[Nasional-e] Is there a left left in Israel?
Ambon
nasional-e@polarhome.com
Wed Feb 5 00:36:16 2003
Is there a left left in Israel?
Henry Siegman IHT Tuesday, February 4, 2003
Wanted, a leader who speaks the truth
NEW YORK David Grossman, the celebrated novelist, recently noted, in Yedioth
Ahronoth, that had Ariel Sharon shown Israeli voters where the country would
be today when he first ran for office two years ago, no one would have voted
for him. Yet despite the security and economic nightmare in which Israelis
now find themselves, they have returned him to office by a near landslide
margin.
.
Even his severest critics must concede that whatever other factors explain
this paradoxical Israeli behavior, the outcome of last Tuesday's elections
is first and foremost an amazing personal triumph for Sharon. It is all the
more remarkable considering that a majority of Israelis have consistently
indicated to pollsters that when it comes to policy, they support the views
of his opponent, Labor's Amram Mitzna, who suffered a crushing defeat.
.
Likud expected the attraction of Sharon's persona to be so irresistible that
it never put forward a political program for the voters. Instead it
campaigned with the slogan "The people want Sharon."
.
Mitzna had several strikes against him. As mayor of Haifa, a major city in
northern Israel that to many Israelis might as well be another country, he
was unknown. He seemed to emerge out of nowhere only months before the
elections, overthrowing Fouad Ben-Eliezer as chairman of the Labor Party and
as the party's candidate for prime minister.
.
Mitzna suffered as much damage from veteran party insiders who resented the
newcomer as he did from his political opposition.
.
He did not help his own cause by announcing his readiness to resume peace
negotiations even with Yasser Arafat, a position entirely consistent with
his view that the establishment of a successful Palestinian state is an
existential Israeli need, not a favor to the Palestinians.
.
But Ehud Barak, in the closing days of his premiership, and Ariel Sharon
have so thoroughly demonized Arafat and his cause - Barak's gift to Sharon
was his insistence that his Camp David initiative was really intended "to
tear the mask off Arafat's face" and reveal his true intention to destroy
Israel - that Mitzna's candor was politically suicidal.
.
Mitzna also had to overcome the utterly destructive legacy of Labor's
participation in the previous, Likud-led government. The party's chairman,
Ben-Eliezer, served as defense minister in Sharon's government and
enthusiastically executed his most brutal policies. The party's elder
statesman, Shimon Peres, served as Sharon's foreign minister, effectively
neutralizing international criticism of Sharon's most egregious offenses
against the peace process.
.
So Labor could not credibly maintain that it had suddenly discovered that
Sharon was not good for Israel, or that Labor was committed to radically
different policies. In the end, what accounts most for Sharon's success is
the skill with which he presented himself to voters in the political center,
and to the U.S. administration, as a moderate who can be counted on to avoid
reckless measures advocated by Israel's extremists, including extremists
within his own party.
.
In fact, Sharon is a stealthy hawk. His moderation is a cleverly fabricated
pretense, as noted by the Hebrew University's Gadi Taub (IHT Views, Jan.
30). Sharon "talks of negotiations just enough" to maintain the support of
America and of Israel's moderate center, and "he raises the specter of
terrorism more than enough to foment Israeli anger and conceal the actual
thrust of his policy, which is strengthening Israel's hold on the
territories."
.
Sharon's overwhelming victory enables him to form a Likud-led right-wing
government that could well last its entire term of office, a longevity
virtually unprecedented in Israel's history. Instead he has stated publicly
that if he cannot form a unity government that includes the Labor Party, he
will call for new elections. Naive moderates see this as evidence that he is
really their man.
.
But the reason why Sharon will not go with a narrow right-wing government is
that he understands that he cannot continue his pretense of moderation
without the cover that only the Labor Party can provide. It is a pretense
that is essential to sustain his efforts to delay the onset of a political
process and to gain time to establish additional "facts on the ground" that
will forever preclude the emergence of a Palestinian state.
.
Have the extraordinary election results spelled the end of Israel's
political left, which in the Israeli context means primarily the peace camp,
as so many pundits now proclaim? It will have done so if Mitzna yields to
pressures, both from within his own party and from the public, and forms a
unity government with Likud.
.
Israel's left will survive as a political force only if Mitzna retains the
stubborn integrity he has shown so far and offers his countrymen a clear
alternative to Sharon's reliance on "decisive" military force that will
supposedly crush the Palestinians and lead to their abject surrender, a
policy goal that Sharon and his military chief of staff have unashamedly
proclaimed.
.
By staying out of Sharon's government, Labor can expose the futility of the
hopes placed in Sharon by moderate Israelis who believe his mantra about
making "painful concessions" for peace. By refusing to compromise his
principles, Mitzna can offer an Israeli public that is suffering a massive
national depression because of the hopelessness of the situation a reason
not to despair.
.
The United States, which uniquely has the capacity to get the parties to end
the impasse, is unwilling to use its domestic political capital to knock
some sense into the belligerents, a situation that may well persist for the
next six years.
.
An end to Israel's travails, not to speak of the suffering of the
Palestinian people, will therefore come only as the result of actions by an
Israeli leader willing to speak the truth, as Mitzna did throughout his
campaign.
.
And the truth is that if Israel does not return essentially to its pre-1967
borders and facilitate the emergence of a viable and successful Palestinian
state, the glorious Zionist enterprise that began more than a century ago
will come to an end.
.
It will be overwhelmed by demographic realities that even Sharon's most
skillful political acrobatics will be unable to forestall.
.
The writer is a senior fellow on the Middle East at the Council on Foreign
Relations. These views are his own.
< < Back to Start of Article Wanted, a leader who speaks the truth
NEW YORK David Grossman, the celebrated novelist, recently noted, in Yedioth
Ahronoth, that had Ariel Sharon shown Israeli voters where the country would
be today when he first ran for office two years ago, no one would have voted
for him. Yet despite the security and economic nightmare in which Israelis
now find themselves, they have returned him to office by a near landslide
margin.
.
Even his severest critics must concede that whatever other factors explain
this paradoxical Israeli behavior, the outcome of last Tuesday's elections
is first and foremost an amazing personal triumph for Sharon. It is all the
more remarkable considering that a majority of Israelis have consistently
indicated to pollsters that when it comes to policy, they support the views
of his opponent, Labor's Amram Mitzna, who suffered a crushing defeat.
.
Likud expected the attraction of Sharon's persona to be so irresistible that
it never put forward a political program for the voters. Instead it
campaigned with the slogan "The people want Sharon."
.
Mitzna had several strikes against him. As mayor of Haifa, a major city in
northern Israel that to many Israelis might as well be another country, he
was unknown. He seemed to emerge out of nowhere only months before the
elections, overthrowing Fouad Ben-Eliezer as chairman of the Labor Party and
as the party's candidate for prime minister.
.
Mitzna suffered as much damage from veteran party insiders who resented the
newcomer as he did from his political opposition.
.
He did not help his own cause by announcing his readiness to resume peace
negotiations even with Yasser Arafat, a position entirely consistent with
his view that the establishment of a successful Palestinian state is an
existential Israeli need, not a favor to the Palestinians.
.
But Ehud Barak, in the closing days of his premiership, and Ariel Sharon
have so thoroughly demonized Arafat and his cause - Barak's gift to Sharon
was his insistence that his Camp David initiative was really intended "to
tear the mask off Arafat's face" and reveal his true intention to destroy
Israel - that Mitzna's candor was politically suicidal.
.
Mitzna also had to overcome the utterly destructive legacy of Labor's
participation in the previous, Likud-led government. The party's chairman,
Ben-Eliezer, served as defense minister in Sharon's government and
enthusiastically executed his most brutal policies. The party's elder
statesman, Shimon Peres, served as Sharon's foreign minister, effectively
neutralizing international criticism of Sharon's most egregious offenses
against the peace process.
.
So Labor could not credibly maintain that it had suddenly discovered that
Sharon was not good for Israel, or that Labor was committed to radically
different policies. In the end, what accounts most for Sharon's success is
the skill with which he presented himself to voters in the political center,
and to the U.S. administration, as a moderate who can be counted on to avoid
reckless measures advocated by Israel's extremists, including extremists
within his own party.
.
In fact, Sharon is a stealthy hawk. His moderation is a cleverly fabricated
pretense, as noted by the Hebrew University's Gadi Taub (IHT Views, Jan.
30). Sharon "talks of negotiations just enough" to maintain the support of
America and of Israel's moderate center, and "he raises the specter of
terrorism more than enough to foment Israeli anger and conceal the actual
thrust of his policy, which is strengthening Israel's hold on the
territories."
.
Sharon's overwhelming victory enables him to form a Likud-led right-wing
government that could well last its entire term of office, a longevity
virtually unprecedented in Israel's history. Instead he has stated publicly
that if he cannot form a unity government that includes the Labor Party, he
will call for new elections. Naive moderates see this as evidence that he is
really their man.
.
But the reason why Sharon will not go with a narrow right-wing government is
that he understands that he cannot continue his pretense of moderation
without the cover that only the Labor Party can provide. It is a pretense
that is essential to sustain his efforts to delay the onset of a political
process and to gain time to establish additional "facts on the ground" that
will forever preclude the emergence of a Palestinian state.
.
Have the extraordinary election results spelled the end of Israel's
political left, which in the Israeli context means primarily the peace camp,
as so many pundits now proclaim? It will have done so if Mitzna yields to
pressures, both from within his own party and from the public, and forms a
unity government with Likud.
.
Israel's left will survive as a political force only if Mitzna retains the
stubborn integrity he has shown so far and offers his countrymen a clear
alternative to Sharon's reliance on "decisive" military force that will
supposedly crush the Palestinians and lead to their abject surrender, a
policy goal that Sharon and his military chief of staff have unashamedly
proclaimed.
.
By staying out of Sharon's government, Labor can expose the futility of the
hopes placed in Sharon by moderate Israelis who believe his mantra about
making "painful concessions" for peace. By refusing to compromise his
principles, Mitzna can offer an Israeli public that is suffering a massive
national depression because of the hopelessness of the situation a reason
not to despair.
.
The United States, which uniquely has the capacity to get the parties to end
the impasse, is unwilling to use its domestic political capital to knock
some sense into the belligerents, a situation that may well persist for the
next six years.
.
An end to Israel's travails, not to speak of the suffering of the
Palestinian people, will therefore come only as the result of actions by an
Israeli leader willing to speak the truth, as Mitzna did throughout his
campaign.
.
And the truth is that if Israel does not return essentially to its pre-1967
borders and facilitate the emergence of a viable and successful Palestinian
state, the glorious Zionist enterprise that began more than a century ago
will come to an end.
.
It will be overwhelmed by demographic realities that even Sharon's most
skillful political acrobatics will be unable to forestall.
.
The writer is a senior fellow on the Middle East at the Council on Foreign
Relations. These views are his own. Wanted, a leader who speaks the truth
NEW YORK David Grossman, the celebrated novelist, recently noted, in Yedioth
Ahronoth, that had Ariel Sharon shown Israeli voters where the country would
be today when he first ran for office two years ago, no one would have voted
for him. Yet despite the security and economic nightmare in which Israelis
now find themselves, they have returned him to office by a near landslide
margin.
.
Even his severest critics must concede that whatever other factors explain
this paradoxical Israeli behavior, the outcome of last Tuesday's elections
is first and foremost an amazing personal triumph for Sharon. It is all the
more remarkable considering that a majority of Israelis have consistently
indicated to pollsters that when it comes to policy, they support the views
of his opponent, Labor's Amram Mitzna, who suffered a crushing defeat.
.
Likud expected the attraction of Sharon's persona to be so irresistible that
it never put forward a political program for the voters. Instead it
campaigned with the slogan "The people want Sharon."
.
Mitzna had several strikes against him. As mayor of Haifa, a major city in
northern Israel that to many Israelis might as well be another country, he
was unknown. He seemed to emerge out of nowhere only months before the
elections, overthrowing Fouad Ben-Eliezer as chairman of the Labor Party and
as the party's candidate for prime minister.
.
Mitzna suffered as much damage from veteran party insiders who resented the
newcomer as he did from his political opposition.
.
He did not help his own cause by announcing his readiness to resume peace
negotiations even with Yasser Arafat, a position entirely consistent with
his view that the establishment of a successful Palestinian state is an
existential Israeli need, not a favor to the Palestinians.
.
But Ehud Barak, in the closing days of his premiership, and Ariel Sharon
have so thoroughly demonized Arafat and his cause - Barak's gift to Sharon
was his insistence that his Camp David initiative was really intended "to
tear the mask off Arafat's face" and reveal his true intention to destroy
Israel - that Mitzna's candor was politically suicidal.
.
Mitzna also had to overcome the utterly destructive legacy of Labor's
participation in the previous, Likud-led government. The party's chairman,
Ben-Eliezer, served as defense minister in Sharon's government and
enthusiastically executed his most brutal policies. The party's elder
statesman, Shimon Peres, served as Sharon's foreign minister, effectively
neutralizing international criticism of Sharon's most egregious offenses
against the peace process.
.
So Labor could not credibly maintain that it had suddenly discovered that
Sharon was not good for Israel, or that Labor was committed to radically
different policies. In the end, what accounts most for Sharon's success is
the skill with which he presented himself to voters in the political center,
and to the U.S. administration, as a moderate who can be counted on to avoid
reckless measures advocated by Israel's extremists, including extremists
within his own party.
.
In fact, Sharon is a stealthy hawk. His moderation is a cleverly fabricated
pretense, as noted by the Hebrew University's Gadi Taub (IHT Views, Jan.
30). Sharon "talks of negotiations just enough" to maintain the support of
America and of Israel's moderate center, and "he raises the specter of
terrorism more than enough to foment Israeli anger and conceal the actual
thrust of his policy, which is strengthening Israel's hold on the
territories."
.
Sharon's overwhelming victory enables him to form a Likud-led right-wing
government that could well last its entire term of office, a longevity
virtually unprecedented in Israel's history. Instead he has stated publicly
that if he cannot form a unity government that includes the Labor Party, he
will call for new elections. Naive moderates see this as evidence that he is
really their man.
.
But the reason why Sharon will not go with a narrow right-wing government is
that he understands that he cannot continue his pretense of moderation
without the cover that only the Labor Party can provide. It is a pretense
that is essential to sustain his efforts to delay the onset of a political
process and to gain time to establish additional "facts on the ground" that
will forever preclude the emergence of a Palestinian state.
.
Have the extraordinary election results spelled the end of Israel's
political left, which in the Israeli context means primarily the peace camp,
as so many pundits now proclaim? It will have done so if Mitzna yields to
pressures, both from within his own party and from the public, and forms a
unity government with Likud.
.
Israel's left will survive as a political force only if Mitzna retains the
stubborn integrity he has shown so far and offers his countrymen a clear
alternative to Sharon's reliance on "decisive" military force that will
supposedly crush the Palestinians and lead to their abject surrender, a
policy goal that Sharon and his military chief of staff have unashamedly
proclaimed.
.
By staying out of Sharon's government, Labor can expose the futility of the
hopes placed in Sharon by moderate Israelis who believe his mantra about
making "painful concessions" for peace. By refusing to compromise his
principles, Mitzna can offer an Israeli public that is suffering a massive
national depression because of the hopelessness of the situation a reason
not to despair.
.
The United States, which uniquely has the capacity to get the parties to end
the impasse, is unwilling to use its domestic political capital to knock
some sense into the belligerents, a situation that may well persist for the
next six years.
.
An end to Israel's travails, not to speak of the suffering of the
Palestinian people, will therefore come only as the result of actions by an
Israeli leader willing to speak the truth, as Mitzna did throughout his
campaign.
.
And the truth is that if Israel does not return essentially to its pre-1967
borders and facilitate the emergence of a viable and successful Palestinian
state, the glorious Zionist enterprise that began more than a century ago
will come to an end.
.
It will be overwhelmed by demographic realities that even Sharon's most
skillful political acrobatics will be unable to forestall.
.
The writer is a senior fellow on the Middle East at the Council on Foreign
Relations. These views are his own. Wanted, a leader who speaks the truth
NEW YORK David Grossman, the celebrated novelist, recently noted, in Yedioth
Ahronoth, that had Ariel Sharon shown Israeli voters where the country would
be today when he first ran for office two years ago, no one would have voted
for him. Yet despite the security and economic nightmare in which Israelis
now find themselves, they have returned him to office by a near landslide
margin.
.
Even his severest critics must concede that whatever other factors explain
this paradoxical Israeli behavior, the outcome of last Tuesday's elections
is first and foremost an amazing personal triumph for Sharon. It is all the
more remarkable considering that a majority of Israelis have consistently
indicated to pollsters that when it comes to policy, they support the views
of his opponent, Labor's Amram Mitzna, who suffered a crushing defeat.
.
Likud expected the attraction of Sharon's persona to be so irresistible that
it never put forward a political program for the voters. Instead it
campaigned with the slogan "The people want Sharon."
.
Mitzna had several strikes against him. As mayor of Haifa, a major city in
northern Israel that to many Israelis might as well be another country, he
was unknown. He seemed to emerge out of nowhere only months before the
elections, overthrowing Fouad Ben-Eliezer as chairman of the Labor Party and
as the party's candidate for prime minister.
.
Mitzna suffered as much damage from veteran party insiders who resented the
newcomer as he did from his political opposition.
.
He did not help his own cause by announcing his readiness to resume peace
negotiations even with Yasser Arafat, a position entirely consistent with
his view that the establishment of a successful Palestinian state is an
existential Israeli need, not a favor to the Palestinians.
.
But Ehud Barak, in the closing days of his premiership, and Ariel Sharon
have so thoroughly demonized Arafat and his cause - Barak's gift to Sharon
was his insistence that his Camp David initiative was really intended "to
tear the mask off Arafat's face" and reveal his true intention to destroy
Israel - that Mitzna's candor was politically suicidal.
.
Mitzna also had to overcome the utterly destructive legacy of Labor's
participation in the previous, Likud-led government. The party's chairman,
Ben-Eliezer, served as defense minister in Sharon's government and
enthusiastically executed his most brutal policies. The party's elder
statesman, Shimon Peres, served as Sharon's foreign minister, effectively
neutralizing international criticism of Sharon's most egregious offenses
against the peace process.
.
So Labor could not credibly maintain that it had suddenly discovered that
Sharon was not good for Israel, or that Labor was committed to radically
different policies. In the end, what accounts most for Sharon's success is
the skill with which he presented himself to voters in the political center,
and to the U.S. administration, as a moderate who can be counted on to avoid
reckless measures advocated by Israel's extremists, including extremists
within his own party.
.
In fact, Sharon is a stealthy hawk. His moderation is a cleverly fabricated
pretense, as noted by the Hebrew University's Gadi Taub (IHT Views, Jan.
30). Sharon "talks of negotiations just enough" to maintain the support of
America and of Israel's moderate center, and "he raises the specter of
terrorism more than enough to foment Israeli anger and conceal the actual
thrust of his policy, which is strengthening Israel's hold on the
territories."
.
Sharon's overwhelming victory enables him to form a Likud-led right-wing
government that could well last its entire term of office, a longevity
virtually unprecedented in Israel's history. Instead he has stated publicly
that if he cannot form a unity government that includes the Labor Party, he
will call for new elections. Naive moderates see this as evidence that he is
really their man.
.
But the reason why Sharon will not go with a narrow right-wing government is
that he understands that he cannot continue his pretense of moderation
without the cover that only the Labor Party can provide. It is a pretense
that is essential to sustain his efforts to delay the onset of a political
process and to gain time to establish additional "facts on the ground" that
will forever preclude the emergence of a Palestinian state.
.
Have the extraordinary election results spelled the end of Israel's
political left, which in the Israeli context means primarily the peace camp,
as so many pundits now proclaim? It will have done so if Mitzna yields to
pressures, both from within his own party and from the public, and forms a
unity government with Likud.
.
Israel's left will survive as a political force only if Mitzna retains the
stubborn integrity he has shown so far and offers his countrymen a clear
alternative to Sharon's reliance on "decisive" military force that will
supposedly crush the Palestinians and lead to their abject surrender, a
policy goal that Sharon and his military chief of staff have unashamedly
proclaimed.
.
By staying out of Sharon's government, Labor can expose the futility of the
hopes placed in Sharon by moderate Israelis who believe his mantra about
making "painful concessions" for peace. By refusing to compromise his
principles, Mitzna can offer an Israeli public that is suffering a massive
national depression because of the hopelessness of the situation a reason
not to despair.
.
The United States, which uniquely has the capacity to get the parties to end
the impasse, is unwilling to use its domestic political capital to knock
some sense into the belligerents, a situation that may well persist for the
next six years.
.
An end to Israel's travails, not to speak of the suffering of the
Palestinian people, will therefore come only as the result of actions by an
Israeli leader willing to speak the truth, as Mitzna did throughout his
campaign.
.
And the truth is that if Israel does not return essentially to its pre-1967
borders and facilitate the emergence of a viable and successful Palestinian
state, the glorious Zionist enterprise that began more than a century ago
will come to an end.
.
It will be overwhelmed by demographic realities that even Sharon's most
skillful political acrobatics will be unable to forestall.
.
The writer is a senior fellow on the Middle East at the Council on Foreign
Relations. These views are his own.