[Marinir] [apakabar] TNI needs Extreme Makeover : An analysis toward its strength.

[YapHongGie]

From:  Humprey Samosir <lemper at s...>
Date:  Sun Jan 30, 2005  9:02 pm ; Msg #  48624
Subject:  TNI needs Extreme Makeover : An analysis toward its strength.


The Indonesian Defence forces consist of not only the regular military
services but also a much larger number of militia and the special branch of
national police. As a consequence, their available military force appears
quite large, until examined closely.


The Army
The Indonesian Defence forces are large, even by world standards they are
quite big. They have, according to the 2003 Dept. of Defence Almanac 276,000
personnel in uniform. However, numbers are not everything. Of the 204,500
which are actually in the Army (as against their Navy and Air Force), only
approximately, just over 31,000 are actually available as "mobile" forces in
their KOSTRAD (28,000), KOPASSUS (3,500) units. The other 173,000 are
involved in "Territorial Defence" units which are dedicated to defensive
purposes and more appropriately could be called internal security units, as
well as being used on civil infrastructure projects.

Therefore, unless the Indonesian high command was willing to run the risk of
the peripheral islands rising in rebellion or attempting outright
succession, it is highly unlikely that those units would be withdrawn for
use in any attempted hypothetical attack on Australia. Indeed, considering
the high importance placed by the Indonesian Defence forces on national
cohesion and their role in maintaining it, one would be very surprised to
see these units being withdrawn from that role, re-equipped for normal
military maneauvre operations and trained in how to undertake them.



Most of the equipment in use by the Indonesian army is quite elderly (the
one exception being their SAMs and their small-arms), most being over 35
years old. Indeed, as the tables in the first post, on the Indonesian
Defence Forces indicate, there is a slight, but perceptible steady decline
in the numbers of AFVs in service in the Indonesian Army. In the space of a
few years, the numbers of AMX-13 light tanks, for example has halved or even
less.

Such old equipment has serviceability problems, particularly the equipment
which was purchased from the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In the case
of the Soviet Union, the break with that nation occurred even before the
Suharto coup, so its obviously quite old equipment and most data sources
make the point that while numbers quoted are relatively high, only
approximately half are still considered to be serviceable. With the break up
of Yugoslavia one must question as to whether or not any of the ex-Yugoslav
weapons would be still functioning at all.



One source, the Defence almanac, does make the point that some of the
venerable, ex-Soviet PT-76 amphibious light tanks are apparently to be
upgraded to a standard referred to as PT-2000, however I have been unable to
discover any information on what that entails (I'd suspect a new
engine/gearbox at the very least and more than likely a new gun, perhaps the
French 90mm used in the Indonesian Marines' AMX-10 PAC-90s).
Even so, thats still a drop in the ocean and it would only bring the PT-76s
from being nearly completely useless to marginally useful.



Most of the other AFVs in use by the Indonesian military, with the exception
of the AMX-10s are just as ancient and one wonders where the spare-parts for
them is coming from, if they are to be considered still in operation as in
ARMED Ambarawa.



The Army is also lacking in artillery, being for a force of its size, rather
under equipped as far as field artillery (weapons of 105mm or less in
calibre) and completely lacks any medium or heavy artillery. It does though,
have a large number of mortars of 81mm or 120mm calibre.
This is of course understandable when one considers the types of operations
that the Army is primarily engaged in (COIN and defence of the homeland),
rather than offensive operations.
As mentioned, the Army's SAMs and small-arms are perhaps the only two areas
where quite modern equipment has been procured in the last 10-15 years. The
Rapier SAMs, are quite modern, only being some 10 years old and represent a
real threat to any potential attacking aircraft, as do the RBS-70s.
Their numbers though, are relatively low and would only provide defences for
either a small number of high-value targets, or possible the army in the
field but not necessarily both.


In the area of small-arms, the Indonesians have been following military
fashion and replacing their older, larger calibre weapons firing 7.62x51mm
NATO rounds with those firing 5.56x45mm ammunition as standard of FNC
(Senapan-Serbu). This has resulted in the procurement of M16A1s and other
similar weapons in relatively large numbers.



The Navy
The Indonesian Navy, surprisingly for an archipelagic nation has always been
the "poor-man" of the three services. Its equipment has been of low quality
and is serviceability doubtful. This changed though, in 1990 when the
Science and Development Minister, Mr.Habibie announced suddenly that he had
negotiated a deal with the German Government to purchase a large number of
ex-East German corvettes and landing craft.

In doing so, he created virtually, an "instant fleet". However, the choice
of ships selected, left a lot to be desired, if as according to some, he was
choosing to create or enhance the supposed threat against Australia.
The Pattimura Class corvettes selected (ex-Parchim class) were designed for
operations in the narrow, shallow seas of the Baltic.
They lacked adequate air-Defence, electronic, anti-surface, or even
anti-submarine warfare equipment (having been sold by the Germans
sans-weapons meant that even the rudimentary ones normally carried were
missing). Once out of the shallow, littoral waters of the Indonesian
archipelago, their value would be slight.



If, on the otherhand, they had been designed not for offensive but rather
defensive and patrol duties, then their choice made good sense except that
the Indonesian navy is now facing, in 10-15 years a block obsolescence
problem when all these hulls need replacing at once.
What made more sense was the purchase, at the same time as the corvettes, of
12 ex-East German LST (Landing Ship Tank) amphibious warfare ships. However,
as with the corvettes, block obsolescence becomes a real worry, further down
the track, while their value is limited when its understood that a great
deal of the intra-island commerce depends upon the regular use of navy ships
such as these as ferries which of course means the national economy would
suffer if they were withdrawn for normal miliary operations en masse.



Air Force
The air force, like the Navy and the Army is primarily equipped with older
generation equipment and because of the ongoing political repercussions of
the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia has suffered serviceability
problems and a general lack of spare parts for the majority of its aircraft
which are sourced from the USA.
Indeed, as a consequence of those problems, Jakarta recently announced
cancellation of a followon order for further F-16A/Bs and its replacement by
one for several Su-30MKs from Russia instead.


While these aircraft will introduce a quantum leap for the Indonesian Air
Force, it should be pointed out the small number on order (only 12) plus
their considerable increased sophistication over anything that the
Indonesians have operated in the past, would indicate going by such
experiences in other third world air forces that both the serviceability and
the usefulness of these aircraft will be, at least in the initial stages,
severely limited as the Indonesian Air Force attempts to come to grips with
their new mounts. They are though, no strangers to Russian aircraft.


Overall though, it is very obvious, going by the equipment chosen and
procured over the last two decades, that the Indonesian Air Force is
primarily configured for a defensive, rather than an offensive role. Its
main combat aircraft have tended to be small, lightly-equipped fighters
intended for visual dogfighting, with a secondary role as fighter-bombers
(F-5s and F-16s), backed by a fairly large number of fighter-bombers and
specialist COIN aircraft (A-4s & OV-10s).


The rotary-wing assets are though, quite large, but primarily in the light
to medium range, which is understandable when one considers the terrain and
types of operations which the Air Force undertakes (ie., Jungle/COIN in
direct support of the army). Just where are they when Tsunami relief
occured? A refreshing thought !


Surprisingly, again for an archipelagic nation, Maritime Reconnaissance has
been until recently, relatively neglected by the Indonesian Air Force,
although the recently announced planned acquisition of several CN-235 MPs,
when coupled to the use of the C-130 MP and the B737 Surveilers, this will
be somewhat addressed, although numbers are still quite low and indicate a
preference towards surface reconnaissance/warfare rather than ASW.
Not unsurprisingly, the Air Force has a large transport component, although
primarily oriented towards tactical rather than strategic missions.
The strategic assets that it does have, tend on the whole to be quite old
and in several cases, unusual or even odd choices (such as the L-100-30
Hercules).
It lacks any adequate in-flight refuelling aircraft beyond a few KC-130
Hercules and its Boeing 737 "Surveiler" aircraft which have a secondary use
in such a role (although in doing in using them as such, they would
obviously not be available in their primary role as maritime reconnaissance
aircraft).
In addition, the lack of adequate AEW & C aircraft and ECM assets, would
tend to indicate that the Indonesians have a considerable amount of distance
to go, if they were contemplating an offensive effort against one of their
neighbours.


Conclusion
Overall, the force structures and equipment of the Indonesian Defence Forces
indicate a defensive force which is not intended to undertake any long-range
offensive operations of an extended nature. The Army is primarily concerned
with its control and responsibilities with regard to national unity and
maintenance of public order. This is reflected in its stated rationales as
well as the way in which its structure has been built up and designed, as
well as the equipment which has been purchased over the last few decades.


The Air Force and the Navy, while possibly, because of the nature of their
services, having potentially much more offensive ability than the Army,
have, just like the Army, by the nature of the equipment purchased and their
structures, been subordinated to the Armys role within the social structure
of the nation. Their equipment tends to be short-ranged, designed for use in
and around the environs of the Indonesian archipelago and obviously lacking
in offensive ability.


 The small number of submarines currently in service and purchases recently
announced, indicate a continuation of the present policy of confining
interest to a "brown-water" littoral naval role, rather than seeking a
"blue-water" one.


 The recently announced purchase of Su-30MK fighter-bombers by the Air
Force, as already noted, the mere acquisition of equipment does not
necessarily mean that the Indonesian Air Force will either know how to use
these aircraft properly. Or be able to maintain such a relatively
sophisticate aircraft after having concentrated for many years on older,
much simpler ones. The low numbers also mean that their ability to seriously
affect any conflict, even remotely possible, between say, Australia and
Indonesia would be relatively low, particularly when faced by a much larger
number of RAAF F/A-18s flown by much better trained pilots equipped and
trained in the full use of their mounts.


Overall, I would be forced to objectively rate any possible threat by the
Indonesian Defence Forces (ignoring the political dimension for the moment)
as extremely low from a military viewpoint. They lack the ability to project
power far enough beyond their borders to represent any real, credible
threat, and in order to do so,TNI would be required to undertake not only a
massive re-equipment program but also a massive re-training one, as well as
reorienting their entire thinking towards undertaking offensive rather than
primarily defensive operations.

ps: this paperwork was presented at US Marine Warfare Academy in 2004.

Semper Fidelis,
H.H Samosir


Merenung dibawah Sathergate: 'Let there be Light'
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