[Marinir] {Spam?} The Story behind "The SEAL assault on Patilla Airfield during Operation Just Cause"

aditya kusuma wardhana elite_navyseal at yahoo.com
Mon May 23 18:15:05 CEST 2005


Forumners, ini ada lagi artikel yg membahas kegagalan
SEAL team di PANAMA..semoga bisa menambah wawasan dan
menjadi bahan diskusi yg menarik buat kita semua..
Hopefully, Sir.Lt.Col would give us more Analysis from
this article....

Source :http://www.specwarnet.com/miscinfo/patilla.htm
The SEAL assault on Patilla Airfield during Operation
Just Cause 
 
(courtesy US Navy)
 
In 1989 the United States invaded Panama. During the
invasion, the US Navy SEALs were tasked with two
missions. The first, to disable a boat General Noriega
might use to escape, was successful (It was "disabled"
by putting so much explosives under the hull that one
engine was never found!). The second was not, to the
tune of four SEALs killed and eight seriously wounded.
It is this second incident we will focus on. 
The failure of this mission started during the
planning process. The original plan called for Army
units to be air lifted into key areas. But the Navy
command was unhappy that none of their units got to
share in the action, so SEAL Team 4 was given two
missions one of which probably should have been
assigned to the Army Rangers. The second mission SEALS
were tasked with was disabling Manuel Noriega's
Learjet at Patilla Field to prevent him from escaping
in it. 
Originally, the plan called for 48 SEALs in two
platoons to be towed near the cliffs at the end of the
runway. The SEALs would then move the 3,500 ft. length
of the airfield up to the hangar the lear was kept.
One squad would disable the lear while another would
pull small airplanes onto the airstrip to prevent it
from being used. The others would be used to provide
security at the north and south end of the fields. 
The planner of the mission, Commodore John Sandoz, had
asked an experienced SEAL under his command, a
Lieutenant Commander Mike Walsh, to review his plan.
Walsh had recently returned from a three half year
tour in Panama and knew both the country and its
current situation well. Walsh almost immediately
rejected the original and offered three different
plans of his own. 
The first was to drive a team of eight SEALs to the
fence of the airfield in a vehicle disguised to look
like one of the many canal zone vehicles in the area.
Previous reconnaissance would have located a hole in
the fence the SEALs could use to gain access to the
field. Four SEALS would remain behind as vehicle and
fence guards while the remaining four would move to
the hangar, take care of any guards in the hangar with
sienced MP5s, and then disable the plane. 
The second plan was to infiltrate a SEAL sniper team
into the airfield and have them take position on top
of the airfield's cafeteria. This position would give
them a commanding view of the main doors to the hangar
as well as the rest of the airfield. Only if the plane
was about to move out would the SEALs open fire,
disabling it with rounds into the cockpit ot tires. 
The third and best plan involved the same two-man SEAL
sniper team, but would base them from an apartment
rented next to the airfield. This plan would involve
the least amount of danger to the SEAL operators and
was more in-line with how SEALs normally operate. 
All three plans were shot by Commodore Sandoz. The
original plan would be implimented. Lt. Cdr Walsh
refused to sign an endorsement for Sandoz's plan and
was moved from operations to logistics for his
refusal. 
H hour for the invasion was set for 0100. The PBR from
SBU-26, with CRRCs in tow, left the dock at Rodman
2000 hours on Decemer 19, 1989. The SEALs were armed
with an impressive array of weapons. Not only were
pistols and M-16/203 combos carried, but several team
members had the then-new M-249 Saw or M-60 machine
gun. Rounding out their arsenal were fragmentation
grenades, claymore mines, and AT-4 anti-tank rockets. 
At 0045, the mission commander was notified that H
hour had been moved forward 15 minutes (fighting had
broken out early between Panamanian and American
forces). The element of surprise lost, the SEALs
continued towards their objective. A second problem
was that the USAF Combat Controllers attached to the
SEALs had not been able to raise the AC-130 Spectre
assigned to provide supporting fire if needed. 
Other problems began to crop up as the reached the
shore and assembled on the edge of the runway. There
was no cover. The runway was well lit by landing
lights and backscatter from the city. Worse yet, the
administration building and hangar itself were well
lit. And fire from the nearby city began waking up
houseguards in buildings surrounding the field. On the
positive side, a SEAL surveillance team had occupied a
rented apartment across from the field earlier in the
day and could give them realtime intelligence about
troop and vehicle movements. 
So far, things had gone well. Bravo Platoon had
disarmed several guards and had began to drag light
aircraft onto the runway. As they did, the two squads
of Golf Platoon made their way up the field. Radio
calls came in; one reporting that a helicopter had
left Colon heading for Patilla--possibly carrying
Noriega. The second relayed that several PDF armed
cars mounting 90mm cannon were possibly heading to the
north end of the field. 
About this time, the houseguards in the buildings
surrounding the airfield noticed members of Golf
Platoon's unprotected dash up the field. Using
portable radios, they notified guards in the hangar
and then took aim on the SEALs below. The hangar
guards, now awake, quickly dressed and took up
defensive positions in the hangar. 
The two squads took up position, the first within 100
feet of the hangar, the second slightly behind and to
the side of the first. A call came out from the hangar
for the SEALS to surrender. A SEAL responded by
demanding the Panimanians surrender to the SEALs.
Realizing they were in a bad position on a brightly
lit field, the first squad tried to relocate. Then
several long bursts of fire came out from the hangar. 
In the initial volley of fire, all but one of the
SEALs were wounded. The houseguards across the
airfileld also began to fire upon the SEALs, putting
them in a deadly cross-fire. Some of the SEALs were
now dead, and those that weren't were having a hard
time dealing with their wounds and getting out of the
heavy rucks they'd brought with them. 
The second squad of Golf platoon began to attemp to
lay down a protective cover as Bravo Platoon and
members of the command and control element rushed to
the hangar. The USAF Combat Controllers had just made
contact with the gunship, but they had been kept with
the command and control element of the SEALs and were
too far away to provide assistance. 
Surviving members began to drag the casualties away,
several becoming casualties themselves in the process.
Lt Phillips from Golf's second squad ordered the
Learjet to be taken out by rocket. The AT-4 hit the
aircraft cleanly, destroying any chance of it being
used to escape. A medevac was reported as inbound, but
wasn't actually released from Howard AFB (only ten
minutes away for another hour and a half. 
Killed were Lt. John Connors, CPO Donald McFaul,
Torpedoman's Mate 2nd Class Issac Rodriguez, and
Botswain's Mate 1st Class Chris Tilghman. Rodriguez
had only been a SEAL for one week. Eight other SEALS
had been seriously wounded. 
The operations during Just Cause should have been
tasked to the units that specialized in that type of
operation. The SEALS were a logical choice in the
assault on Noriega's boat, but the Army Rangers should
have been given the Patilla mission. Given that the
SEALs got the mission, the senior staff should have
come up with a better plan that was less risky, and
the SEALs leading the team should have refused the
mission as it was planned and developed a new plan
using methods more in-line with SEAL doctrine. A
smaller force should have been used. A sniper team
could have taken out the lear and prevented any other
aircraft from using the field. The SEALs should not
have tried a conventional assault on an open,
coverless airfield. 
 
In memory and appreciation of those that lost their
lives serving our country during Just Cause.


Regards
Aditya Kusuma


		
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