[Marinir] {Spam?} Scud Hunting with Delta Force and the Special Air Service (SAS)

[aditya kusuma wardhana]

Forumners..ada sedikit cerita tentang operasi gabungan
antara DELTA dan SAS pada saat perang Teluk, untuk
menghancurkan Situs2 Scud Missile Iraq, smoga menambah
wawasan kita....
Source:http://www.specialoperations.com/Army/Delta_Force/scuds.html

Scud Hunting with Delta Force and the Special Air
Service (SAS)

By Thomas B. Hunter

Reprinted by permission of Special Operations Journal
(?1997)

  
During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Saddam Hussein
launched approximately 350 ballistic missiles against
Iran. These attacks included a large number of R-17
single-stage missiles from a stockpile of 650
purchased from the Soviet Union. The R-17, as
originally designed, had a maximum range of 300 km and
was capable of carrying either a 2,000 lb.
conventional or 100 kiloton nuclear warhead. In time,
however, Iraqi engineers were ordered to develop a
weapon capable of striking deeper into Iranian
territory. To this end, designers made use of
cannibalized parts from other R-17s to create three
longer range hybrids unique to the Iraqi military: a
long-range Scud (unnamed), the al-Hussein (600-650 km)
and the al-Abbas (750-900 km). Most alterations were
made via a reduction in warhead weight and a
corresponding increase in fuel load. Saddam also
managed to acquire 36 mobile launch vehicles based on
the MAZ543 (8x8) wheeled chassis, originally developed
in 1965 for the Soviet Army. The TELs as designed had
a road range of 550 km, a top road speed of 70 km/hr,
and vehicle cab air filtration for use in an NBC
environment. Of these, only the Al-Abbas could not be
fired from a mobile launcher. However, these
successive Iraqi modifications, while providing
greater range, dramatically reduced both the
structural integrity of the missile and its
notoriously poor accuracy (1 km CEP).

Despite these major drawbacks, it did serve one
purpose particularly well: when fired in any number
against densely populated urban areas, the Scud was an
effective terror weapon. This secondary use was not
lost on Hussein. On 18 January, seven Scuds struck
Haifa and Tel Aviv, destroying 1,587 apartments and
causing nearly fifty civilian casualties. Similar
attacks followed in the next few days. These terror
attacks caused the desired response. Israel
immediately sortied aircraft ready to strike Iraqi
targets. Later, they launched a nuclear-capable
missile into the Mediterranean Sea to clearly
demonstrate to Iraq one of the possible responses to
further Scud attacks. Only quick intervention by
senior U.S. politicians and the immediate dispatch of
Patriot missile batteries to Tel Aviv averted a
catastrophe. Hussein's intent was clear: to divide the
Coalition by prompting Israel to attack and thus
become an active participant in the war. There seemed
little doubt that at the very least, this action would
cause Syria, Egypt and others to abandon the
Coalition. At worst, Arab nations might side with Iraq
and prompt an all-out Middle East war. For this
reason, destruction of Scuds became the overwhelming
priority for Allied war planners.

The primary focus of counterforce planning at the hme
with regard to the Iraqi Scud threat revolved around
the location and destruction of fixed launch sites. By
August 1990, the Department of Defense had located
five such sites with 28 launchers. TR-1 / U-2R
reconnaissance, E-8 JSTARS radar ground surveillance
aircraft, and DSP early-warning satellite imagery
quickly located fixed sites, however these tools
proved insufficient in monitoring the transient mobile
Scud launchers. Thus, the decision was made to send
special operations forces to hunt the Scuds on the
ground. The U.S. Army's Special Forces Operational
Detachment-Delta (SFOD-D), better known as Delta
Force, and the British Special Air Service (SAS) were
selected to perform what would become one of the
largest counterterrorist operations in history.

The senior British officer in the Gulf, Lieutenant
General Sir Peter de la Billiere, was the first to
convince U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf, a skeptic of
the use of special operations forces, that SAS teams
could be inserted behind enemy lines to conduct
effective harassment and sabotage missions against the
enemy. To the surprise of some, this suggestion was
approved and two 'Sabre' squadrons (one half of the
Regiment's fighting manpower) were deployed and began
operations on 20 January 1991. On 24 January, however,
the mission was changed to focus on Scud-hunting in
western Iraq. The British teams were assigned a vast
expanse near the H-2 airfield, from south of Highway
10 to the Saudi Arabian border. known as "Scud Alley".


One squadron from Delta arrived in Saudi Arabia by
early February 1991 as part of the Joint Special
Operations Task Force (JSOTF). Following a period of
concentrated planning, teams infiltrated western Iraq
by a variety of methods, often working with the pilots
and crews of MH-60 Black Hawks and MH-47E Chinooks
from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment
(SOAR) based in Ft. Campbell, Kentucky. (Heavily armed
aircraft from this unit also conducted independent
direct action missions against Iraqi radar sites,
convoys, and other targets.) The U.S. element was
assigned as its hunting ground the area northwest of
Highway 10 near Al Qaim, known as "Scud Boulevard".

The primary mission for both SAS and Delta was to
locate and designate targets for destruction by
Coalition warplanes. To this end, most teams traveled
at night, while hiding out during the day. In periods
of darkness or for targets obscured by camouflage, the
roving teams carried laser target designators (LTD).
Using these, an attacking aircraft could employ
laser-guided bombs or missiles riding the beam emitted
by the LTD. Those targets that were caught out in the
open during daylight hours were targeted visually by
the operators on the ground who then directed in
aircraft armed with unguided bombs and other
munitions. The hunters were able to provide
information on enemy vehicle movements, however by the
time this intelligence was incorporated into the
target package oftentimes the mobile launchers had
left their hiding place and moved to another location.

In addition to their targeting duties, Delta undertook
other direct action missions against the Scuds. These
included using long-range, .50-caliber sniper rifles
to disable and destroy missiles both in rearming farms
and those mounted on their TELs. Other interdictions
reportedly involved eliminating Scud crews as well as
the use of AT4 anti-tank missiles on larger targets.
One of the more interesting elements of the operation
was the group based at the outpostof Al Jouf,
approximately 150 miles south ofthe Iraqi border. This
was a truly 'joint' team made up of SAS personnel,
along with USAF A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft and AFSOC
MH-53J Pave Lows. These British teams soon developed a
close relationship with the USAF crews as the Pave
Lows provided insertion and the 'Warthogs' were often
the first aircraft to respond to reports of TEL
sightings. It should be mentioned that other SAS units
were also transported in their own version of the
Chinook, flown by its own helicopter squadron (based
in Hereford) or Royal Air Force (RAF) crews. One
30-man SAS team, reportedly deployed from Al Jouf,
successfully assaulted a Scud command-and-control
center, despite the presence of an estimated 300 Iraqi
military personnel.

Delta and SAS adapted to the harsh terrain by making
effective use of light vehicles during their
operations instead of patrolling on foot. Delta
operated the Fast Attack Vehicle (FAV) while the SAS
drove two versions, the Longline Light Strike Vehicle
(LSV) and an updated version of the long-lived "Pink
Panther" Land Rover. Both vehicles were designed to
carry heavy loads, including two or three
fully-equipped soldiers, food, water, ammunition,
extra fuel and a wide variety of weapons (up to six
Milan or TOW anti-tank missiles, and a mount for a
40mm grenade launcher, 30mm cannon or .50 caliber
heavy machine gun). One persistent but unverified
report from the Gulf War recounted that a single LSV
carried 12 SAS troopers and their gear during one such
operation.

It was not long, however, before a major shortcoming
in the Scud hunt operations became apparent. Upon
sighting a viable target, the troopers had to
communicate the intelligence over the emergency
"guard" frequency. Response times averaged an
unacceptably high sixty (60) minutes, during which
some targets were able to escape unharmed. The C3I
system that had proven so effective for the advance
planning of conventional airstrikes proved
insufficient for incorporating real-time intelligence
being sent back by the troopers. In order to
facilitate communications between the ground teams and
Coalition air power, the SAS requested and was
approved the posting of liaison officers to the
Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) in Riyadh. As a
result, improvements were made which permitted more
direct communication. This was further enhanced by the
practice of keeping ground attack aircraft constantly
in the air, ready to respond immediately when a
suitable target was located. Coalition aircraft were
also warned of the presence of special forces
operating in western Iraq, in an effort to prevent any
"friendly fire" casualties.

These missions were not without loss to the hunters.
At approximately 0300 on 21 February, four pilots and
crew from the 160th SOAR and three Delta operators
were killed when an MH60 helicopter crashed into a
sand dune during zero-visibility weather conditions
near the Ar Ar airfield. The ground team was
reportedly conducting counterforce operations when one
of the team was injured in a fall from a cliff and
required medevac, to which the 160th responded.
Similarly, one eight-man SAS team was compromised
while on a reconnaissance mission. Four of these
troopers died during escape-and-evasion after they
were engaged by subsequent Iraqi patrols. Commandos
from both groups were injured in firefights with Iraqi
forces on a number of occasions in addition to
casualties from exposure to unexpectedly cold
nighttime weather.

The effect of the overall ground-based 'Scud Hunt'
from a military perspective is skill a matter of
speculation. There is no question that Coalition
aircraft attacked a number of decoys and other targets
that only after-action analysis revealed were not
Scud-carrying TELs. One graphic incident occurred at a
press briefing during the war in which General
Schwarzkopf claimed video footage being displayed
showed Scud launchers being destroyed when in fact
later analysis indicates it was instead a group of
fuel tanker trucks. At the end of the war UNSCOM found
62 complete al-Hussein missiles, six MAZ-543 TELs and
four other TELs, along with parts of 88 other missiles
and nine TELs. The Iraqis were also suspected of
hiding other missiles from the UN inspection teams. 14
of 28 fixed sites were also destroyed. From a
political perspective, however, the hunt was an
unqualified success and may have provided one of the
single greatest, and least known, contributions to the
victory of Coalition forces in the Gulf.





		
__________________________________ 
Yahoo! Mail Mobile 
Take Yahoo! Mail with you! Check email on your mobile phone. 
http://mobile.yahoo.com/learn/mail