[Nasional-m] If we fight, it must be in a way to legitimize global U.S. role

Thu Aug 22 10:12:07 2002

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If we fight, it must be in a way to legitimize global U.S. role

Opinion Zbigniew Brzezinski

Zbigniew Brzezinski

There is a right and a wrong way for America to wage war. Obviously, if =
it is attacked, America must respond with all its might. The same is =
true if an ally is attacked. But the issue becomes much more complex if =
a threat, but not an attack, is involved. America must consider =
carefully the consequences of its actions, for itself as the world's =
preeminent power and for the long-term evolution of the international =
system as a whole.
The United States may have to go to war to oust Saddam Hussein from =
power in Iraq because the potential nexus between conspiratorial =
terrorism and the weapons of mass destruction Hussein is said to be =
producing cannot be blithely ignored. But war is too serious a business =
and too unpredictable in its results to be undertaken because of a =
personal peeve, demagogically articulated fears or vague factual =
assertions.
If it is to be war, it should be conducted in a manner that legitimizes =
U.S. global hegemony and, at the same time, contributes to a more =
responsible system of international security. Accordingly, several =
essential steps should be followed:
(1) The president himself has to make, in a speech addressed to the =
nation, a careful, reasoned case, without sloganeering, on the specifics =
of the threat. Detailed evidence needs to be presented that the threat =
is both grave and imminent. An explanation is also needed as to why one =
member of "the axis of evil" is seen as more menacing than others. The =
president's=20
 case should serve as the basis for serious and searching consultations =
with Congress and key allies as well as other interested states.
(2) Iraq's defiance of the international community is the central issue =
that should concern the world. Hence the focus of the U.S. concern must =
be on weapons of mass destruction that Iraq may be surreptitiously =
seeking to produce in contravention of U.N. resolutions, and not on =
Saddam Hussein personally.
Insofar as Iraqi weapons of mass destruction are concerned, a persuasive =
case needs to be made as to why, in the U.S. view, deterrence no longer =
suffices. The often cited formula that Hussein used weapons of mass =
destruction (specifically gas) against his own people ignores the fact =
that he did not use such weapons in 1991 against U.S. troops or Israel, =
both of which had the capacity to retaliate and thus to deter.
(3) The United States should itself take the lead in formulating =
detailed plans for a genuinely intrusive and comprehensive inspection =
regime, one that would define the rules of the game for Iraq's =
compliance with the will of the international community. America's =
European allies would find it difficult not to go along with this, while =
Iraq's recalcitrance - either by outright refusal or efforts to sabotage =
the inspection process - would then=20
 provide a highly legitimate casus belli for military action.
(4) As the United States positions itself for war, it must become more =
active in pacifying the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by pressuring both =
sides. The standoff between Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat has undone =
much of the progress achieved after Oslo, while inflicting massive =
suffering on the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. In the absence of any =
serious effort by the Bush administration to push the Israelis and =
Palestinians toward peace, there is a high risk that a U.S. assault on =
Iraq will be perceived as part of an American-Israeli effort to impose a =
new order on the Middle East without regard for either Iraqi or =
Palestinian civilian casualties.
(5) The United States should soon begin discussions with its allies as =
well as other concerned powers, including Arab friends, regarding =
possible postwar arrangements for Iraq, including a prolonged collective =
security presence and plans for international financing of the social =
rehabilitation of the country. Doing so would reinforce the credibility =
of the U.S. determination to use force in the event that a nonviolent =
resolution of the issue proves to be impossible.
It follows from the above that there is also a wrong way for America to =
initiate a war. That can be stated very briefly:
(1) The initiation of a war should not be decided in camera by the =
president alone with just a few of his own appointees, without regard =
for either American or global public opinion.
(2) Public support should not be generated by fear-mongering or =
demagogy, with some of it encouraged=20
 by parties with a strategic interest in fostering American-Arab =
hostility. Particularly disturbing has been the news report that some =
members of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board have been pushing, in =
addition to war with Iraq, a confrontation in U.S.-Saudi Arabian =
relations.
(3) War should not start with a bolt from the blue but be the =
consequence of demonstrated Iraqi unwillingness to accept international =
rules. A sudden launching of war could prompt many to justify any =
subsequent Iraqi retaliation against America or Israel, even with a =
weapon of mass destruction, while setting a dangerous example of an =
essentially Darwinian international system characterized by sudden, =
preemptive attacks.
War should be waged with meticulous attention to minimizing civilian =
casualties, given the widespread view abroad that U.S.-sponsored =
sanctions have already badly and unfairly hurt the Iraqi population.
Ultimately what is at stake is something far greater than Iraq: It is =
the character of the international system and the role in it of the most =
powerful state. Neither the White House nor the American people should =
ignore the fact that America's enemies will do everything possible to =
present the United States as a global gangster. Yet without a respected =
and legitimate law-enforcer, global security could be in serious =
jeopardy. America must thus walk a fine line in determining when, in =
what circumstances and how it acts as such in initiating the use of =
force.
 Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser to President Carter=20

The Guardian Weekly 22-8-2002, page 26

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<DIV>If we fight, it must be in a way to legitimize global U.S.=20
role Opinion Zbigniew Brzezinski Zbigniew =
Brzezinski There=20
is a right and a wrong way for America to wage war. Obviously, if it is=20
attacked, America must respond with all its might. The same is true if =
an ally=20
is attacked. But the issue becomes much more complex if a threat, but =
not an=20
attack, is involved. America must consider carefully the consequences of =
its=20
actions, for itself as the world's preeminent power and for the =
long-term=20
evolution of the international system as a whole. The United States =
may have=20
to go to war to oust Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq because the =
potential=20
nexus between conspiratorial terrorism and the weapons of mass =
destruction=20
Hussein is said to be producing cannot be blithely ignored. But war is =
too=20
serious a business and too unpredictable in its results to be undertaken =
because=20
of a personal peeve, demagogically articulated fears or vague factual=20
assertions. If it is to be war, it should be conducted in a manner =
that=20
legitimizes U.S. global hegemony and, at the same time, contributes to a =
more=20
responsible system of international security. Accordingly, several =
essential=20
steps should be followed: (1) The president himself has to make, in a =
speech=20
addressed to the nation, a careful, reasoned case, without sloganeering, =
on the=20
specifics of the threat. Detailed evidence needs to be presented that =
the threat=20
is both grave and imminent. An explanation is also needed as to why one =
member=20
of "the axis of evil" is seen as more menacing than others. The =
president's=20
 &nbsp;case should serve as the basis for serious and searching =
consultations=20
with Congress and key allies as well as other interested states. (2) =
Iraq's=20
defiance of the international community is the central issue that should =
concern=20
the world. Hence the focus of the U.S. concern must be on weapons of =
mass=20
destruction that Iraq may be surreptitiously seeking to produce in =
contravention=20
of U.N. resolutions, and not on Saddam Hussein personally. Insofar as =
Iraqi=20
weapons of mass destruction are concerned, a persuasive case needs to be =
made as=20
to why, in the U.S. view, deterrence no longer suffices. The often cited =
formula=20
that Hussein used weapons of mass destruction (specifically gas) against =
his own=20
people ignores the fact that he did not use such weapons in 1991 against =
U.S.=20
troops or Israel, both of which had the capacity to retaliate and thus =
to=20
deter. (3) The United States should itself take the lead in =
formulating=20
detailed plans for a genuinely intrusive and comprehensive inspection =
regime,=20
one that would define the rules of the game for Iraq's compliance with =
the will=20
of the international community. America's European allies would find it=20
difficult not to go along with this, while Iraq's recalcitrance - either =
by=20
outright refusal or efforts to sabotage the inspection process - would =
then=20
 &nbsp;provide a highly legitimate casus belli for military =
action. (4) As=20
the United States positions itself for war, it must become more active =
in=20
pacifying the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by pressuring both sides. The =

standoff between Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat has undone much of the =
progress=20
achieved after Oslo, while inflicting massive suffering on the Israeli =
and=20
Palestinian peoples. In the absence of any serious effort by the Bush=20
administration to push the Israelis and Palestinians toward peace, there =
is a=20
high risk that a U.S. assault on Iraq will be perceived as part of an=20
American-Israeli effort to impose a new order on the Middle East without =
regard=20
for either Iraqi or Palestinian civilian casualties. (5) The United =
States=20
should soon begin discussions with its allies as well as other concerned =
powers,=20
including Arab friends, regarding possible postwar arrangements for =
Iraq,=20
including a prolonged collective security presence and plans for =
international=20
financing of the social rehabilitation of the country. Doing so would =
reinforce=20
the credibility of the U.S. determination to use force in the event that =
a=20
nonviolent resolution of the issue proves to be impossible. It =
follows from=20
the above that there is also a wrong way for America to initiate a war. =
That can=20
be stated very briefly: (1) The initiation of a war should not be =
decided in=20
camera by the president alone with just a few of his own appointees, =
without=20
regard for either American or global public opinion. (2) Public =
support=20
should not be generated by fear-mongering or demagogy, with some of it=20
encouraged &nbsp;by parties with a strategic interest in fostering=20
American-Arab hostility. Particularly disturbing has been the news =
report that=20
some members of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board have been pushing, =
in=20
addition to war with Iraq, a confrontation in U.S.-Saudi Arabian=20
relations. (3) War should not start with a bolt from the blue but be =
the=20
consequence of demonstrated Iraqi unwillingness to accept international =
rules. A=20
sudden launching of war could prompt many to justify any subsequent =
Iraqi=20
retaliation against America or Israel, even with a weapon of mass =
destruction,=20
while setting a dangerous example of an essentially Darwinian =
international=20
system characterized by sudden, preemptive attacks. War should be =
waged with=20
meticulous attention to minimizing civilian casualties, given the =
widespread=20
view abroad that U.S.-sponsored sanctions have already badly and =
unfairly hurt=20
the Iraqi population. Ultimately what is at stake is something far =
greater=20
than Iraq: It is the character of the international system and the role =
in it of=20
the most powerful state. Neither the White House nor the American people =
should=20
ignore the fact that America's enemies will do everything possible to =
present=20
the United States as a global gangster. Yet without a respected and =
legitimate=20
law-enforcer, global security could be in serious jeopardy. America must =
thus=20
walk a fine line in determining when, in what circumstances and how it =
acts as=20
such in initiating the use of force. &nbsp;Zbigniew Brzezinski was =
national=20
security adviser to President Carter The Guardian Weekly =
22-8-2002, page=20
26</DIV></BODY></HTML>

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