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GSS_INIT_SEC_CONTEXT(3)	      Programmer's Manual      GSS_INIT_SEC_CONTEXT(3)

NAME
     gss_init_sec_context — Initiate a security context with a peer applica‐
     tion

SYNOPSIS
     #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>

     OM_uint32
     gss_init_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
	 const gss_cred_id_t initiator_cred_handle,
	 gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle, const gss_name_t target_name,
	 const gss_OID mech_type, OM_uint32 req_flags, OM_uint32 time_req,
	 const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
	 const gss_buffer_t input_token, gss_OID *actual_mech_type,
	 gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
	 OM_uint32 *time_rec);

DESCRIPTION
     Initiates the establishment of a security context between the application
     and a remote peer.	 Initially, the input_token parameter should be speci‐
     fied either as GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, or as a pointer to a gss_buffer_desc
     object whose length field contains the value zero.	 The routine may
     return a output_token which should be transferred to the peer applica‐
     tion, where the peer application will present it to
     gss_accept_sec_context(3). If no token need be sent,
     gss_init_sec_context() will indicate this by setting the length field of
     the output_token argument to zero. To complete the context establishment,
     one or more reply tokens may be required from the peer application; if
     so, gss_init_sec_context() will return a status containing the supplemen‐
     tary information bit GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED. In this case,
     gss_init_sec_context() should be called again when the reply token is
     received from the peer application, passing the reply token to
     gss_init_sec_context() via the input_token parameters.

     Portable applications should be constructed to use the token length and
     return status to determine whether a token needs to be sent or waited
     for.  Thus a typical portable caller should always invoke
     gss_init_sec_context() within a loop:

     int context_established = 0;
     gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
	    ...
     input_token->length = 0;

     while (!context_established) {
       maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat,
				       cred_hdl,
				       &context_hdl,
				       target_name,
				       desired_mech,
				       desired_services,
				       desired_time,
				       input_bindings,
				       input_token,
				       &actual_mech,
				       output_token,
				       &actual_services,
				       &actual_time);
       if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
	 report_error(maj_stat, min_stat);
       };

       if (output_token->length != 0) {
	 send_token_to_peer(output_token);
	 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, output_token)
       };
       if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {

	 if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
	   gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat,
				  &context_hdl,
				  GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
	 break;
       };

       if (maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
	 receive_token_from_peer(input_token);
       } else {
	 context_established = 1;
       };
     };

     Whenever the routine returns a major status that includes the value
     GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the context is not fully established and the fol‐
     lowing restrictions apply to the output parameters:

     ·	 The value returned via the time_rec parameter is undefined Unless the
	 accompanying ret_flags parameter contains the bit
	 GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG, indicating that per-message services may be
	 applied in advance of a successful completion status, the value
	 returned via the actual_mech_type parameter is undefined until the
	 routine returns a major status value of GSS_S_COMPLETE.

     ·	 The values of the GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG, GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG,
	 GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG, GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG, GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and
	 GSS_C_ANON_FLAG bits returned via the ret_flags parameter should con‐
	 tain the values that the implementation expects would be valid if
	 context establishment were to succeed.	 In particular, if the appli‐
	 cation has requested a service such as delegation or anonymous
	 authentication via the req_flags argument, and such a service is
	 unavailable from the underlying mechanism, gss_init_sec_context()
	 should generate a token that will not provide the service, and indi‐
	 cate via the ret_flags argument that the service will not be sup‐
	 ported.  The application may choose to abort the context establish‐
	 ment by calling gss_delete_sec_context(3) (if it cannot continue in
	 the absence of the service), or it may choose to transmit the token
	 and continue context establishment (if the service was merely desired
	 but not mandatory).

     ·	 The values of the GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG and GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG bits
	 within ret_flags should indicate the actual state at the time
	 gss_init_sec_context() returns, whether or not the context is fully
	 established.

     ·	 GSS-API implementations that support per-message protection are
	 encouraged to set the GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG in the final ret_flags
	 returned to a caller (i.e. when accompanied by a GSS_S_COMPLETE sta‐
	 tus code).  However, applications should not rely on this behavior as
	 the flag was not defined in Version 1 of the GSS-API.	Instead,
	 applications should determine what per-message services are available
	 after a successful context establishment according to the
	 GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and GSS_C_CONF_FLAG values.

     ·	 All other bits within the ret_flags argument should be set to zero.

     If the initial call of gss_init_sec_context() fails, the implementation
     should not create a context object, and should leave the value of the
     context_handle parameter set to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT to indicate this.	 In
     the event of a failure on a subsequent call, the implementation is per‐
     mitted to delete the "half-built" security context (in which case it
     should set the context_handle parameter to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT ), but the
     preferred behavior is to leave the security context untouched for the
     application to delete (using gss_delete_sec_context(3) ).

     During context establishment, the informational status bits
     GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN and GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicate fatal errors, and GSS-
     API mechanisms should always return them in association with a routine
     error of GSS_S_FAILURE.  This requirement for pairing did not exist in
     version 1 of the GSS-API specification, so applications that wish to run
     over version 1 implementations must special-case these codes.

PARAMETERS
     minor_status  Mechanism specific status code.

     initiator_cred_handle
		   handle for credentials claimed. Supply GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL
		   to act as a default initiator principal.  If no default
		   initiator is defined, the function will return
		   GSS_S_NO_CRED.

     context_handle
		   context handle for new context.  Supply GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT
		   for first call; use value returned by first call in contin‐
		   uation calls.  Resources associated with this context-han‐
		   dle must be released by the application after use with a
		   call to gss_delete_sec_context().

     target_name   Name of target

     mech_type	   Object ID of desired mechanism. Supply GSS_C_NO_OID to
		   obtain an implementation specific default

     req_flags	   Contains various independent flags, each of which requests
		   that the context support a specific service option.	Sym‐
		   bolic names are provided for each flag, and the symbolic
		   names corresponding to the required flags should be logi‐
		   cally-ORed together to form the bit-mask value.  The flags
		   are:

		   GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG

		       True   Delegate credentials to remote peer

		       False  Don't delegate

		   GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG

		       True   Request that remote peer authenticate itself

		       False  Authenticate self to remote peer only

		   GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG

		       True   Enable replay detection for messages protected
			      with gss_wrap(3) or gss_get_mic(3)

		       False  Don't attempt to detect replayed messages

		   GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG

		       True   Enable detection of out-of-sequence protected
			      messages

		       False  Don't attempt to detect out-of-sequence messages

		   GSS_C_CONF_FLAG

		       True   Request that confidentiality service be made
			      available (via gss_wrap(3))

		       False  No per-message confidentiality service is
			      required.

		   GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG

		       True   Request that integrity service be made available
			      (via gss_wrap(3) or gss_get_mic(3))

		       False  No per-message integrity service is required.

		   GSS_C_ANON_FLAG

		       True   Do not reveal the initiator's identity to the
			      acceptor.

		       False  Authenticate normally.

     time_req	   Desired number of seconds for which context should remain
		   valid.  Supply 0 to request a default validity period.

     input_chan_bindings
		   Application-specified bindings.  Allows application to
		   securely bind channel identification information to the
		   security context.  Specify GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS if
		   channel bindings are not used.

     input_token   Token received from peer application.  Supply
		   GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, or a pointer to a buffer containing the
		   value GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER on initial call.

     actual_mech_type
		   Actual mechanism used.  The OID returned via this parameter
		   will be a pointer to static storage that should be treated
		   as read-only; In particular the application should not
		   attempt to free it.	Specify NULL if not required.

     output_token  token to be sent to peer application.  If the length field
		   of the returned buffer is zero, no token need be sent to
		   the peer application.  Storage associated with this buffer
		   must be freed by the application after use with a call to
		   gss_release_buffer(3).

     ret_flags	   Contains various independent flags, each of which indicates
		   that the context supports a specific service option.	 Spec‐
		   ify NULL if not required.  Symbolic names are provided for
		   each flag, and the symbolic names corresponding to the
		   required flags should be logically-ANDed with the ret_flags
		   value to test whether a given option is supported by the
		   context.  The flags are:

		   GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG

		       True   Credentials were delegated to the remote peer

		       False  No credentials were delegated

		   GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG

		       True   The remote peer has authenticated itself.

		       False  Remote peer has not authenticated itself.

		   GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG

		       True   Replay of protected messages will be detected

		       False  Replayed messages will not be detected

		   GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG

		       True   Out-of-sequence protected messages will be
			      detected

		       False  Out-of-sequence messages will not be detected

		   GSS_C_CONF_FLAG

		       True   Confidentiality service may be invoked by call‐
			      ing gss_wrap(3) routine

		       False  No confidentiality service (via gss_wrap(3))
			      available. gss_wrap(3) will provide message
			      encapsulation, data-origin authentication and
			      integrity services only.

		   GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG

		       True   Integrity service may be invoked by calling
			      either gss_get_mic(3) or gss_wrap(3) routines.

		       False  Per-message integrity service unavailable.

		   GSS_C_ANON_FLAG

		       True   The initiator's identity has not been revealed,
			      and will not be revealed if any emitted token is
			      passed to the acceptor.

		       False  The initiator's identity has been or will be
			      authenticated normally.

		   GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG

		       True   Protection services (as specified by the states
			      of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are
			      available for use if the accompanying major sta‐
			      tus return value is either GSS_S_COMPLETE or
			      GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED.

		       False  Protection services (as specified by the states
			      of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are
			      available only if the accompanying major status
			      return value is GSS_S_COMPLETE.

		   GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG

		       True   The resultant security context may be trans‐
			      ferred to other processes via a call to
			      gss_export_sec_context().

		       False  The security context is not transferable.

		   All other bits should be set to zero.

     time_rec	   Number of seconds for which the context will remain valid.
		   If the implementation does not support context expiration,
		   the value GSS_C_INDEFINITE will be returned. Specify NULL
		   if not required.

RETURN VALUES
     GSS_S_COMPLETE
		   Successful completion

     GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED
		   Indicates that a token from the peer application is
		   required to complete the context, and that
		   gss_init_sec_context must be called again with that token.

     GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN
		   Indicates that consistency checks performed on the
		   input_token failed

     GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL
		   Indicates that consistency checks performed on the creden‐
		   tial failed.

     GSS_S_NO_CRED
		   The supplied credentials were not valid for context initia‐
		   tion, or the credential handle did not reference any cre‐
		   dentials.

     GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED
		   The referenced credentials have expired

     GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS
		   The input_token contains different channel bindings to
		   those specified via the input_chan_bindings parameter

     GSS_S_BAD_SIG
		   The input_token contains an invalid MIC, or a MIC that
		   could not be verified

     GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN
		   The input_token was too old.	 This is a fatal error during
		   context establishment

     GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN
		   The input_token is valid, but is a duplicate of a token
		   already processed.  This is a fatal error during context
		   establishment.

     GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT
		   Indicates that the supplied context handle did not refer to
		   a valid context

     GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE
		   The provided target_name parameter contained an invalid or
		   unsupported type of name

     GSS_S_BAD_NAME
		   The provided target_name parameter was ill-formed.

     GSS_S_BAD_MECH
		   The specified mechanism is not supported by the provided
		   credential, or is unrecognized by the implementation.

SEE ALSO
     gss_accept_sec_context(3), gss_delete_sec_context(3), gss_get_mic(3),
     gss_release_buffer(3), gss_wrap(3)

STANDARDS
     RFC 2743	   Generic Security Service Application Program Interface Ver‐
		   sion 2, Update 1

     RFC 2744	   Generic Security Service API Version 2 : C-bindings

HISTORY
     The gss_init_sec_context function first appeared in FreeBSD 7.0.

AUTHORS
     John Wray, Iris Associates

COPYRIGHT
     Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).	 All Rights Reserved.

     This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to oth‐
     ers, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or
     assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and dis‐
     tributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided
     that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all
     such copies and derivative works.	However, this document itself may not
     be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or ref‐
     erences to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except
     as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case
     the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process
     must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other
     than English.

     The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
     revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

     This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS
     IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK
     FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
     LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT
     INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FIT‐
     NESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

BSD			       January 26, 2010				   BSD
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