[Nasional-m] Don't play into the hands of extremists

[Ambon]

IHT


 Don't play into the hands of extremists
  Youssef M. Ibrahim Washington Post. Tuesday, August 13, 2002

America, Saudi Arabia and Islam

NEW YORK There are people inside the American defense establishment - the
most powerful, technologically sophisticated military in the history of
mankind - who believe that the greatest threat they face today may come from
followers of an early 18th-century religious extremist who called for a
renewal of Islamic spirit, moral cleansing and the stripping away of all
innovations to Islam since the seventh century. Those disciples are known as
Wahabis.
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Their namesake would have vanished into obscurity but for an act of
political savvy that assured his followers influence over what has become
one of the world's wealthiest, most pivotal regions. In 1745, the religious
leader Mohammad Ibn Abdul Wahab forged an alliance with Mohammad Ibn Saud,
the principal tribal leader of a large portion of the Arabian peninsula. Ibn
Abdul Wahab wanted to propagate his brand of Islamic orthodoxy. Ibn Saud
wanted to unite tribes and secure political command, becoming the founder of
the Al Saud dynasty that still rules what is now known as Saudi Arabia.
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Since the Sept. 11 attacks, perpetrated by people who mostly came from Saudi
Arabia, "Wahabism" has entered the vocabulary of American policy makers
almost as synonymous with death, destruction and terror. Moreover, Wahabi
teachings and influence in Riyadh have colored the American image of Saudi
Arabia, threatening to move it from the category of a friend helping to
stabilize oil prices and the region to one of a foe alien to American values
and bent on hurting Americans.
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Less obvious, however, is that the Sept. 11 attacks also have strained ties
between the "Wahabis" and Arab governments. The alliance between the House
of Saud - wealthy, cosmopolitan, and increasingly Western in tastes and
habits - and the proponents of an austere form of Islam based on a literal
interpretation of the Koran is becoming harder to sustain.
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An increasing number of newspaper commentators, regional leaders and Saudi
officials are daring to speak up against the backwards "Wahabi" vision of
society. And Gulf governments are taking a tougher line against extremists
once thought to be useful, or at least relatively harmless. Instead of
representing growing Wahabi power, the Sept. 11 attacks and their aftermath
in Afghanistan may signal the peak of Wahabi influence, and a turning point
in Arab attitudes toward such extremists.
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These nuances are important for the United States as it wages its war
against terror and tries to identify its foes. The Bush administration must
better distinguish between Islam and the real enemy - radical extremists
within Islam. Otherwise the United States risks a collision with 1.2 billion
Muslims around the word who do not appreciate being demonized - as Saudi
officials felt they were the other day by a report leaked to The Washington
Post - just because they disagree with American policies in the Middle East
or American plans to invade Iraq.
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It is true that the links between Saudi rulers and Wahabi followers have
been real and durable. The pact of mutual convenience made more than 250
years ago continues. The Saudi minister of religion is always a member of
the Al Sheikh family, descendants of Ibn Abdul Wahab. Moreover links between
Ibn Abdul Wahab and the house of Saud have been sealed with multiple
marriages. The Wahabis' sway over mosques has ebbed and flowed, but they
possess their own notorious religious police and have extended their reach
via networks of schools throughout the Muslim world.
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It is difficult to pinpoint the boundaries of Wahabism. It is not a religion
or an offshoot of Islam. Its followers are not a tribe or ethnic group, and
they prefer to identify themselves as muwahiddun, which means "the
unifiers."
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It is, however, extremely austere and rigid. It tolerates little dialogue
and less interpretation. It frowns on idolatry, tombstones or the veneration
of statues and artworks. Wahabis forbid smoking, shaving of beards, abusive
language, rosaries and many rights for women. They regard all those who
don't practice their form of Islam, including other Muslims, as heathens and
enemies.
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Their prominence is a relatively recent phenomenon. During the 1950s, Cairo,
infused with the nationalism of Gamal Abdel Nasser, was the intellectual
center of the Arab world. But the massive Israeli victory over Arab armies
in the 1967 war dealt a blow to Nasser's prestige. Islamic religious leaders
stepped into that ideological vacuum.
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When the big oil money of the 1970s started flooding the Gulf region, the
balance in religious matters shifted away from the progressive Levantine
version of Islam that existed in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Algeria, to
the Wahabis' rigid tendencies. As millions of Egyptian, Moroccan, Pakistani
and other guest workers poured into Saudi Arabia, they returned home with
both money and a new religion. Egypt started to tip over. Anwar Sadat, who
had struck his own alliance with the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood to
fight the remnants of Nasserism, was killed by it. Later there were at least
five attempts by Islamic extremists against the life of his successor, Hosni
Mubarak.
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The war against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan gave radical Islam a chance
to deploy its military prowess. Wahabis in Saudi Arabia and the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt profited, fattening their ranks with new recruits and
coffers with new contributions. At that time, the American government
considered the Saudis' links with these groups useful. With the
encouragement of the Carter and Reagan administrations, the Saudis funded
the jihad against the Soviet forces jointly with the CIA.
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Ironically, the money that brought Wahabis power throughout the Arab world
has also widened the gap between Wahabis and Arab societies. Increasingly,
the Wahabi outlook is detested by the Saudi ruling elite, the growing middle
class and the vast, powerful business community in Saudi Arabia.
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The attack on the United States by Al Qaeda may spell the beginning of the
end of this brand of radical Islamic extremism, as people in the region deal
with the harm that Osama bin Laden, a Wahabi disciple, has done to the
reputation and welfare of Muslims around the world. The entire Saudi
religious establishment is under pressure from both the royal family and the
Saudi public. For the first time, artists, politicians and pundits are
openly criticizing the clergy in Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia,
Malaysia and throughout the world of Islam.
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The historic alliance between the Sauds and Wahabis may be coming apart -
unless the United States intervenes with unreasonable demands for instant
reforms couched in barely disguised racial slurs. Instant anything in Saudi
Arabia or the conservative world of Islam is impossible.
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The simple-speak propagated by the Bush White House has mixed mainstream
Islam with Wahabism into a confusing mish-mash. The two are different. True,
Arab governments coddled the fundamentalists. But so did the United States,
giving a green card to Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman in recognition for his
service in rounding up volunteers in Egypt to fight the Soviet forces. He
ended up with a life sentence for conspiring to blow up the Lincoln Tunnel
and the World Trade Center.
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I would argue that just as the 1967 war spelled the end of Nasserism, the
Sept. 11 attack will mark the beginning of the end of radical extremist
Islam in all its varieties. The money from Islamic charities is drying up.
After Sept. 11, the "swamps" that provided recruits are drying up, too, so
much so that two Islamic groups in Egypt, Jihad and Al Gamaa al Islamiya,
have formally announced they are abandoning the armed struggle. In Saudi
Arabia, half the population of 18 million sees Wahabism as oppressive. The
same goes for people in Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait.
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That does not automatically translate into loving the United States. Sept.
11 has given Americans an opening, though. Millions of Muslims who belong to
the secular middle and business classes and the governing elites also detest
Muslim fundamentalists. But they equally detest U.S. Middle East policy. It
is time to bond with them on fighting fundamentalism without demanding that
they subscribe to every American policy. America's friends there, the
secularists, need to be offered a way to bond with America instead of being
presented with simplistic choices of black and white.
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The writer is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a
former foreign correspondent for The New York Times and The Wall Street
Journal. He contributed this comment to The Washington Post.