x3ffe05014819ffff
-A hmac-md5 "authentication!!" ;
Get the SA information associated with first example above:
get 3ffe:501:4819::1 3ffe:501:481d::1 ah 123456 ;
Flush all entries from the database:
flush ;
Dump the ESP entries from the database:
dump esp ;
Add a security policy between two networks that uses ESP in tunnel mode:
spdadd 10.0.11.41/32[21] 10.0.11.33/32[any] any
-P out ipsec esp/tunnel/192.168.0.1-192.168.1.2/require ;
Use TCP MD5 between two numerically specified hosts:
add 10.1.10.34 10.1.10.36 tcp 0x1000 -A tcp-md5 "TCP-MD5 BGP secret" ;
SEE ALSOipsec_set_policy(3), racoon(8), sysctl(8)
Changed manual key configuration for IPsec, October 1999,
http://www.kame.net/newsletter/19991007/.
HISTORY
The setkey utility first appeared in WIDE Hydrangea IPv6 protocol stack
kit. The utility was completely re-designed in June 1998.
BUGS
The setkey utility should report and handle syntax errors better.
For IPsec gateway configuration, src_range and dst_range with TCP/UDP
port number do not work, as the gateway does not reassemble packets (can‐
not inspect upper-layer headers).
BSD May 13, 2006 BSD
