Crypt::Random::Seed(3pUser Contributed Perl DocumentatCrypt::Random::Seed(3pm)NAMECrypt::Random::Seed - Simple method to get strong randomness
VERSION
Version 0.03
SYNOPSIS
use Crypt::Random::Seed;
my $source = new Crypt::Random::Seed;
die "No strong sources exist" unless defined $source;
my $seed_string = $source->random_bytes(4);
my @seed_values = $source->random_values(4);
# Only non-blocking sources
my $nonblocking_source = Crypt::Random::Seed->new( NonBlocking=>1 );
# Blacklist sources (never choose the listed sources)
my $nowin32_source = Crypt::Random::Seed->new( Never=>['Win32'] );
# Whitelist sources (only choose from these sources)
my $devr_source = Crypt::Random::Seed->new( Only=>['TESHA2'] );
# Supply a custom source.
my $user_src = Crypt::Random::Seed->new( Source=>sub { myfunc(shift) } );
# Or supply a list of [name, sub, is_blocking, is_strong]
$user_src = Crypt::Random::Seed->new(
Source=>['MyRandomFunction',sub {myfunc(shift)},0,1] );
# Given a source there are a few things we can do:
say "My randomness source is ", $source->name();
say "I am a blocking source" if $source->is_blocking();
say "I am a strong randomness source" if $source->is_strong()
say "Four 8-bit numbers:",
join(",", map { ord $source->random_bytes(1) } 1..4);'
say "Four 32-bit numbers:", join(",", $source->random_values(4));
DESCRIPTION
A simple mechanism to get strong randomness. The main purpose of this
module is to provide a simple way to generate a seed for a PRNG such as
Math::Random::ISAAC, for use in cryptographic key generation, or as the
seed for an upstream module such as Bytes::Random::Secure. Flags for
requiring non-blocking sources are allowed, as well as a very simple
method for plugging in a source.
The randomness sources used are, in order:
User supplied.
If the constructor is called with a Source defined, then it is
used. It is not checked vs. other flags (NonBlocking, Never,
Only).
Win32 Crypto API.
This will use "CryptGenRandom" on Windows 2000 and "RtlGenRand" on
Windows XP and newer. According to MSDN, these are well-seeded
CSPRNGs (FIPS 186-2 or AES-CTR), so will be non-blocking.
EGD / PRNGD.
This looks for sockets that speak the EGD
<http://egd.sourceforge.net/> protocol, including PRNGD
<http://prngd.sourceforge.net/>. These are userspace entropy
daemons that are commonly used by OpenSSL, OpenSSH, and GnuGP. The
locations searched are "/var/run/egd-pool", "/dev/egd-pool",
"/etc/egd-pool", and "/etc/entropy". EGD is blocking, while PRNGD
is non-blocking (like the Win32 API, it is really a seeded CSPRNG).
However there is no way to tell them apart, so we treat it as
blocking. If your O/S supports /dev/random, consider HAVEGED
<http://www.issihosts.com/haveged/> as an alternative (a system
daemon that refills /dev/random as needed).
/dev/random.
The strong source of randomness on most UNIX-like systems. Cygwin
uses this, though it maps to the Win32 API. On almost all systems
this is a blocking source of randomness -- if it runs out of
estimated entropy, it will hang until more has come into the
system. If this is an issue, which it often is on embedded
devices, running a tool such as HAVEGED
<http://www.issihosts.com/haveged/> will help immensely.
/dev/urandom.
A nonblocking source of randomness that we label as weak, since it
will continue providing output even if the actual entropy has been
exhausted.
TESHA2.
Crypt::Random::TESHA2 is a Perl module that generates random bytes
from an entropy pool fed with timer/scheduler variations.
Measurements and tests are performed on installation to determine
whether the source is considered strong or weak. This is entirely
in portable userspace, which is good for ease of use, but really
requires user verification that it is working as expected if we
expect it to be strong. The concept is similar to
Math::TrulyRandom though updated to something closer to what
TrueRand 2.1 does vs. the obsolete version 1 that Math::TrulyRandom
implements. It is very slow and has wide speed variability across
platforms : I've seen numbers ranging from 40 to 150,000 bits per
second.
A source can also be supplied in the constructor. Each of these
sources will have its debatable points about perceived strength. E.g.
Why is /dev/urandom considered weak while Win32 is strong? Can any
userspace method such as TrueRand or TESHA2 be considered strong?
SOURCE TABLE
This table summarizes the default sources:
+------------------+-------------+------------+--------------------+
| SOURCE | STRENGTH | BLOCKING | NOTE |
|------------------+-------------+------------+--------------------|
| RtlGenRandom | Strong(1) | No | Default WinXP+ |
|------------------+-------------+------------+--------------------|
| CryptGenRandom | Strong(1) | No | Default Win2000 |
|------------------+-------------+------------+--------------------|
| EGD | Strong | Yes(2) | also PRNGD, etc. |
|------------------+-------------+------------+--------------------|
| /dev/random | Strong | Yes | Typical UNIX |
|------------------+-------------+------------+--------------------|
| /dev/urandom | Weak | No | Typical UNIX NB |
|------------------+-------------+------------+--------------------|
| TESHA2-strong | Strong | No | |
|------------------+-------------+------------+--------------------|
| TESHA2-weak | Weak | No | |
+------------------+-------------+------------+--------------------+
The alias 'Win32' can be used in whitelist and blacklist and will match
both the Win32 sources "RtlGenRandom" and "CryptGenRandom". The alias
'TESHA2' may be similarly used and matches both the weak and strong
sources.
1) Both CryptGenRandom and RtlGenRandom are considered strong by this
package, even though both are seeded CSPRNGs so should be the equal of
/dev/urandom in this respect. The CryptGenRandom function used in
Windows 2000 has some known issues so should be considered weaker.
2) EGD is blocking, PRNGD is not. We cannot tell the two apart. There are
other software products that use the same protocol, and each will act
differently. E.g. EGD mixes in system entropy on every request, while
PRNGD mixes on a time schedule.
STRENGTH
In theory, a strong generator will provide true entropy. Even if a
third party knew a previous result and the entire state of the
generator at any time up to when their value was returned, they could
still not effectively predict the result of the next returned value.
This implies the generator must either be blocking to wait for entropy
(e.g. /dev/random) or go through some possibly time-consuming process
to gather it (TESHA2, EGD, the HAVEGE daemon refilling /dev/random).
Note: strong in this context means practically strong, as most
computers don't have a true hardware entropy generator. The goal is to
make all the attackers ill-gotten knowledge give them no better
solution than if they did not have the information.
Creating a satisfactory strength measurement is problematic. The Win32
Crypto API is considered "strong" by most customers and every other
Perl module, however it is a well seeded CSPRNG according to the MSDN
docs, so is not a strong source based on the definition in the previous
paragraph. Similarly, almost all sources consider /dev/urandom to be
weak, as once it runs out of entropy it returns a deterministic
function based on its state (albeit one that cannot be run either
direction from a returned result if the internal state is not known).
Because of this confusion, I have removed the "Weak" configuration
option that was present in version 0.01. It will now be ignored. You
should be able to use a combination of whitelist, blacklist, and the
source's "is_strong" return value to decide if this meets your needs.
On Win32, you really only have a choice of Win32 and TESHA2. The
former is going to be what most people want, and can be chosen even
with non-blocking set. On most UNIX systems, "/dev/random" will be
chosen for blocking and "/dev/urandom" for non-blocking, which is what
should be done in most cases.
BLOCKING
EGD and /dev/random are blocking sources. This means that if they run
out of estimated entropy, they will pause until they've collected more.
This means your program also pauses. On typical workstations this may
be a few seconds or even minutes. On an isolated network server this
may cause a delay of hours or days. EGD is proactive about gathering
more entropy as fast as it can. Running a tool such as the HAVEGE
daemon or timer_entropyd can make /dev/random act like a non-blocking
source, as the entropy daemon will wake up and refill the pool almost
instantly.
Win32, PRNGD, and /dev/urandom are fast nonblocking sources. When they
run out of entropy, they use a CSPRNG to keep supplying data at high
speed. However this means that there is no additional entropy being
supplied.
TESHA2 is nonblocking, but can be very slow. /dev/random can be faster
if run on a machine with lots of activity. On an isolated server,
TESHA2 may be much faster. Also note that the blocking sources such as
EGD and /dev/random both try to maintain reasonably large entropy
pools, so small requests can be supplied without blocking.
IN PRACTICE
Use the default to get the best source known. If you know more about
the sources available, you can use a whitelist, blacklist, or a custom
source. In general, to get the best source (typically Win32 or
/dev/random):
my $source = Crypt::Random::Seed->new();
To get a good non-blocking source (Win32 or /dev/urandom):
my $source = Crypt::Random::Seed->new(NonBlocking => 1);
METHODS
new
The constructor with no arguments will find the first available source
in its fixed list and return an object that performs the defined
methods. If no sources could be found (quite unusual) then the
returned value will be undef.
Optional parameters are passed in as a hash and may be mixed.
NonBlocking => boolean
Only non-blocking sources will be allowed. In practice this means EGD
and /dev/random will not be chosen (except on FreeBSD where it is non-
blocking).
Only => [list of strings]
Takes an array reference containing one or more string source names.
No source whose name does not match one of these strings will be
chosen. The string 'Win32' will match either of the Win32 sources, and
'TESHA2' will match both the strong and weak versions.
Never => [list of strings]
Takes an array reference containing one or more string source names.
No source whose name matches one of these strings will be chosen. The
string 'Win32' will match either of the Win32 sources, and 'TESHA2'
will match both the strong and weak versions.
Source => sub { ... }
Uses the given anonymous subroutine as the generator. The subroutine
will be given an integer (the argument to "random_bytes") and should
return random data in a string of the given length. For the purposes
of the other object methods, the returned object will have the name
'User', and be considered non-blocking and non-strong.
Source => ['name', sub { ... }, is_blocking, is_strong]
Similar to the simpler source routine, but also allows the other source
parameters to be defined. The name may not be one of the standard
names listed in the "name" section.
random_bytes($n)
Takes an integer and returns a string of that size filled with random
data. Returns an empty string if the argument is not defined or is not
more than zero.
random_values($n)
Takes an integer and returns an array of that many random 32-bit
values. Returns an empty array if the argument is not defined or is
not more than zero.
name
Returns the text name of the random source. This will be one of:
"User" for user defined, "CryptGenRandom" for Windows 2000 Crypto API,
"RtlGenRand" for Windows XP and newer Crypto API, "EGD" for a known
socket speaking the EGD protocol, "/dev/random" for the UNIX-like
strong randomness source, "/dev/urandom" for the UNIX-like non-blocking
randomness source, "TESHA2-strong" for the userspace entropy method
when considered strong, "TESHA2-weak" for the userspace entropy method
when considered weak. Other methods may be supported in the future.
User supplied sources may be named anything other than one of the
defined names.
is_strong
Returns 1 or 0 indicating whether the source is considered a strong
source of randomness. See the "STRENGTH" section for more discussion
of what this means, and the source table for what we think of each
source.
is_blocking
Returns 1 or 0 indicating whether the source can block on read. Be
aware that even if a source doesn't block, it may be extremely slow.
AUTHORS
Dana Jacobsen <dana@acm.org>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
To the best of my knowledge, Max Kanat-Alexander was the original
author of the Perl code that uses the Win32 API. I used his code as a
reference.
David Oswald gave me a lot of help with API discussions and code
reviews.
SEE ALSO
The first question one may ask is "Why yet another module of this
type?" None of the modules on CPAN quite fit my needs, hence this.
Some alternatives:
Crypt::Random::Source
A comprehensive system using multiple plugins. It has a nice API, but
uses Any::Moose which means you're loading up Moose or Mouse just to
read a few bytes from /dev/random. It also has a very long dependency
chain, with on the order of 40 modules being installed as prerequisites
(depending of course on whether you use any of them on other projects).
Lastly, it requires at least Perl 5.8, which may or may not matter to
you. But it matters to some other module builders who end up with the
restriction in their modules.
Crypt::URandom
A great little module that is almost what I was looking for.
Crypt::Random::Seed will act the same if given the constructor:
my $source = Crypt::Random::Seed->new(
NonBlocking => 1,
Only => [qw(/dev/random /dev/urandom Win32)]
);
croak "No randomness source available" unless defined $source;
Or you can leave out the "Only" and have TESHA2 as a backup.
Crypt::Random
Requires Math::Pari which makes it unacceptable in some environments.
Has more features (numbers in arbitrary bigint intervals or bit sizes).
Crypt::Random::Seed is taking a simpler approach, just handling
returning octets and letting upstream modules handle the rest.
Data::Entropy
An interesting module that contains a source encapsulation (defaults to
system rand, but has many plugins), a good CSPRNG (AES in counter
mode), and the Data::Entropy::Algorithms module with many ways to get
bits, ints, bigints, floats, bigfloats, shuffles, and so forth. From
my perspective, the algorithms module is the highlight, with a lot of
interesting code.
Upstream modules
Some modules that could use this module to help them:
Bytes::Random::Secure, Math::Random::ISAAC, Math::Random::Secure, and
Math::Random::MT to name a few.
COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2013 by Dana Jacobsen <dana@acm.org>
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
under the same terms as Perl itself.
The software is provided "AS IS", without warranty of any kind, express
or implied, including but not limited to the warranties of
merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose and noninfringement.
In no event shall the authors or copyright holders be liable for any
claim, damages or other liability, whether in an action of contract,
tort or otherwise, arising from, out of or in connection with the
software or the use or other dealings in the software.
perl v5.14.2 2013-02-16 Crypt::Random::Seed(3pm)